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In January 2005, President Bush announced the Vision for Space Exploration.  
This vision involved a progressive expansion of human capabilities beyond Low Earth 
Orbit beginning with a return to the moon starting no later than 2020. Current design 
processes utilized to meet this vision employ performance based trade studies to 
determine the lowest cost, highest reliability solution.  In these design processes, 
designers trade independent performance variables and then calculate the design 
discriminators, reliability and costs, of the different architectures.  The methodology 
implemented in this dissertation focuses on a concurrent evaluation of the performance, 
cost, and reliabilities of lunar architectures.  This process directly addresses the top level 
requirements early in the design process and allows the decision maker to evaluate the 
highest reliability, lowest cost lunar architectures without being distracted by the 
performance details of the architecture. 
There is a significant amount of research in the operations management 
community about the need for the decision maker to be provided with not only the 
optimal solution for a set of requirements, but also the set of near-optimal solutions for 
changing top-level requirements.  The methodology presented in this thesis increases the 
transparency of the process by providing the decision maker with the entire set of 
solutions in the form of a Pareto frontier.  This frontier allows the decision maker to 
choose the highest reliability solution which meets the budgetary constraints of project 
 xviii
requirements. This selection from a series of solutions allows the decision maker to be 
invested in the solution to the architecture while avoiding non-optimal configurations.  
To achieve this methodology of bringing optimal cost and reliability solutions to 
the decision maker, parametric performance, cost, and reliability models are created to 
model each vehicle element.  These models were combined using multidisciplinary 
optimization techniques and response surface equations to create parametric vehicle 
models which quickly evaluate the performance, reliability, and cost of the vehicles.  
These parametric models, known as ROSETTA models, combined with a life cycle cost 
calculator provide the tools necessary to create a lunar architecture simulation.   The 
integration of the tools into an integrated framework that can quickly and accurately 
evaluate the lunar architectures is presented.  This lunar architecture selection tool is 
verified and validated against the Apollo and ESAS lunar architectures.  The results of 
this lunar architecture selection tool are then combined into a Pareto frontier to guide the 
decision maker to producing the highest reliability architecture for a given life cycle cost.   
The advantages of this method over traditional design processes are numerous.  
With this presented methodology, the decision maker can transparently choose a lunar 
architecture solution based upon the high level design discriminators. This method can 
achieve significant reductions in life cycle costs (over 40%) keeping the same 
architecture reliability as a traditional design process point solution.  This methodology 
also allows the decision maker to choose a solution which achieves a significant 
reduction in failure rate (over 50%) while maintaining the same life cycle costs as the 





The purpose of this dissertation is to improve on the design practices currently 
employed by the aerospace community.  Currently top level design discriminators, such 
as cost and reliability, are calculated after the vehicle configurations are set.  These 
discriminators are then used to select the winning design among the different candidate 
designs.  This research proposes a methodology to pull these important design 
discriminators to the front of the design process by combining physics-based parametric 
models with multidisciplinary optimization techniques and Pareto frontiers to visualize 
the ideal reliability and cost architecture solutions.  Once this ability is verified with 
historical lunar architectures, the process will be applied to a current lunar architecture 
selection problem. 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
Man has always been captivated by the notion of exploration.  Whether that 
exploration is being driven by national competition, economic considerations, or 
scientific motivation the end result has been the expansion of human knowledge.  Great 
explorers have opened the door for future generations to follow in their footsteps.  
Christopher Columbus was one of the first such explorers.  His journey to the Americas 
in the fifteenth century opened the door for future exploration, settlement, and 
technological advancement of the western hemisphere.  This spirit of exploration 
CHAPTER 1   
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continued throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the expansion of 
European colonialism in Africa and Asia.  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
exploration was not only conducted for the gain of national prestige but also for scientific 
advancement.  Darwin’s theories of evolution and natural selection were conducted on 
the H.M.S. Beagle during the 1830s and later in the 1870s when the H.M.S. Challenger 
conducted the first global marine research expedition [1].  With the exploration of the 
North and South Poles in the early twentieth century, the age of terrestrial exploration of 
unknown lands ended, though the people’s captivation with exploration had not 
diminished.   
In October 1957, the Soviet Union officially opened a new region of exploration 
with the launch of Sputnik I.  Sputnik I was the world’s first artificial satellite.  Sputnik I, 
much like the mission of Columbus five hundred years before, was the opening event in a 
new age of exploration.  Columbus’s mission started the European exploration of the 
western hemisphere; Sputnik marked the start of the space age and the U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
space race [2].  This race inspired the most ambitious undertaking in human history: 
landing on the lunar surface. 
1.1.1 THE APOLLO PROGRAM 
The Apollo missions and subsequent lunar landings were all inspired by the same 
motivation as Columbus and Magellan: international competition and national prestige.  
It was national prestige not scientific motivation that caused then President John F. 
Kennedy to proclaim, “Our nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this 
decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the Earth [3].”   
This presidential direction and subsequent funding from Congress formed a “crash” 
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research program to send man to the moon.  This “crash” program allowed NASA to 
concern itself primarily with returning to the moon by the end of the decade.  The top 
level system metrics for this program was performance (send a man to the moon), 
schedule (by the end of the decade), and safety.  The finances associated with achieving 
this goal was an afterthought. 
When President Kennedy announced that the United States would be pursuing a 
lunar program there were hundreds of different lunar architectures to choose from.  In 
fact, lunar exploration architectures have been considered for decades.  In 1865 Jules 
Verne wrote a story in which explorers traveled to the moon via a giant cannon.  From 
the Earth to the Moon is one of the earliest ventures of science fiction, and although 
infeasible, it was one of the first writings on the subject of lunar exploration.  In 1961, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was tasked with finding a 
feasible architecture that would accomplish a safe lunar landing before the decade was 
over. 
The lunar architectures proposed by NASA were quickly reduced to four different 
modes: the Earth Orbit Rendezvous (EOR), the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR) and C-5 
direct, and the Nova direct [4].  These modes were then compared and contrasted with the 
existing hardware programs in an attempt to produce the most feasible lunar architecture 
to safely put a man on the moon before the end of the decade.  This was a very manual 
process with each component of each mode being designed separately and then iterated 
until a closed solution was achieved.  The different lunar modes were calculated with 
different top level design criteria (payload capability, number of men to the lunar surface, 
etc.).  This resulted in a process which never really compared the modes on an equal basis 
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and resulted in over a million man years committed before an architecture was selected 
[5].  Each mode was championed by a different group at NASA, and the competition was 
both for the design as well as political ambitions of the lobbying group [6].  After a 
significant amount of debate the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous was adopted as the mode of 
choice to explore the moon.  Famed rocket designer, Werner Von Braun, attributed the 
selection of LOR to three factors [7]: 
 
1. LOR appeared most likely to be accomplished within the decade 
2. LOR offered adequate performance margins 
3. Designs of a reentry vehicle and a lunar landing vehicle constituted the 
two most critical tasks in producing a lunar spacecraft and separating these 
two functions into two separate elements was bound to greatly simplify 
the development of the spacecraft system. 
 
Figure 1 shows the resulting Apollo architecture in the launch configuration.  The 
architecture consists of the Saturn V three stage launch vehicle, a three man Command 




Figure 1: Apollo Architecture Components [8]. 
 
Once the architecture was selected, the detailed design analysis was conducted 
and the architecture tested on a series of flight tests.  The space race culminated on July 
20, 1969 with the first lunar landing of Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin on Apollo 11.  
This event signified that the race to the moon was complete, and as with any race the 
winner was determined.  Although NASA and the United States had won the race to the 
moon, they had lost the motivation that had sustained their effort.  Much like the 
European exploration of the nineteenth century, when the race to discover new territory 
came to a close, the justification for continued exploration became focused on scientific 
research.  The next six Apollo missions, consisting of five lunar landings, were based on 
this motivation of scientific research and the desire to gain a better understanding of the 
origin of Earth.  Unfortunately this goal was not nearly as captivating as that of 
international competition, and the cost, $2.5 Billion FY72, was prohibitive given the 
ongoing Vietnam War [1]. The political and social environment of the 1970s deemed the 
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Apollo program unsustainable and it was therefore was terminated with the last lunar 
mission of Apollo 17 in 1972.   
The resulting Apollo program cost over $25.4 billion, with only the building of 
the Panama Canal rivaling the Apollo program's size as the largest non-military 
technological endeavor ever undertaken by the United States [9].  James E. Webb, the 
NASA Administrator at the height of the program between 1961 and 1968, always 
contended that Apollo was a management exercise more than anything else and that the 
technological challenge, while sophisticated and impressive, was largely within reach at 
the time of the 1961 decision [9].  This huge undertaking revolutionized systems 
engineering and design practices in the 1960’s.  No longer could vehicle designers work 
independently of the systems within which their designs were required to work.  
Unfortunately, sustainability was never a major contributor in the design process; and, 
although successful, the lunar program never continued beyond Apollo. 
1.1.2 THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM 
Once the Apollo program was terminated, NASA, with the interest of the country 
in mind, looked for the next captivating space initiative.  The United States dabbled in 
space projects such as the Skylab missions and the Apollo-Soyuz test projects, but did not 
delve into another major space program. Many believed that the next logical step was to 
proceed past the Moon to Mars.  Such exploration would pose a very interesting problem 
for designers.  To launch a spacecraft large enough to travel to Mars would require either 
the launch of an enormous rocket into space or a space station equipped to assemble the 
spacecraft in space.  As Apollo was placing the first man on the moon, NASA pushed on 
to develop nuclear propulsion to power the spacecraft, a space station to provide a place 
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to stage the rocket, and a space shuttle to provide inexpensive and reliable access to the 
space station.   
As Apollo was landing and NASA was undergoing huge successes, the budget of 
the Mars program was cut.    NASA administrator, Thomas Paine, decided that the Mars 
program would have to be put on the shelf, but a joint space station-shuttle plan remained 
feasible.  Further budget cuts during the aerospace recession of the early 1970’s caused 
the office of Management and Budget (OMB) to cut NASA funds to the point where even 
the shuttle-station concept was too expensive to pursue.  Through some NASA 
perseverance and the support of the Air Force (who favored the shuttle as an inexpensive 
reconnaissance satellite launch vehicle) the shuttle pushed on to the design stages [10]. 
 The design of the Space Transportation System (STS) concept was a completely 
different challenge than the design of the Apollo architecture.  NASA was now operating 
within a strict budget to which the design philosophies of the agency would have to 
adapt.  Unfortunately, the precedent of designing to meet performance goals had already 
been set.  NASA designed the Space Shuttle with much the same methodology as Apollo.  
Each contactor would be left to design its own solution to the space access problem, and 
NASA would then iterate with the designs to produce a less than optimal solution. 
The first design concepts for the Space Shuttle were quite varied.  They ranged 
from the Martin Marietta Titan II-M design, which featured a Titan III rocket with a 
small orbiter on the top of the vehicle, to the Lockheed Star Clipper, which was a lifting 




Figure 2: Lockheed Star Clipper and Martin Marietta Titan II-M [10]. 
 
Both of these 1967 designs used expendable tanks (as will the shuttle), but at the time a 
two-stage fully reusable shuttle was favored.  It was believed that a totally reusable 
configuration would, in the end, provide an economic benefit despite the high 
development costs. In theory, the high launch rate and low cost per flight would 
overcome the initial design costs. 
The debate of what the shuttle should look like continued for several years.  Many 
different launch systems were proposed, all of which were at least partially reusable and 
most had a cylindrical payload bay of at least 16 by 60 feet to accommodate the needs of 
NASA’s lone advocate: the Air Force.  The economic turndown of the seventies 
dramatically changed NASA’s outlook for the Space Shuttle.  NASA was forced to 
justify the benefit of a reusable spacecraft over the existing expendable rockets.  The 
imposed cost ceiling influenced many of the shuttle’s design characteristics.  First, it was 
decided that an aluminum frame would be used in place of a titanium structure.  The 
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titanium would be lighter and require less thermal protection, but the high cost of the 
metal and the lack of experience building airframes out of titanium forced the aluminum 
structure on the shuttle designers. 
The next cost cutting approach was to return to the early designs of the late sixties 
and put the fuel in an expendable tank separate from the orbiter.  This was advantageous 
due to the low density of liquid hydrogen.  Although light, the hydrogen required a great 
deal of structure, resulting in a heavy airframe.   By placing the hydrogen externally, the 
airframe would be reduced, resulting in a lighter orbiter.   
A third cost cutback was achieved in the selection of a Thrust Assisted Orbiter 
Shuttle (TAOS). A severe disadvantage to this method of unmanned rocket boosters is 
that rockets would have to be retrieved manually after falling to earth much like the 
expendable space capsules of the Apollo missions.  The major advantages came in 
development costs, which were significantly lower for these unmanned boosters.  Other 
alternatives were considered in the TAOS discussion as well.   The designers needed to 
decide whether to use a high-pressure feed liquid system or a solid booster.  The solid 
booster was chosen in the end due to its low development costs, lighter structure, and the 
fact the shell would fill with air on decent and float for easy recovery. 
A final cost cutting measure was initiated by the OMB to decrease the overall size 
of the shuttle to a 30,000 lb payload with a 10 by 30 foot bay.  This would be much less 
expensive to develop and the shuttle could still carry over 80% of the intended cargo.  
NASA resisted the idea, as did the Air Force, which was interested in the large payload 
bay to launch its own satellites.  A cost summary was done for the five competing options 
for the orbiter.  It seemed that due to the high costs of the subsequent options, the first 
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option was going to be selected, but NASA and the Air Force argued that the fourth was 
necessary (Table 1).  In early 1972, George Shultz of the OMB formally approved the 
larger NASA sponsored design somewhat spontaneously and sent the issue to President 
Nixon for approval.   
 
Table 1: Shuttle Design Configurations [10].  
CASE  1 2 2A 3 4 
Payload bay (ft.)  10 x 30 12 x 40 14 x 45 14 x 50 15 x 60 
Payload weight (lbs)  30,000 30,000 45,000 65,000 65,000 
Development Cost ($billions)  4.7 4.9 5 5.2 5.5 
Operating Cost ($millions/flight)  6.6 7 7.5 7.6 7.7 
Payload costs ($/pound)  220 223 167 115 118 
 
  
This table enumerates the design problems faced during the shuttle design process.  As 
the requirements changed, the design process had to be manually rerun with performance 
variables as the main variables in the design process.  Cost was only evaluated as an 
afterthought and then used as a discriminator between the designs.  This flawed design 
process resulted in a vehicle which has never reached its cost or reliability goals.  As a 
result the Space Shuttle cost over $33 billion dollars FY05 to become operational with an 
average cost of $1.3 Billion FY05 per flight [11]. 
1.1.3 EXPLORATION SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE STUDY 
With the recent Columbia accident the future of the Space Shuttle has been put 
into question.  In January 2004, President George W. Bush announced a new direction for 
NASA.  In his address to the public, the president announced a new Vision for Space 
Exploration in which NASA would return humans to the Moon by 2020.  This new 
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direction for NASA is similar to the redirection NASA faced at the beginnings of both 
the Apollo and Space Shuttle eras.  NASA is now facing the task of designing a set of 
vehicles to return man to the moon and also to continue to service the international space 
station.  Dr. Michael Griffin was named the NASA administrator in April 2005 and 
further refined the design tasks.  Dr. Griffin set out to accelerate the new vehicle design, 
called the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), to be completed on the eve of the Space 
Shuttle retirement in 2010.  With a new administrator and a new space vision, NASA set 
out to design a new set of vehicles to return to the moon. 
During the summer of 2005 the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) 
team was assembled at NASA headquarters to conduct the design process to create the 
new lunar architecture to accomplish the Vision for Space Exploration.  The team was 
assembled from 20 core team members from various NASA field centers with over 400 
additional staff members assisting the design of the architecture.  The ESAS team was 
constituted to work towards the completion of the following four tasks [12]: 
1. Complete assessment of the top-level Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) 
requirements and plans to enable the CEV to provide crew transport to the 
ISS; and, to accelerate the development of the CEV and crew-launch 
system to reduce the gap between the shuttle retirement and CEV Initial 
Operating Capability (IOC), 
2. Define top-level requirements and configurations for crew and cargo 
launch systems to support the lunar and Mars exploration programs 
3. Develop a reference lunar exploration architecture concept to support 
sustained human and robotic lunar exploration operations and,  
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4. Identify key technologies required to enable and significantly enhance 
these reference exploration systems and a reprioritization of near-term and 
far-term technology investments. 
The ESAS team went about defining the architecture using the traditional design process 
of determining performance characteristics and then defining costs for each of the 
contending architecture elements.  The best vehicle elements were then chosen based 




Figure 3: Final ESAS Architecture [12]. 
 
The final architecture selection involves shuttle derived launch vehicle elements with a 
new blunt body capsule CEV.  Each element in the ESAS architecture was independently 
designed and then the reliability and cost were calculated after the design was set.   The 
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reliability and cost were then used as discriminators in the design process to choose the 
final architecture.  These discriminators are noted in the ESAS final report; 
 
“The (Crew Launch Vehicle, (CLV)) configuration was selected due to its lower 
cost, higher safety/reliability, its ability to utilize existing human-rated systems 
and infrastructure and the fact that it gave the most straight forward path to a 
CaLV [13]” 
 
In fact, the ESAS report claims nine advantages/features of the selected architecture.  All 
nine of the advantages have to do with cost, affordability, or reliability/safety.  These 
claims prove that reliability and cost seem to be the major discriminators used by the 
ESAS team to select the preferred system.  Unfortunately, this methodology of 
comparing the costs and reliabilities of elements after the design process is both 
inefficient and slow and does not produce an optimal design.  A further problem occurs 
when the requirements of the project change.  In the months preceding this paper, 
changing cost caps and performance constraints have caused a massive redesign of the 
ESAS architecture.  This has resulted in delays in the selection of the architectures since 
the design process must be repeated with the new performance criteria and constraints.  
To date, the NASA Constellation Program and the sponsoring Exploration Systems 
Mission Directorate (ESMD) continues to study lunar exploration architectures.  
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Complex space vehicle designs like that of the STS and Apollo missions require 
hundreds of thousands of hours of conceptual design work to obtain the best 
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configuration.  The criteria used to determine the best configuration have historically 
been linked to performance variables such as speed and range for aircraft, or payload 
capacity for a launch vehicle.  During the 1980s and 1990s there was a paradigm shift in 
the criteria used to select vehicles.  Aircraft and spacecraft were no longer selected based 
upon the typical performance discriminators, but now cost and reliability were of 
increased importance to the customer.  As the NASA budget began to shrink in the post-
Apollo era the use of cost as a discriminator has become a priority. 
 
 
Figure 4:  NASA budget as a percentage of the Federal Budget [14]. 
 
  This cost consciousness directly affected the design of the STS and evidenced 
continued impact throughout the life of the shuttle.  In fact, the Columbia Accident 
Review Board attributes some of the STS programs to the diminishing budget; 
 
“The White House, Congress, and NASA leadership exerted constant pressure to 
reduce or at least freeze operating costs.  As a result, there was little margin in the 
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budget to deal with the unexpected technical problems or make Shuttle 
improvements.[14]” 
 
NASA’s focus shifted significantly after the Columbia disaster of 2003.  Since 
then, NASA has instituted a safety-first policy promoting reliability and safety to the 
forefront of vehicle design.  This focus has continued through the ESAS design process.  
As the ESAS final report noted; 
 
“This approach (ESAS) resulted in an architecture that met vehicle and mission 
requirements for cost and performance, while ensuring that the risks to the 
mission and crew were acceptable [13].” 
 
This quote demonstrates the importance of analyzing reliability while addressing 
cost and performance.  As the top level programmatic requirements change, there is no 
currently used process to automatically change the architecture element’s designs and 
resulting reliability. 
1.2.1 ORDER OF CURRENT DESIGN PROCESS 
Current design processes rely on the use of legacy tools to evaluate the 
performance parameters of a design.  Cost and reliability of the closed vehicle design are 
then calculated.  The reliability and costs are used as the major discriminators between 
different vehicle solutions for architecture elements.  A primary flaw with this process 
lies in the complexity of the space vehicle problem, which requires designers to restrict 
the design before complete information about the requirements is obtained.  A second 
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concern is the solutions to the design process tend to produce optimal cost or reliability 
configurations indirectly by comparing the results of the investigated vehicles. This 




Figure 5: Design Structure Matrix for Typical Launch Vehicle Design 
 
As Figure 5 indicates, the design process for a vehicle is completed in two stages.  The 
first iteration loop is highlighted in green.  This loop closes the performance of the 
vehicle and includes all of the engineering analysis necessary to design a launch vehicle.  
Once the performance is closed, the typical design discriminators such as cost and 
reliability are calculated.  Unfortunately, this method is cumbersome and requires the 
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design process to be completed for each vehicle before the major design discriminators 
can be calculated and compared. 
 A solution to this problem of treating cost and reliability as an afterthought is to 
present the decision maker with the ideal solutions for varying design budgets.  This will 
be accomplished by creating a Pareto frontier of the reliability and cost design space so 
that the decision maker can seamlessly see the effect of changing budgets on the 
reliability of the system.  This method will further allow the decision maker to see the top 
level criteria (reliability and cost) without becoming bogged down in the design decisions 
for the different vehicles in the architecture.    
1.2.2 CHANGING TOP LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 
A further problem occurs when the requirements of the project change.  In fact, 
requirement instability is one of the main issues facing designers today [15].  Meeting 
changing requirements is especially difficult within a highly complex system of systems, 
like a lunar architecture.  As requirements change, major redesigns are necessary to meet 
the new and often uncompromising goals of the customer.  This is especially true of the 
budget of the project.  As demonstrated by the STS program in section 1.1, when the 
budget of the shuttle was changed, a complete redesign of the vehicle became necessary.  
The shuttle program went through numerous redesigns based upon the changing budget 
of the shuttle system (Table 1).  Currently, there is no methodology that allows the 
decision makers to switch between architecture elements or vehicle design options as the 
top level requirements change.  The design process must evolve to allow changing 
requirements to quickly filter through the design process, as the instability of 
requirements is likely to continue to be a problem. 
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A solution to the problem of changing requirements is accomplished by creating 
an integrated framework to solve lunar architectures quickly.  With this integrated 
framework a Pareto frontier can be created for the varying requirements to accurately 
compare the different requirement changes to find the highest reliability configuration for 
a given design budget.  
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND GOALS 
The main objective of this research is to create a methodology to treat investment 
as an independent variable in the design process with respect to reliability.  This will 
allow the top level customer requirements such as budget and required reliability to be 
directly addressed by the vehicle designers.  Also, if cost is included as an independent 
variable in a design process, it can be easily traded.   This method will allow the 
maximum reliability of a system to be achieved for a given design budget.  To 
accomplish this objective the reliability of different classes of vehicles must be calculated 
as a function of the life cycle costs.  
 
• Goal 1: Create a methodology to bring design discriminators such as cost and 
reliability to the forefront of the design process. 
 
To accomplish this goal, a survey of existing design techniques was conducted.  These 
design techniques are then evaluated and the pertinent parts of the processes are 
combined to create a new design philosophy.  This philosophy will need to present the 




• Goal 2: Create and validate a tool that can quickly and efficiently evaluate 
lunar architectures to provide accurate reliability and cost information 
to the decision maker. 
 
This goal is necessary to prove that the method defined in Goal 1 is accurate and 
applicable to today’s lunar design problems.  The method will be validated against 
historical lunar architectures (Apollo) as well as current design studies (ESAS).  The 
performance of the architecture tool will be gauged and the accuracy of the answers, 
performance, cost, and reliability, will be compared with results obtained from previous 
design methods. 
 
• Goal 3: Apply the tool to existing lunar architecture modes so that the optimal 
reliability lunar mode can be evaluated for changing life cycle costs. 
 
Once the method and the lunar architecture tool are validated in Goal 2, the lunar 
architecture selection tool will be used to reanalyze the Apollo lunar architecture mode 
decision [7].  The given methodology will be applied to each of the lunar mission modes 
under consideration in the 1960s.  The Pareto frontiers of the optimal solutions for each 
of the mission modes will be compared with the solutions obtained during the actual 
Apollo mission mode selection process.  The optimal Pareto frontier will then be created 
and the optimal solution for any given Apollo budget can be easily obtained.  Once the 
Apollo decision is reanalyzed, the procedure will be applied to the ESAS architecture 
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selected by the ESAS team.  Due to constraints on the project, the mission mode will be 
kept constant; however, the architecture elements will be allowed to change to produce 
the optimal vehicle configurations for the mission mode. 
1.4 DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
This dissertation will cover multiple aspects of the design problem faced by 
today’s decision makers.  The first chapter discussed the history of relevant major NASA 
design projects.  This history provided a motivation for the necessity of a new design 
process and gave an outline of the proposed research objectives.  Chapter 2 is a 
background of the relevant literature pertaining to this research.  This literature review 
includes a summary of current reliability practices and their shortcomings. This summary 
covers the current techniques used in reliability modeling including; Failure Mode 
Effects and Criticality Analysis, Reliability Block Diagrams, Redundancy Modeling, 
Markov Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment.  This review 
of reliability techniques will pave a way to create the dynamic fault tree analysis which 
will be used to create the optimal Pareto Frontiers for the lunar architectures. 
Chapter 2 continues with a review of current costing techniques.  These 
techniques include weight based Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs), as well as the 
NASA Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM).  The shortcomings in these costing methods 
will be addressed and their application to the methodology of this research will be 
demonstrated.  The review of literature will continue with a complete analysis of current 
conceptual vehicle design practices.  This will include topics such as Design Structure 
Matrices, Multidisciplinary Design Optimization, Response Surface Methodology, the 
creation of Reduced Order Simulation for Evaluating Technologies and Transportation 
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Architecture (ROSETTA) models, as well as the Monte Carlo Simulations which are 
used to complete an uncertainty analysis.   
Chapter 3 discusses the approach used to implement the methodology as 
mentioned in the research objectives.  This methodology involves the creation of 
ROSETTA models that can accurately describe the performance, cost, and reliability of 
different architecture elements (vehicles) efficiently and robustly.  These ROSETTA 
models contain Response Surface Equations to model high fidelity physics based 
analyses.  The ROSETTA models also contain a NAFCOM based cost estimating 
relationships, and a dynamically changing fault tree analysis to build up the reliability of 
the element.  These ROSETTA models will automatically calculate the cost, reliability, 
safety, and performance as the configuration of the vehicle changes.  ROSETTA models 
will then be combined in an integrated design framework to accurately and quickly 
evaluate a lunar architecture.  This lunar architecture tool will then be mated with a 
Genetic Algorithm optimizer to produce the optimal reliability points that will define the 
Pareto frontier. 
Once the methodology of this dissertation is set, Chapter 4 outlines the baseline 
results of the architecture tool.  The lunar architecture selection tool is validated against 
the Apollo Lunar Orbit Rendezvous, Earth Orbit Rendezvous, and Direct missions.  Once 
the tool is validated against these historical mission modes, the ESAS final configuration 
will be simulated.  This simulation will then be compared with the published ESAS 
results as well as the previous Apollo mission modes to discover any discrepancies or 
weakness in this design method. 
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Chapter 5 contains the implementation of the lunar architecture selection tool in 
creating the Pareto frontiers for the different mission modes.  This chapter contains the 
optimized Pareto frontiers for the Apollo Direct, EOR, and LOR mission modes.  These 
optimized solutions will then be compared with the solutions obtained during the Apollo 
era.  The ESAS architecture mission mode will also be optimized and the Pareto frontier 
will be compared with the actual baseline results obtained in the ESAS final report. 
Chapter 6 outlines the application of this methodology to the Apollo lunar mission 
mode selection problem.  The Pareto Frontiers created in Chapter 4 will then be 
compared to produce the optimal mission mode for different life cycle costs.  With these 
Pareto Frontiers the mission mode selection made during the Apollo era can be 
reassessed and evaluated with this modern exploration of the design space.  Once the 
ideal Apollo architectures are selected, the ESAS lunar architecture will be evaluated.  As 
of 2007, the ESAS lunar mission mode is already selected as an EOR-LOR mission.  The 
background of this selection is addressed in Chapter 1 and again in Chapter 6.  Because 
this mission mode is already selected, the lunar architecture tool will be implemented to 
find the ideal architecture element configurations to produce the highest reliability 
architecture for any given life cycle cost.  
Chapter 7 will provide a list of conclusions on the performance of the method and 
its implementation in the lunar architecture selection tool.  Chapter 7 will also provide 





This chapter contains the background necessary to evaluate the methodology 
presented in this research. This background and literature review includes a summary of 
current reliability practices and their strengths and shortcomings.  This reliability 
knowledge will be used to construct an efficient dynamic fault tree analysis which is used 
to compile the Loss of Mission reliability and the Loss of Crew safety for each of the 
vehicles under consideration in a lunar architecture.  This review also contains a detailed 
analysis of the current conceptual design process as it was conducted for the models used 
in the NASA Advanced Technology Lifecycle Analysis System (ATLAS) project [16].  
This review will conclude with a brief overview of the multidisciplinary optimization 
process and a description of the Genetic Algorithm optimizer which will be used in this 
methodology. 
2.1 INTEGRATED PRODUCT AND PROCESS DEVELOPMENT 
The goal of any project is to design, produce, and operate a product of the highest 
quality and reliability at the lowest cost.     As Chapter 1 discussed, the focus of this 
research is to provide a tool to designers that will help them optimize the reliability of 
each system by allocating their limited resources appropriately.  The best way to achieve 
this is to integrate the expertise and efforts of management and engineering disciplines 
from the program outset [17].  This is known as Integrated Product and Process 
CHAPTER 2   
BACKGROUND  
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Development (IPPD).  This process involves the use of multidisciplinary Integrated 
Product Teams (IPT). Members of these IPTs work on a project concurrently rather than 
independently.  Using the IPPD approach is important since the majority of design 
decisions affect multiple disciplines, yet are typically made before a true understanding 
of their consequences is known.  This is especially true in the conceptual design phase.  A 
concept for the IPPD process created by the Georgia Institute of Technology is given 
































































Figure 6: Georgia Tech IPPD Process [18]. 
 
As this figure indicates, the process to develop a highly reliable and successful system is 
complex.  This process must first establish the requirements and needs of the system and 
then design the system to meet those needs.  The majority of the research involves 
establishing a methodology to systematically evaluate the shaded iteration loop in Figure 
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6.  This process will accomplish that by evaluating the alternatives to the lunar 
architecture design problem and selecting the most reliable system for a given budget.  
The main problem with establishing the ideal solution for a lunar architecture problem is 
that the majority of the costs are committed early before any true details about the design 
are available.  The proposed method will allow the user to make informed decisions on 
the architecture elements while most of the detailed design parameters are unknown.  
This will allow a paradigm shift in the typical cost, knowledge, and design freedom 
curves shown in Figure 7.  As this figure shows, most of the costs are typically 
committed early in the project where little knowledge about the system is recognized yet 































Figure 7: Paradigm Shift in Complex Vehicle Design [19]. 
 
The goal of the proposed technique is to select the appropriate architectural elements by 
improving the reliability knowledge in the conceptual design phase.  This is 
accomplished by allowing the user to select the most reliable concepts that have adequate 
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performance based upon the available resources.  This technique, combined with the 
proposed uncertainty analysis, will allow the designer to have more knowledge about his 
design choices in the conceptual design phase.  This will result in a more informed 
decision.  The methodology will also allow the user to change his system instantaneously 
based upon a changing budget.  This will, in turn, increase the design freedom of the user.  
The result of this methodology is that the user will have more knowledge and design 
freedom early on in the process, which will therefore reduce the number of resulting 
redesigns. 
2.2 RELIABILITY OVERVIEW 
As was described in the introduction, with the shrinking budget of NASA and the 
decreasing tolerance of failure, there has been an increased importance on improving the 
reliability and cost of aerospace systems.  This focus on reliability is, not only to save 
NASA’s valuable resources, but also to justify NASA’s standing as one of the world’s 
premier space agencies.  Every failure experienced by NASA diminishes the prestige of 
the agency. Whether the failure is as mundane as a delayed launch or as catastrophic as a 
shuttle loss, failures are directly tied into the reliability of the system.  E. Lewis defines 
reliability as the probability that a system will perform its intended function for a 
specified period of time under a given set of conditions [20].  This universal definition 
can be applied to anything from computer chips to spacecraft.  For spacecraft, this is 
typically defined as the probability that a vehicle will successfully complete its mission 
under expected conditions.  In aerospace terms this is generally broken down into two 
categories: loss of vehicle reliability (LOV), and loss of crew reliability (LOC).  These 
values can be equivalent if the vehicle in question does not have a fail safe mode, such as 
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a crew escape system or a programmatic plan, like that of the STS strategy, utilize the 
international space station in case of a tile failure.  For the purposes of this research the 
vehicles in question will be compared based upon a LOM approach.  This mainly impacts 
the launch vehicle selection because that tends to be the only segment where crew abort 
systems are possible. 
There are many other terms used in the reliability research area.  These include 
safety and security.  In reliability terms, safety is defined as the ability of an entity to 
perform under abnormal conditions [21].  This includes failures due to outside factors, 
such the failure which occurred on STS 107.  On that mission foam shedding from the 
external tank caused a failure in the Thermal Protection System (TPS).  This failure in the 
TPS then caused a system failure and the loss of the crew.  Although the foam shedding 
problem in itself was not a LOM event, the combination and interaction of the foam 
shedding along with the downstream location of the delicate TPS system caused the 
failure.  For this example, the safety of the vehicle was diminished due to the proximity 
of TPS to the shedding from the external tank.  For the purposes of this research, complex 
interactions between conceptual vehicle elements may not be completely understood.  
Therefore, estimates will be made about the overall vehicle reliability by accounting for 
the probability of complex interactions, such as those that caused the Columbia failure.  
Taking these facts into account, the reliability that will be used to compare the different 
vehicles will in fact include a qualitative estimate of safety. 
A third term used in reliability analysis is security.  In terms of reliability, security 
is defined as the ability of an entity to perform in the presence of malevolent environment 
[21].  This includes the ability of an aircraft to sustain battle damage and remain in 
 28
service.  For the purposes of this research, security will not be considered in the selection 
process. 
Risk is another term commonly used in aerospace design.  Risk is defined as the 
potential for loss resulting from exposure to a danger.  Risk is considered a measure of 
both safety and security.  NASA defines risk in a set of triplets.  Determining risk 
generally amounts to answering the following questions [22]: 
 
1. What can go wrong? 
2. How likely is it? 
3. What are the consequences? 
 
The answers to these questions help designers understand the risks associated with their 
designs.  The answer to the first question is a set of accident scenarios.  The second and 
third questions evaluate the probabilities of the scenarios as well as their impact on the 
failure.   An implementation of this risk definition is shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8: Implementation of the Triplet Definition of Risk used by NASA [23]. 
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This figure shows the development of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), as defined 
by NASA.  To properly gauge all of the risks associated with a design, the designer must 
first understand all of the failure modes associated with the vehicle.  This is truly a 
daunting task since complex systems such as space vehicles have millions of 
components, all of which need to interact properly to produce a working system.   
For this proposed research, only failures that can cause a loss of vehicle will be 
analyzed.  This is done so that the likelihood of catastrophic event can be characterized 
and used to compare competing vehicles for lunar exploration architecture.  Reliability 
analysis is an important tool in this risk assessment process.  Reliability analyses provide 
the answers to the first two questions in the risk triplet.  The subsequent reliability 
analyses described in this section can be used to identify problem areas in a design and 
determine how likely each designated failure scenario is.  From this analysis a 
comprehensive risk assessment can be formulated to compare competing designs. 
2.3 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS SHORTCOMINGS 
Reliability and safety are generally considered some of the most important design 
parameters in the aerospace field.  The importance has only increased recently with the 
loss of a second Space Shuttle crew in the Columbia disaster.  Unfortunately, reliability is 
one of the hardest design parameters to fully characterize in the conceptual design 
process.  This is mainly because a majority of the interactions between the subsystems of 
the vehicle are not completely understood.  These interactions play a major role in the 
overall reliability of the system. 
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2.3.1 AIRCRAFT RELIABILITY 
Despite the problems with addressing reliability early in the design process, 
attempts have been made to increase the reliability of aerospace systems since the early 
1900s.  After World War I, reliability became of major interest to the aircraft industry 
and attempts to improve reliability were pushed to the forefront.  These attempts usually 
involved trial and error techniques with little emphasis given to quantitative reliability 
techniques [24].  As the aircraft design process was refined throughout the 1940s and 50s 
an emphasis was placed on collecting data on system failures to better quantify the 
probability of such failures occurring.  This data collection process was extensive but 
easily obtained with the variety of aircraft operating at the time.  This data collection 
allowed the aircraft designers of the day to properly categorize the reliability problems 
experienced by their aircraft.  This wealth of data enabled the designers to identify the 
weak components of the system and develop newer more reliable components to act as 
replacements.  In cases where the weak components could not be improved upon, 
redundancy was added to increase the reliability of the entire system.  These techniques 
of categorizing failures and refining designs continued for decades, with each refinement 
creating a more reliable system.   
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Figure 9: Catastrophic Accident Rate (Hull Loss) of Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet 
(1959-2004) [25]. 
 
This figure demonstrates how the increasing reliability gained through this data collection 
process reduced the number of catastrophic failures in the airline industry.  This reduction 
of accidents is the direct result of the refinement instituted by the airline designers as they 
began to understand the failure modes of their vehicles.  To achieve this increased 
reliability (accident rate of 1E-7), hundreds of millions of flights had to be conducted and 
the resulting data analyzed and applied to the new aircraft designs.   
The space industry of today is similar to the early aircraft industry in that there are 
a limited number of vehicles operating.  In fact there are only three active man rated 
vehicles in the world today: the Space Shuttle, the Soyuz vehicle, and the Shenzhou 
vehicle.  This is a major problem with applying the aircraft reliability model to space 
systems.  Although similar, the space transportation problem is fundamentally different 
than that faced by the airplane community.  The environment faced by space vehicles is 
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orders of magnitude more difficult to manage than it’s the aircraft counterparts.  This 
results in a completely new problem for spacecraft designers, and the reliability data is 
therefore limited. 
2.3.2 SPACE SHUTTLE RELIABILITY  
Risk assessment and reliability analysis have been a part of NASA’s procedures 
since the agency was founded. Unfortunately, during the Apollo program, pessimistic risk 
estimates discouraged the agency from adopting a quantitative risk analysis [26].  In fact, 
the overall mission success probability was only 40.43%, with a mission safety of only 
85.00% [27].  After Apollo when this number seemed overly pessimistic, NASA 
abandoned quantitative risk analysis for a more qualitative approach.  As a result, the 
Space Shuttle design process described in Chapter 1 was reliant on cost and performance 
as the main design drivers.  The inherent dangers associated with space travel as well as 
the increased importance placed upon mitigating these risks, has forced NASA to place 
increased importance on reliability.   
This increased importance is apparent in the shuttle risk assessments conducted 
since the first shuttle accident, Challenger in 1986, and continuing through the Columbia 
accident in 2003.  After the Challenger accident, it became obvious that the Space Shuttle 
reliability programs were lacking and a new focus on reliability was needed.  The aircraft 
model of failure analysis was not appropriate due the limited number of flights and the 
different environment of space travel.  To accomplish an accurate reliability analysis, 
shuttle program managers needed to address the failure modes of the Space Shuttle.  This 
involved a top down breakdown of each event that could cause a shuttle failure and 
subsequently applying a failure analysis to each event [28].  These failure analyses 
 33
required detailed data regarding the possible failures of the hundreds of components that 
comprise the Space Shuttle system.  Due to the limited flight experience of the Space 
Shuttle, test data had to be included in the reliability estimates [29].  This resulting 
analysis was completed under a 1995 study conducted by Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC).  This study was comprehensive quantitative risk 
assessment that included all phases of a shuttle mission [30].  This risk assessment 
concluded that the LOV probability of the shuttle lie between 1/76 and 1/230.  This 
seemed accurate based upon the limited number of flights conducted. 
The Columbia accident of 2003 resulted in a renewed emphasis on reliability.  
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board made two significant findings regarding the 
proposed research and shuttle risk assessment.  First, it found that over the last two 
decades, little to no progress has been made toward attaining integrated, independent, and 
detailed analyses of risk to the Space Shuttle.  Second, it found that system safety 
engineering and management is separated from mainstream engineering and is not 
vigorous enough to have an impact on system design [14].  These organizational 
problems are the result of NASA’s previous design methodologies, which focused on 
performance and cost.  The new emphasis on reliability and safety will force a new 
design process and current aerospace designers will be required to include the analysis of 
reliability and safety in their design proposals. 
The shuttle program has been forced to increase the reliability of an unnecessarily 
complex system through patchwork modifications of the existing vehicle.  Most of the 
reliability estimates of the Space Shuttle program were made after the system was 
operational.  The lunar exploration problem proposed by President Bush in his Vision for 
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Space Exploration is a much more complicated mission and therefore will result in a 
more complex architecture.  The proposed research attempts to address the problems 
faced by the reliability of the shuttle program by fully integrating the reliability estimates 
into the design process and including them as the major discriminators in the conceptual 
design.  This will allow the resulting vehicles that comprise the lunar architecture to be 
designed specifically to attain the maximum reliability for the given budget. 
2.4 RELIABILITY TECHNIQUES 
This section will describe the relevant techniques of reliability and risk 
assessment currently applied in aerospace design.   Many techniques have been 
implemented to estimate the reliability of complex systems.  The earliest techniques 
involved observation of operational vehicles.  These gave accurate representations of the 
overall failure rates, but did little to increase knowledge about the interactions of complex 
subsystems to better understand the reliabilities of systems.  Quantitative reliability 
studies became a reality in World War II.  A German mathematician, named Lusser, 
questioned the existing notion that the reliability of a chain of components was 
determined by the strength of its weakest link.  He showed that a series of strong links 
can be inherently more unreliable than a single weak link, due to the operational loading.  
His theories resulted in an increase in quality assurance of all the vehicle components and 
increased the reliability of the V1 missile to a success rate of over 60 percent [24].  This 
was the beginning of current reliability theories and their applications to complex 
systems. 
 35
2.4.1 FAILURE MODE EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS 
Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a qualitative reliability 
analysis that employs a set procedure for the evaluation of the severity of potential failure 
modes.  FMECA is an extension of Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA), which then 
ranks each potential failure mode according to severity and probability of occurrence. 
The objective of this analysis is to identify weak areas in the design by breaking the 
systems into subsystems and then to components to identify all of the possible failure 
modes. 
The purpose of FMECA is to identify the potential failures in the system so that 
they can be addressed.  According to MIL-STD-1629A, the procedure for evaluation 
FMEA of a complex system is to decompose the problem to the component level with 
each component or subassembly treated as a black box.  The reliability engineer then 
evaluates the effect of the loss of a black box on the rest of the system. The FMECA 
process is an organized brainstorming activity to rank the severity of the failure modes of 
the different subassemblies on the entire system. 
In the aerospace design process, the FMECA process begins with a Functional 
Hazard Analysis (FHA).   FHA is a systematic process that defines the system and the 
potential hazards in the total system.  FHA is designed to develop safety design to 
guidelines in order to reduce or even eliminate potential hazards from the conceptual 
design.  The hazards identified in the FHA process are then qualitatively prioritized by 




Table 2: Hazard Severity Classification for FHA [17]. 
Hazard Severity Category Hazard Severity Definition Design 
Standard 
Catastrophic 1 
Loss of equipment or personnel 






Major Equipment damage or severe 






Minor equipment damage or minor 





Insignificant equipment damage or 





This severity classification is combined with the probability of occurrence to form a Risk 
Assessment Code (RAC).  RAC is a useful graphical tool to determine whether a risk is 
acceptable or whether major redesign work must be done to raise the design’s safety to an 
acceptable level.  An example of both the severity classifications and the RAC are given 
as Table 3 and Table 4. 
 
Table 3: Risk Assessment Code Matrix [17]. 
Hazard Severity Probability of Occurrence 
 A B C D E 
1 1 1 2 3 4 
2 1 2 3 3 5 
3 2 3 4 5 5 




Table 4: Hazard Probability of Occurrence for FHA [17]. 
Hazard 
Occurrence 




Frequent A Likely to occur frequently in operating life of the system 
Continuously 
experienced 
Probable B Will occur several times in operating life of the system 
Will occur 
frequently 
Occasional C Likely to occur sometime in operating life of the system 
Will occur 
several times 





Assumed occurrence may not be 






The RAC matrix gives a code for the resulting risk of the activity.  Red boxes denote an 
undesirable hazard that must be corrected through redesign.  A yellow box denotes a 
hazard that must be addressed by the operator of the vehicle.  This risk may either be 
deemed acceptable or a request for redesign must be made.  A green box denotes a risk 
that is generally considered acceptable within the aerospace community.  
 Once the FHA has been completed, the FMECA procedure evaluates the results 
of the FHA and assesses the impact on the total system.  This can be accomplished 
through a series of functional block diagrams of the system and subsystem components.  
Functional blocks are outlined and the interactions are shown. Once the block diagrams 
are created and the interactions known, a FMECA worksheet can be created. 
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Figure 10: FMECA Worksheet for CTV [17]. 
 
Figure 10 shows an example FMECA worksheet for a Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV).  As 
this worksheet demonstrates, the analysis can be very detailed even in the conceptual 
design phase.  All of the potential hazards are outlined for the power system of the CTV 
with severity indicated by a color code.   Overall, the FMECA process is used to identify 
all of the possible failure modes of the systems.  This allows the designer to address the 
 39
most critical failure modes and subsequently redesign the vehicle or choose a different 
vehicle for the mission. 
2.4.2 RELIABILITY NETWORKS AND REDUNDANCY MODELING 
Another technique commonly used in reliability is the implementation of 
networks and redundancy modeling.  A reliability network is defined as a representation 
of the reliability dependencies between components in a system [24].  These networks 
give a graphic representation of the system and are one of the simplest ways to 
quantitatively calculate the reliability of a system.  These simple networks use basic 
probability analyses to compute the overall reliability of a system. These reliability 
networks, also known as Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD), provide a simple method to 










Figure 11: Simple Reliability Network. 
 
As this figure shows, component A must be functional for the system to work 
successfully.  If A is working, then either components B and C or components D and E 
have to be operational for the system to be functional. 
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 Reliability Block Diagrams are a simple way to model components working 
together to create a system.  As systems get more complex, the reliability block diagram 
techniques tend to break down and become very complicated.  RBDs are usually used to 
model subsystems to simplify both the models and the calculations.  These models rely 
on an accurate description of the component reliabilities as well as the independence of 
the components modeled.  RBDs can be used to model almost any system as long as it 
can be broken down to its independent components.  The RBDs can help to identify weak 
points in the system and allow the designer to improve the system by either increasing the 
reliability of the component or adding redundancy to the system. 
 Redundancy is a method of increasing reliability of the system by including a 
backup, or identical component, to the system that will take over if the original 
component fails.  Redundancy is not a solution to all reliability problems since redundant 
systems usually increase weight, cost, and complexity.  Redundancy is a good solution 
for backing up inherently unreliable components that are essential to the success of the 
system.  There are four approaches to adding redundancy to a design [17]: 
 
1. Active Redundancy- Redundant systems operate simultaneously. 
2. Voting Redundancy- Multiple components function and the one that 
produces the expected results is chosen to work with the system. 
3. Stand-by Redundancy- The backup component stays offline until a failure 
occurs.  The backup then begins to operate in place of the original 
component when a failure occurs. 
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4. Redundancy with Repair- In this configuration a failed component can be 
repaired before the mission is lost, or the failed component is not critical 
to the mission success. 
These redundancy models can be combined in many ways to produce a more reliable 
system.  Other redundancy configurations include parallel systems, duplex, bimodal, 
majority voting, adaptive majority logic, gate connector, and stand-by.  These are all 
described in detail in reference 17. 
The Space Shuttle can be depicted as an example of a breakdown of a complex 
system into its subsystems.  During the Challenger accident in 1986, an O-ring failure in 
the solid rocket motor caused a system wide failure ending in a loss of crew.  The 
designers of the Space Shuttle realized the potential problem with O-ring joints and 
added stand-by redundancy to the system by adding a second O-ring to each joint of the 
system.  The resulting block diagram of the 12 O-rings working in redundant pairs on the 















Figure 12: Proposed O-Ring RBD for Space Shuttle [31]. 
 
This redundancy was based on the O-ring failure and was designed to be completely 
independent.  Unfortunately, as the solid rocket motors fire, the steel structure bulges due 
to the increased pressure and temperature.  This bulge causes a rotation in the four joints 
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of the solid rocket motor.  The rotation then causes a gap to form where the O-rings were 
intended to seal.  This gap affected both O-rings and caused interdependence between the 
O-rings.  This interdependence causes the overall reliability of the joint to be far less than 
the simple model in Figure 12 predicts.  The misrepresentation by the model has been 
fixed and the resulting differences in reliability were calculated.  The results of analyses 
of the failures of the O-rings due to temperature were drastic.   
The report found that the Space Shuttle had a launch reliability of 0.98 when the 
temperature was above 60 degrees Fahrenheit, but only 0.87 when the temperature was 
below 31 degrees Fahrenheit [31].  This discrepancy was a direct result of the O-ring 
reliability. 
 As this example demonstrates, RBD can be useful but does not always address all 
of the interdependencies that can exist in a complex system.  That is why RBD and 
redundancy methods are typically used early in the design process to understand the top 
level reliability relationships.  More detailed analysis is needed to adequately represent 
the true reliability of a complex system prior to the flight testing. 
2.4.3 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
Fault trees are another common reliability technique used by conceptual 
designers.  A Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down or deductive approach to 
reliability modeling.  This approach involves identifying the top level failure and uses an 
approach to identify potential causes for a system failure. 
FTA was first developed in 1962 by Bell Telephone Laboratories for use in the 
Minuteman ballistic missile system.  In this case a top level event, such as a missile 
failure, is broken down into the causes that can lead to the failure.  These causes are 
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further broken down into the failures of systems and then subsystems until the component 
level probability of failure is established.  These component failures can then be 
combined mathematically to compute the overall reliability of the system.  A simple FTA 
consists of two types of gates: an ‘AND’ gate and an ‘OR’ gate.  In this simplest form of 
FTA, an ‘AND’ gate denotes that the output event (higher level) occurs if all events 
inputting to it (below) occur.  An ‘OR’ gate denotes that the output event will occur if 
any of the input events occur.  Other FTAs can include more complicated gates such as a 
‘k out of n’ gate (voting gate), ‘inhibit’ gate, ‘not’ gate, ‘Exclusive OR’ gates, and 
‘Priority AND’ gates [24]. 
A FTA for a typical conceptual design involves multiple layers but does not go 
into the detail of a FTA for a preliminary design.  An example of a FTA for a conceptual 
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Overall LOM = LOV = 1/281.181 flights
• 10X Historical ELV structure reliability
• 10X Historical ELV avionics reliability
• 20X Historical ELV subsystem reliability
• 10X Historical ELV propellant storage reliability
• 1/4000 firings RL-10 engine failure rate
• Two engine out capability
• One oxidizer tank loss capability  
Figure 13:  Fault Tree Analysis for Artemis Conceptual Lunar Lander Design [32]. 
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Artemis was a reusable lunar lander designed by the Space Systems Design Laboratory 
(SSDL) at Georgia Tech.  The FTA shown in Figure 13 is a typical example of the FTA 
conducted at the conceptual vehicle design level.  This analysis was conducted in a FTA 
software tool called Relex [33].  This FTA used the assumptions in the box to compute 
the component reliabilities in the blue circles.  These component reliabilities can typically 
be computed by similar subsystem FTAs.  The component reliabilities for this vehicle 
were then combined in the FTA to produce an overall vehicle reliability of 0.996 for the 
mission of landing on the moon and returning to Low Lunar Orbit (LLO). 
 Fault tree analyses can also become rather complicated when applied to a 
complex system.  For example, the Space Shuttle fault tree has over 1,400 elements.  This 
FTA is broken down into 7 branches each containing the different components that make 
up the failure probabilities.  A summary of the fault tree presented in the Columbia 
investigation is provided as Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Elements in the Space Shuttle Fault Tree [14]. 
Number of Open Elements Branch of Fault Tree Total 
Number of 
Elements 
Likely Possible Unlikely 
Orbiter 234 3 8 6 
Space Shuttle Main Engine 22 0 0 0 
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor 35 0 0 0 
Solid Rocket Booster 88 0 4 4 
External Tank 883 6 0 135 
Payload 3 0 0 0 




As this table shows, the FTA for the Space Shuttle was incredibly complex yet still 
missed 10 likely elements that could cause a failure.  This table demonstrates one of the 
main problems of an FTA.  If components are ignored or forgotten in the bottom levels, 
the reliability calculated at the top level is artificially inflated.  This can cause a system to 
be deemed acceptably reliable even though realistically the reliability is optimistically 
high.  FTA also suffers from the same requirement of independency of root events that 
affects the RBD analysis. 
2.4.4 MARKOV ANALYSIS 
A Markov analysis is another tool used by engineers to evaluate the reliability of a 
system.  Unlike FTA and RBD, this analysis does not require that the component events 
be completely independent.  This makes Markov analysis a truly dynamic state space 
model. 
A Markov analysis consists of a series of Markov chains.  These chains consist of 
states and transitions from the states.  A state is the condition in which the element is 
currently operating.  This is typically described in reliability analysis as operating or 
failed.  The transitions between the states are usually described as the failures and repairs 




Figure 14:  Markov Chain of a Parallel System with Two Identical Components [21]. 
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In this type of model the circles indicate the states and the transitions are denoted by 
arrows.  This example also shows that the transitions occur with a failure rate of λ and a 
repair rate of µ.  These symbols are used because the typical Markov chains model the 
failure rates as exponential functions.  This is because the Markov chain requires that the 
system have the memoryless property.  The memoryless property states that the future 
states of the problem are independent of the past states.  For example, a repaired 
component has the same likelihood of failure as a brand new component.  This is 
described mathematically as equation 1. 
 
)|(),...,,,|( 02 jXkXPaXhXiXjXkXP tdttdttdtttdtt ======== +−−+  (1) 
 
The above equation shows that the probability of making a transition must be constant 
with time, or the likelihood of failure is only dependant on the working state of the 
component.   
 One of the main drawbacks of the Markov analysis is that the size of the model 
increases exponentially with the number of components in the model.  For example a 





Figure 15: Markov Analysis of a 2 out of 3 System with Warm Spares and Repair [21]. 
  
As this figure demonstrates, the diagram for a Markov analysis becomes very 
complicated even with a relatively simple system.  One resolution to this problem is to 
use a Markov analysis for parts of the system that are dependant and then use the 
resulting subsystem failure probability as an input into a model which can handle larger 
systems such as a FTA or RBD. 
2.4.5 PETRI NETS 
A Petri net is a reliability tool first proposed by C. A. Petri in 1962.  A Petri net 
provides the means to analyze the dynamic behavior of systems.   A Petri net has two 
types of nodes: a place node and a transition node.  In the Petri diagram, arcs connect the 
places and transition nodes.  One or more tokens can exist in each place marking the state 
of the system.  A transition occurs when every input to that transition has at least one 
token in it.  This “firing” occurs by removing one token from the input and placing that 
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token into the output.  An example of a Petri net for a repairable system is given as 
Figure 16.  
 
 
Figure 16: Reparable Unit Petri Net [17]. 
 
Petri nets can be used in much the same way as FTA.  An example of a generic 
FTA and the corresponding Petri nets are given below as Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17: Petri Net of Generic FTA [34]. 
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As this figure shows, Petri nets can be used to replicate the work of an FTA.  Petri nets 
are much more powerful in determining reliability because they can model dynamic 
systems.  Petri nets can be used to represent the states of many components over time by 
monitoring the tokens in the system.   
2.4.6 PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive analysis method for 
analyzing the risk associated with complex technological systems such as aerospace 
systems.  A PRA can include many of the reliability techniques described in previous 
sections.  PRA was first used in the nuclear industry to address the risks associated with 
nuclear power plants.  As noted in section 2.3.2, PRA was first used in the aerospace 
industry to analyze the risk associated with the Space Shuttle program after the 
Challenger accident.  PRA is so widely accepted at NASA that the agency intends to use 
PRA in all of its programs and projects to support optimal management decisions for the 
improvement of safety and program performance [23].  
 
 
Figure 18: Typical PRA Operational Outline [23]. 
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The PRA process begins with the definition of the objectives.  This process 
involves defining possible end states of the assessment.  These end states can be failures 
that result in either loss of mission, vehicle, or crew.  The next step is to become familiar 
with the system under analysis.  This is necessary to discover all of the various nuances 
of the vehicle in question.  This can involve a complicated inspection of a current vehicle 
or an in-depth design analysis for a conceptual vehicle.  The third step is to identify the 
accident scenarios that will lead to the end state defined in the first step.  This can be a 
complicated process since all of the accident scenarios may not have been proposed in the 
initial design process.  The fourth step is to model each scenario in a tool called an event 
tree.  An event tree organizes each accident scenario into the different events that can 
result from the initial failure.  A typical event tree is given as Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19: Event Tree Structure [23]. 
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The fifth step in the PRA process is to model each accident scenario in a FTA as 
described in section 2.4.3.  Once the FTA is arranged, the next step is to collect the 
necessary reliability data on the components in the FTA.  This can involve failure rate 
data, repair times, etc.  The seventh step is to integrate scenarios that appear in the path of 
each accident scenario.  This is an important step because the components of the FTA 
must be completely independent.  The next step is to apply an uncertainty analysis to the 
probabilities collected in the previous step.  The Monte Carlo analysis used at this stage is 
described in detail in section 2.6.6.  A sensitivity analysis can also be conducted to 
determine the impact of the different probability inputs to the PRA.  The final step is to 
rank the main contributors to the undesirable end state defined in the first step.  
 PRA results in an organized collection of the risks associated with a complex 
vehicle design.  PRA is an ideal solution to the risk problem because it is a methodical 
approach to analyzing all of the different risk factors that could face a vehicle.  PRA 
builds on the existing techniques of reliability engineering and applies the techniques to a 
complex system.  It includes an uncertainty analysis to accurately depict the probabilities 
of failure due to the different branches of the FTA.  It results in a quantitative estimate of 
the risks as well as potential risk reduction measures that can be taken by the designers. 
 For this research an dynamically changing version of the FTA is used.  Fault trees 
were chosen over the other reliability techniques presented due to the common use of 
FTAs in aerospace design.  As presented earlier in this dissertation, FTAs were used in 
the STS program as well as in the ESAS results.  Because of this common use and the 
availability of subsystem reliability data a FTA will be used as the baseline reliability 
tool. 
 52
2.5 COST ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
This section will describe the relevant techniques of cost estimation and their 
application to the conceptual design process.  There are a many varying approaches to 
cost estimation; and, as a result, slightly different resulting costs can be obtained for the 
same design.  The origins of parametric cost estimation began in World War II.  At this 
time there were many aircraft were developed for the war effort, but there was no 
accurate way to estimate the cost of development of these vehicles.  The process has 
developed significantly as the decades progressed and the design process for aerospace 
vehicles became more defined.  Today, there are a series of organized government lead 
activities to standardize the cost estimation process.  These activities include the 
Parametric Cost Estimating Handbook sponsored by the Department of Defense (DoD), 
NASA/Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM), and the Transcost workbook.  These 
programs were attempts to standardize the cost estimating process to compare competing 
vehicles on equal footing.  A summarization of the costing techniques follows. 
2.5.1 COST ESTIMATION OVERVIEW 
For conceptual design, cost is usually broken down into two groups: recurring and 
non-recurring costs.  Non-recurring costs are the “one-time” costs, such as the cost of 
vehicle design and the purchase of all reusable hardware.  Recurring costs are the costs to 
operate the vehicle including the purchase of any expendable hardware.  In the aerospace 
community non-recurring costs are generally grouped together as the Design, 
Development, Testing, and Evaluation (DDT&E) costs. The DDT&E is the cost of taking 
a conceptual vehicle design from the drawing boards to certification for flight.  This 
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includes the cost to complete the design process, develop manufacturing tooling, produce 
the subsystem testing, and integration into the entire system.   
Recurring costs are generally broken down into the Theoretical First Unit (TFU) 
cost, the cost of subsequent hardware, and operations cost.  The TFU cost is the cost to 
build the first vehicle resulting from the design process.  TFU can be either considered a 
recurring cost if the vehicle is expendable or a non-recurring cost if the vehicle is 
reusable.  This cost tends to be significantly higher than the average cost for the vehicle 
since a learning curve generally exists for the production of space vehicles.  A learning 
curve is a type of statistical estimation first suggested by T. P. Wright [35].  In Wright’s 
work he observed that as the process for producing airplanes matured the cost to produce 




aXY =       (2) 
 
  Where: Y= the cumulative average cost per unit 
X= the cumulative number of units produced 
a=the cost of the first unit (TFU) 
b=learning rate (in percentage) 
 
This learning curve is still used today to accurately define the production costs of 
hardware over the life of a vehicle.  Typical learning rates are between 70-100%, with 
100% representing no learning curve.  Aerospace vehicle production typically uses a 
learning curve rate of 85-95% since these vehicles are complicated systems with low 
production runs.   
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The operations cost is the cost to fly the vehicle.  This can be broken down into 
mission operations and ground operations.  Mission operations include the personnel to 
manage and fly the vehicle, as well as fuel and other consumables, while ground 
operations includes all of the personnel and equipment necessary to service the vehicle 
and prepare it for flight.  These costs are typically represented as man-hours necessary to 
complete a mission. 
One way to accomplish the cost estimation of an aerospace design, a bottoms-up 
parametric cost model is used.  These parametric cost models are mathematical 
representations of the correlation between the design variables (typically weight) and the 
cost of a subsystem.  A typical Cost Estimating Relationship (CER) contains algebraic 
constants which calculate the cost based upon the weight of the subsystem.  These CERs 
are also affected by complexity factors which change the CER based upon the design 
differences between the analog system and the current design.  A generic weight based 
CER is given below. 
 
bWaCFCost )(*=      (3) 
 
Where: a and b are constants defined by the analogous system 
CF is the complexity factor associated with the design (typically 0.1-2) 
W is the weight of the subsystem analyzed 
 
CERs are useful tools in the parametric cost estimation of a vehicle design.  One 
of the main advantages of the use of CERs is that they can quickly estimate the costs for a 
changing vehicle design.  Because of their mathematical nature, CERs can be quickly 
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integrated into a design code and utilized automatically.  They can also produce reliable 
and repeatable estimates if the CERs were constructed from appropriate analog systems 
to the design being evaluated.  CERs have some major weaknesses that were enumerated 
by the handbook [36]: 
 
 1. CERs are sometimes too simplistic to forecast costs.  Generally, if one has 
detailed information, the detail may be reliably used for estimates.  If 
available, another estimating approach may be selected rather than a CER. 
 2. Problems with the database may mean that a particular CER should not be 
used.  While the analyst developing a CER should validate that CER, it is the 
responsibility of any user to validate the CER by reviewing the source 
documentation.  Read what the CER is supposed to estimate, what data were 
used to build that CER, how old the data are, how they were normalized, etc.  
A user must never use a cost model without reviewing its source 
documentation. 
 
A parametric cost model is advantageous because it provides a repeatable relationship 
between input variables and resultant costs.  Therefore, aerospace systems that are 
analyzed by the same cost model can be directly compared to decide the lowest cost 
system. 
 A second, more complicated method of cost estimation is the grass roots approach 
of cost estimation.  This method of estimating costs involves an estimation of the work 
force necessary to construct and operate the design.  With this method it is more difficult 
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to evaluate the different design changes and the resulting cost of those design changes.  
For this reason the NAFCOM weight based cost estimation method will be used. 
In a cost centric design, the goal of the aerospace designer is to compare the life 
cycle costs of systems to determine the most cost effective system.  Life cycle costs 
(LCC) incorporates all the costs of the system, including design, production, operation, 
support, and disposal.  This cost includes DDT&E, TFU, production, and operations cost 
and is the best discriminator for deciding on the most cost effective system.  This analysis 
typically includes the investment profile of the project, as well as the depreciation of the 
vehicle and the time value of money.  Unfortunately, as described in the problem 
statement, these costs are usually only considered at the end of the design cycle.  This 
research proposes to calculate these costs up front to decide on the most appropriate lunar 
architecture based upon the available budget and resulting reliability. 
2.5.2 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PARAMETRIC COST ESTIMATING HANDBOOK 
In the fall of 1995 the Department of Defense (DoD) created a joint initiative 
between both government and industry to standardize the cost estimating procedures used 
for government procurement programs.  A combination of professional and industry cost 
estimating associations have come together to create this estimating procedure.  This 
group included representatives from the International Society of Parametric Analyst 
(ISPA), Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis (SCEA), the Space Systems Cost 
Analysis Group (SSCAG), the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC), and 
the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).  This group concluded there were no 
barriers to the use of parametric cost estimation in both DoD and NASA proposals.  A 
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summary of the parametric cost estimating procedures recommended by the handbook is 
given as Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20: Parametric Cost Estimating Process [36]. 
 
As this figure shows, the cost estimation process begins with data collection and 
evaluation.  The data is first analyzed and then plotted.  These plots typically contain the 
cost of various subsystems of existing projects on the dependent axis and a design 
variable, such as subsystem weight, on the independent axis.  From these data points, a 
statistical analysis can be used to fit a curve to the data, and the CERs can be created.  
These CERs can then be combined with the parametric modeling tools to produce the 
vehicle costs.  These costs should then be rationalized with previous programs to verify 
their validity. 
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2.5.3 NASA AIR FORCE COST MODEL (NAFCOM) 
The NASA Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM) is a costing tool developed to 
model both the DDT&E and the hardware costs for aerospace vehicles.  NAFCOM is 
generally accepted as the most appropriate parametric cost model for the evaluation of 
the costs of a single vehicle [37].  The NAFCOM tool is a software database that has 
historical subsystem costs for a variety of aerospace projects.  The data is broken down 
by subsystem and mission type and is then normalized to produce accurate cost estimates 
for new vehicle designs.  NAFCOM facilitates a bottoms-up approach to cost estimation 
by estimating the costs of each subsystem using CERs of analogous systems. 
NAFCOM was developed by the Science Applications International Corporation 
(SAIC) to provide a parametric cost estimating tool for space hardware.  Since the early 
nineties, eight versions of NAFCOM have been developed, with the most recent being 
created in 2004.  NAFCOM builds upon the Resource Data Storage and Retrieval 
(REDSTAR) library which contains aerospace project data from the early sixties.  
NAFCOM has since been consolidated into a stand alone software tool complete with 
graphical user interfaces to allow easy implementation in the cost analysis of a vehicle 
design.   
2.5.4 TRANSCOST COST ESTIMATING HANDBOOK 
The Transcost cost estimating handbook is similar to the NAFCOM software tool 
in that it is a repository for CERs for aerospace vehicles.  The Transcost handbook was 
first compiled in 1971 and has been updated until the latest version published in 2000. 
The Transcost handbook contains data from US, European, and Japanese space vehicles 
dating from 1960-2000 [38].  The Transcost is a database of top-down CERs for space 
 59
launch vehicles.  It is intended for use as a system model to compare the costs of different 
systems at the top level.  This process is advantageous at the conceptual vehicle design 
level because the details of the subsystems may not be completely defined.  The 
Transcost model was defined to choose the most economic vehicle concept from a list of 
alternatives early on in the design process.  A summary of where Transcost fits into the 
vehicle design process is shown below as Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21: Cost Estimation via Transcost [38]. 
 
As this figure shows, the Transcost methodology is designed to use CERs at the top level 
to select the proper design.  Once this design is selected, a detailed analysis is conducted 
using a bottoms-up approach, like the NAFCOM cost model.  Transcost can then be used 
again on the more refined system to verify the results of the bottoms-up approach.   
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2.6 CURRENT CONCEPTUAL VEHICLE DESIGN PROCESS 
This section will outline the current conceptual vehicle design process used at the 
Space Systems Design Laboratory at the Georgia Institute of Technology.  The 
conceptual design process involves a combination of multiple design disciplines. These 
disciplines are treated as individual contributing analyses to the entire vehicle design.  
Each of these contributing analyses is coupled, which makes a difficult design problem.  
This coupling requires iteration between the disciplines to close the vehicle design.   
Once this analysis is defined, there are many different methods to optimize the 
design.  These are all grouped under the topic of Multidisciplinary Design Optimization 
(MDO).  For very complicated designs, an MDO process, which directly runs the 
contributing analyses, may not provide the necessary efficiency.  In these cases, a 
Response Surface Methodology (RSM) can be used to approximate the design 
disciplines.  Once the MDO process has been completed, closing a particular design, a 
ROSETTA model can be made.  ROSETTA models utilize RSMs to allow the designer 
to quickly trade the design parameters of a vehicle.  Once this fast acting tool is created, 
an uncertainty analysis can be conducted using Monte Carlo Simulations.  An 
introduction to each of these topics is included in the following section. 
2.6.1 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN DISCIPLINES AND THE DESIGN STRUCTURE MATRIX 
As described in the introduction to this section there are many different coupled 
disciplines that make up a conceptual vehicle design.  This coupling between the 
disciplines is graphically represented as a design structure matrix.  Each of the 
contributing analyses (design disciplines) is represented as a box in the DSM; the links 
between the boxes are the coupling variables that are passed between the disciplines.  
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Links leaving the right hand side of the boxes represent data that is passed downstream to 
the following design disciplines.  The links leaving the left hand side represent 
information that is required upstream in the design process. This information typically 
includes design variables that are approximated in the analyses preceding the active 
discipline, which will now be rerun with the correct values of the variables.  This 
procedure must then be iterated so that the design disciplines are all using conforming 
values for the design variables. 
The DSM for a typical launch vehicle design involves two different iteration 
loops which were described in section 1.2.1.  For this generic launch vehicle design, the 
first iteration loop is between the propulsion, trajectory, aeroheating, and weights and 
sizing disciplines.  This iteration loop closes the performance aspects of the vehicle.  The 
second iteration loop is between operations, reliability, and cost.  This loop uses the 
converged physical design and creates the operations, reliability, and costs of the closed 














Figure 22: Design Structure Matrix for a Generic Launch Vehicle. 
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 Each discipline in the DSM is associated with one or more conceptual design 
tools associated with it.  Table 6 provides a listing of each discipline and a corresponding 
typically used aerospace design tool or tools.  Configuration, aerodynamics, propulsion, 
trajectory, structural design, aeroheating, and reliability are all analyzed with their 
respective disciplinary tool.  Weights and sizing is typically composed of a series of Mass 
Estimating Relationships (MERs) that are summarized and internally closed in an MS 
Excel workbook.    Cost CERs are based upon parametric costing analyses as described in 
detail in section 2.5. 
 
Table 6: Typical Design Tools for Conceptual Vehicle Design 
Discipline Analysis Tool 
Configuration Computer Aided Design (CAD) 
Aerodynamics APAS (HABP)  
Propulsion Design REDTOP  
Trajectory POST 3-D  
Weights & Sizing MERs  
Structures GT-STRESS 
Aeroheating Miniver  




This table only provides a sampling of some of the reference tools implemented in the 
contributing analyses associated with a conceptual vehicle design.  For example, POST 3-
D is a typical trajectory tool for the conceptual design of a launch vehicle.  Other in-space 
trajectory tools may be more appropriate for the interplanetary missions.  Each of the 
design disciplines in the DSM are analyzed and then iterated to find the closed solution to 
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the vehicle design.  A summary of the different design disciplines used for the launch 
vehicle described in Figure 22 follows: 
Internal Configuration: 
This design discipline is usually determined via geometric relationships and computer 
aided design codes.  This discipline is necessary to determine the tank and structural 
layouts of the launch vehicle.  It is also necessary to determine the interactions of the 
stages and the engine placements.  Although this discipline technically changes with the 
changing size of the vehicle, for most models it is considered to change photographically 
with the size of the vehicle.  For simpler vehicles, configuration is not necessary because 
the tank sizes and structural sizes can be calculated via simple geometric relationships 
and therefore is combined with the weights analysis.  
Aerodynamics: 
 This design discipline is necessary to determine the aerodynamic coefficients of 
the vehicle during the atmospheric flight portion of the trajectory.  The lift and drag 
coefficients were calculated via an aerodynamics simulation code.  For most vehicle 
models, Aerodynamic Preliminary Analysis System II (APAS) was used to calculate 
these coefficients [39].  These aerodynamic coefficients were then used with the scaled 
cross sectional area to find the total aerodynamic forces on the vehicle.  
Propulsion: 
 This design discipline is necessary to determine the engine performance of the 
vehicle during the powered portion of the trajectory.  To calculate the engine 
performance, REDTOP, a conceptual chemical rocket design code was used [53].  
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REDTOP requires that the engine cycle type, propellant type, and thrust level are given 
from the architecture design.  REDTOP then calculates the Isp, and engine thrust to 
weight which is necessary to calculate the weight and trajectory of the vehicle.  This 
design tool is a stand alone program which must be run in every iteration of the DSM to 
calculate the engine performance. 
Trajectory: 
 Much like the Propulsion discipline, the trajectory discipline is in the iteration 
loop of the vehicle.  The trajectory analysis is also completed by a conceptual design tool 
which must be completed each iteration of the design process.  This trajectory discipline 
is optimized using a three degree of freedom trajectory simulation code called the 
Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories (POST 3-D) [55].  This trajectory simulator 
iterates through the equations of motion to find the ideal trajectory for a given vehicle 
configuration.  For most vehicle model, the payload was treated as a constraint, with the 
optimizer set to minimize fuel consumption.  
Mass Estimation Relationships: 
 Much like the Propulsion and Trajectory disciplines, the mass estimating 
discipline is in the iteration loop of the vehicle.  This discipline uses Mass Estimating 
Relationships (MERs) to calculate the dry weight of the vehicle as a function of the total 
propellant required.  This dry weight is a function of the engine thrust to weight from the 
propulsion discipline, the propellant calculated from the trajectory analysis, and the 
configuration inputs.  A summary of MER database used in this analysis is given as [57]. 
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 The Reliability and Cost disciplines are calculated using new derived methods of 
the NAFCOM cost model and the FTA analysis.  NAFCOM was used as the costing 
model because of its accuracy for aerospace vehicles including those used in a lunar 
architecture.  An FTA analysis was chosen over other reliability analyses due to the 
availability of subsystem data and the prevalence of FTA analysis in aerospace design.  A 
summary of the changes to both the NAFCOM cost model and the FTA reliability 
analysis is given in Chapter 3. 
 To achieve a closed design, the contributing analyses are iterated until the inputs 
to the individual modules do not change.  This iteration is necessary because of the 
feedback loops in the DSM.  Once the vehicle is closed each of the CAs are using 
consistent data and an actual conceptual design is completed. 
2.6.2 MULTIDISCIPLINARY DESIGN OPTIMIZATION 
Once the DSM has been successfully constructed, a method must be used to close 
the vehicle design.  The disciplines within the DSM compete for the available resources 
as well as the selection design parameter values, to produce the ideal solution.  
Historically, a Fixed Point Iteration (FPI) method has been used to close the vehicle 
design.  This method iterates among the design disciplines to determine a closed solution.  
Unfortunately, this solution may not be ideal.  To solve this complex problem 
Multidisciplinary Design Optimization (MDO) techniques were created.  MDO is series 
of techniques to find the optimal solution for a complex engineering problem consisting 
of many conflicting design disciplines.  A summary of the disciplines used in a 
conceptual launch vehicle design is given in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Characteristics of Design Disciplines for a Conceptual Launch Vehicle [40]. 
Discipline: Variable/Constraint Number 
and Type: 
Code Type: 




Aerodynamics Few variables, continuous Interactive 
Trajectory Many, continuous, 
dense/sparse 
Design-oriented 
Weights and Sizing Few-to-many variable, 
continuous/discrete 
Design-oriented 
Heating Few, continuous/discrete Interactive 
Structures Many, continuous/discrete Batch, commercial 
Controls Many, continuous Batch, commercial 
Propulsion Few, continuous/discrete Design-oriented, 
regression equations 
Operations Many, discrete Highly interactive, 
regression equations 




As this table demonstrates each design discipline uses different types of variables as well 
as multiple different analysis codes.  This makes the MDO problem very difficult since 
one optimization scheme will not address all of the different design problems faced by 
the individual disciplines. 
There are many different MDO methods available to the aerospace designer.  A 
short list includes the All at Once Approach (AAO) [41], Collaborative Optimization 
(CO) [42], and Bi-Level Integrated System Synthesis (BLISS) [43].  These MDO 
techniques have been used repeatedly in the design of aerospace vehicles.  There is a 
wealth of literature on their implementation and effectiveness as it pertains to the 
aerospace design problem.  A comparison of the techniques for a reusable launch vehicle 
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was conducted by Brown [41] at the SSDL at Georgia Tech using the same design 
process outlined in this section.  His qualitative results are included as Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Comparison of MDO Techniques for a Conceptual Launch Vehicle [41]. 
Criteria FPI AAO BLISS CO 
Implementation Difficulty A C B+ C+ 
Total Execution Time A A- B+ B- 
Model Robustness A D B+ B 
Formulation Difficulty A A B+ B- 
Optimization Deftness D A- A B 
Convergence Error A A- B+ C+ 
 
 
As evidenced by this table, all of the MDO methods presented were able to complete the 
reusable launch vehicle problem with differing levels of success. Although each method 
has advantages and disadvantages, most arrived at the ideal solution much faster than a 
traditional manual process. 
2.6.3 MULTIDISCIPLINARY DESIGN OPTIMIZATION WITH GENETIC ALGORITHMS 
A genetic algorithm is a stochastic, domain spanning method to solve complicated 
optimization problems.  The optimization process mimics that of nature’s natural 
selection process.  Several generations of design variables are conducted and the best 
designs survive to pass their characteristics on to the next generation.  After several 
generations the best designs should be found through the natural selection. 
 Genetic algorithms begin by initializing an initial population of designs.  This 
initial population is created randomly from the discretization of the design variables 
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through the use of a binary string.  The discretization is dependent on the range of the 
design variables and the number of bits designated to each variable.  The step size of the 






xStepSize        (4) 
 
Where: n is the number of bits in each design variable  
∆x is the range of the variables.   
 
Therefore as n increases, the step size decreases, and the total number of available points 
increases. 
 Once the design variables are discretized an initial population is randomly 
created.  This initial population can vary in size, but for this paper the population size is 
given by equation 5. 
 
Nnpopsize **3=       (5) 
 
Where: n is the number of bits in each design variable 
N is the number of dimensions of the problem. 
 
Once this initial population is instantiated the three biologically inspired processes are 
implemented on the population to create the next generation. 
 The first biologically inspired process is reproduction.  Reproduction is the start 
of a new generation through a survival of the fittest type selection of the initial 
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population.  There are two main methods to accomplish reproduction.  The first is 
proportional replication.  In this process each design in the initial population is evaluated.  
Each is then proportionally compared to the fitness (1/F) of the entire population 
(equation 6).  The number of times that design appears in the next population is then 













f =    (6) 
 
]*[ ii PpopsizeroundN =       (7) 
 
The second method of reproduction is that of a tournament selection.  Tournament 
selection randomly selects two “combatants” from the initial population.  The one with 
the lower function value is determined the winner of the battle and is promoted to the 
next generation.  This is then repeated until the population size is reached.  Of the two 
methods proportional replication always forces the best designs into the subsequent 
population, unfortunately it is ill posed for a problem where F is less than or equal to 0.  
The tournament method is more robust since there are no restrictions of F, yet there is a 
possibility for poor designs to propagate into further generations due to the randomness 
of the combatants.  It should be noted that this is the only process where it is necessary to 
evaluate the function.  Therefore the method chosen and the number of generations, 
determine the number of function calls for the entire program.  For proportional 
replication there is exactly one function call per member of the population per generation.  
For tournament selection there are many methods to evaluate the function.  In this 
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instantiation of the tournament selection each time a combatant is chosen randomly the 
function value for that design is calculated.  Therefore there are two calls per population 
size, per generation.  This can be reduced through an evaluation of the initial population 
put into memory and the random number generator choosing from that array.  Also since 
reproduction is where the designs are evaluated this is also where the best designs for a 
given generation are stored.   
 The second biologically inspired process of GA is that of crossover.  Crossover is 
a way to genetically splice two parent strings in hopes of creating a better design.  It is 
accomplished by randomly picking two parent strings from the post-reproduction 
population and applying a predetermined probability that the parent’s genes undergo a 
crossover.  This probability is usually about seventy percent of the time.  After this 
crossover occurs the parents are eliminated from crossover consideration and the next 
crossover pair is determined until the entire population is evaluated.  As in reproduction 
there are two different methods to perform a crossover.  The first is known as two-point 
crossover.  This involves taking the parents that have been selected for crossing over and 
applying two random numbers.  The first is the bit where the parents will start crossover 
and the second is the amount of bits that will be crossed.  Once this window is created the 
bits of the parents in this window are switched and returned to the population.  The 
second form of crossover is uniform crossover.  This involves going bit by bit in a string 
and applying the probability of crossover to the bit.  The goals of the crossover process 
are to randomly splice the “good” designs of reproduction in the hopes of finding the best 
design. 
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 The third biologically inspired process is mutation.  Mutation is the selection of a 
single bit in a genetic string to be changed.  This process introduces some diversity into a 
population that has essentially been inbreeding in the previous two processes.  Mutation 
allows designs that are outside the initial population to be more readily tested.  A typical 
mutation rate is usually one to two percent.  It has been found recently that higher 
percentages of mutation seem to work better for typical optimization problems so 
mutation percentages of twenty are typical. 
 This process can then be repeated for a given number of generations to determine 
the solution.  This is done by storing the best design from each generation and saving it.  
The best of these best designs is then chosen as the best ever design and the resulting 
optimum.  A diagram of the iteration loop is given as Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23: Genetic Algorithm Overview 
 
The natural discritization of the GA process makes it an ideal optimization scheme for 
problems in which there are a low percentage of continuous variables.  This optimization 
scheme, when combined with a multidisciplinary analysis such as Fixed Point Interation 





Best in Generation 
Best Overall? 
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For the research described in this paper, a GA is used with an Overall Evaluation Criteria 
(OEC) as the objective function to find the ideal Pareto Frontier for the lunar mission 
modes.  A GA was chosen as the optimization scheme of choice because of the inherent 
ability of GAs to deal with discrete variables.  In a lunar architecture selection problem, 
over 75% of the variables are discrete.  A GA was chosen over a simple design space 
exploration because of the ability of the GA to find the ideal solution in less function 
calls. 
2.6.4 RESPONSE SURFACE METHODOLOGY 
Response Surface Methodology (RSM) is a relatively new method for 
approximating complex analyses.  RSM is a multivariate regression techniques developed 
to model the response of a complex system using a simple algebraic equation.  This 
response surface equation can then be used in place of the physics based design tool.  
This saves both time and resources, since the equation can be evaluated quickly and 
without the involvement of the discipline experts. 
The RSM begins by identifying the design variables that the response surface will 
incorporate and the ranges in which these variables are to vary.  This is an important step 
because the response is only as good as the included variables.  If the proper variables are 
not modeled, the response will be meaningless.  The ranges set for the design variables 
are also critical.  If the ranges are set too narrow the response may be good, but the model 
will be less useful because the response surface equations should only be used within the 
ranges defined.  If the ranges are set too wide the response fit will likely be bad since the 
regression analysis is trying to fit very diverse data.  
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The second step of the RSM is to do a linear screening test to find the important 
design variables that were set in the first step.  A two level Design of Experiments (DOE) 
is run as a screening test.  A DOE is an organized approach to choose which sets of 
design variables to run so that the responses can be evaluated without the entire spectrum 
of design variables begin computed.  Classical DOEs are comprised of one of five 
designs: Full Factorial, Latin Hyper Cube, Box-Behnken, Face-centered Central 
Composite Design (CCD), and D-optimal.  Each of these designs uses a combination of 
the points shown in Figure 24 (full factorial runs the entire design space).   
 
 
Figure 24: Dimensional Representation of Design of Experiments [44]. 
 
Once the model is chosen the design variable combinations are selected and the 
experiments conducted, a process called Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is used to select 
the most appropriate variables for use in the actual response surface.  The ANOVA 
process usually involves a line chart to show which variables have the most significance.   
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Figure 25:  Results of the Screening Test for a Nozzle [45]. 
 
Line charts such as Figure 25 are then used to find the variables which have the most 
significant impact on the design.  For this simple example, distance and overlap may be 
excluded if only three design variables are required. 
 Once the screening test is complete and the proper design variables and their 
respective ranges are defined, a three level DOE is completed for the appropriate design 
variables.  This includes fitting the results with a Response Surface Equation (RSE).  The 




















ii xxbxbxbbR      (8) 
 
       Where: k  is number of variables 
ix  is the main effects 
2
i
x  is the quadratic effects 
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ji xx  is the second order interaction terms 
0b  is the intercept term (contains effect of all ignored variables) 
ib  is the regression coefficients for the first degree terms 
iib  is the regression coefficients for the pure quadratic terms 
ijb  is the regression coefficients for the cross-product terms  
ε  is the error associated with neglecting higher order effects 
 
The resulting RSE must then be tested to assure that it is an accurate 
representation of the physics based model it is approximating.    This is done by 
conducting an analysis of the goodness of the RSE fit.  This check usually involves a 
visual inspection of the Actual points plotted against the RSE’s predicted points, an 
analysis of the R2 of the fit, and a verification test where the actual physics based analysis 
is compared with the RSE model on design points that were not used to create the RSE.  
Once verified, the RSE can be used in place of the legacy design code for the ranges 
specified in the first step.  This RSE provides a reasonably accurate approach to finding 
the optimal design.  Once the design is selected, then the chosen set of design variables 
can be analyzed in the physics based code to verify the results. 
2.6.5 ROSETTA MODELS 
A Reduced Order Simulation for Evaluating Technologies and Transportation 
Architecture (ROSETTA) model is a parametric design tool utilized by the Space System 
Design Laboratory at the Georgia Institute of Technology to quickly evaluate how 
changing the design variable affects a vehicle.  A ROSETTA model is a spreadsheet 
model that uses RSM to approximate each of the design disciplines described in section 
2.6.1 [46].  This includes a RSE for the high fidelity tools such as POST, APAS, and GT 
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Stress.  The ROSETTA model can also be used to calculated the viability of a vehicle if 
the  DDT&E, operations costs, and economics of the vehicle are included in the model. 
The NASA ATLAS project used the ROSETTA model extensively to calculate 
both lunar and Mars architectures.  The ATLAS project was tasked with creating a 
framework to quantitatively evaluate the influence of different technologies on lunar and 
Mars architectures.  ROSETTA models were created for each of the vehicle types and 
were integrated into the ATLAS framework via the Generic Model Template (GMT).  
The ATLAS code then passes the appropriate design variables, including technologies 
from each of the architecture elements to close the reference mission.   
 
 
Figure 26:  ROSETTA Models in the ATLAS Framework [47]. 
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Figure 26 depicts the process flow of the ROSETTA model that was used in the ATLAS 
framework.  The ROSETTA models are denoted in the figure as the model workbooks.  
As this diagram shows, the ATLAS framework calculated the costs and the technology 
data separately from the ROSETTA models.  The ROSETTA model was ideal for the 
ATLAS application because the ROSETTA model can parametrically adjust to the 
changing design variables quickly.  The fact that ROSETTA models can accurately and 
quickly evaluate the design of a vehicle makes uncertainty analysis feasible for an 
aerospace vehicle design. 
 ROSETTA models can very in the fidelity contained in the model.  For this 
research, ROSETTA models will be split into three levels.  These levels are derived from 
the ATLAS project and were slightly modified for use in this thesis. 
• Level 1- Lowest fidelity model, in which most inputs are static or simple 
historical relationships.  Most performance and cost relationships are 
qualitative with some quantitative physics based models (such as the modified 
rocket equation) are included. 
• Level 2- Most widely used type of model.  Includes historical as well as 
physics based mass estimating relationships.  Initial trajectory and 
performance points are verified with a conceptual design tool to estimate non 
ideal parameters, but scaling relationships are used for off nominal points. 
• Level 3- Highest fidelity model.  Response Surface Equations are used to 
represent the conceptual design disciplinary tools.  Design of Experiments 
completed for all necessary physics based codes.  Trajectory and Engine 
performance are all simulated via these response surfaces. 
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For this research, all of the ROSETTA models will be either level 2 or level 3 models.  
The fidelity of the model will depend on the complexity of the vehicle modeled.  All 
lunar ascent and descent modules will be level 3 models because of the complexity of the 
trajectories and the importance of engine performance.  Command modules will be level 
2 because of the lack or propulsion and fact that all powered trajectories are performed by 
other vehicles. 
ROSETTA models will be used in this research to parametrically evaluate the 
performance of the vehicles in the analyzed lunar architecture.  A ROSETTA model will 
be created for each vehicle class that will be evaluated for this research.  The ROSETTA 
models will then be combined in an integrated framework with a Genetic Algorithm 
optimizer to create the Pareto frontier for the costs and reliabilities for each mission 
mode.  
2.6.6 MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS 
In conceptual design, it is important to properly estimate the uncertainty 
associated with each design decision.  This is true for the choices made for the 
performance variables as well as the programmatic variables associated with a lunar 
vehicle design.  To accomplish an uncertainty analysis on a vehicle design a Monte Carlo 
simulation is typically used.  A Monte Carlo simulation is a technique that simulates 
large numbers of random events [45].  This simulation is conducted by setting up 
distributions on the design variables in the ROSETTA model.  These distributions assign 
a probability of choosing a certain value of the design variable, the higher density the 
distribution the higher the probability of selecting that value.  The Monte Carlo 
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simulation then runs the ROSETTA model hundreds of thousands of times with different 
inputs randomly selected via the distributions on the input variables. 
There are many different distributions that can be used on the inputs of the Monte 
Carlo Analysis.  For this research, a triangular distribution will be used on all of the 
subsystem reliabilities.  A triangular distribution requires minimum, maximum, and 
nominal reliabilities to create the distribution.  The nominal is the highest probability of 
occurring and the probability of occurrence decreases linearly on both sides from the 
maximum nominal value to a zero probability at the minimum and maximum value. 
The result of a Monte Carlo analysis are Probability Density Functions (PDFs) for 
the designated output variables.  A PDF is a graphical collection of the response 
variables.  A PDF can then be integrated into a Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF).  
A CDF allows the user to see what percentage of Monte Carlo runs provided a minimum 
required response.  This process is outlined in Figure 27.   
 
 
Figure 27: Monte Carlo Simulation Flow Chart. 
 
In this figure, the assignment of distributions to the input variable is step 1.  Step 2 is the 
application of the Monte Carlo analysis to the ROSETTA models.  Step 3 is the creation 
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of the PDF from the Monte Carlo output.  Finally, step 4 is the integration of the PDF to 
create the CDF.  The CDF is then used to find the probability of reaching a certain 
performance level. 
 For this research, a Monte Carlo analysis will be conducted on the input 
subsystem reliabilities to get a confidence prediction on the resulting vehicle reliabilities 
and safeties.  The resulting 90% confidence (90% of the simulations have lower 
reliabilities and higher costs) and 10 % confidence bands can then be compared with the 
baseline to get a better understanding of the robustness of the ideal Pareto Frontier.   
2.7 CURVE FITTING OF PARETO FRONTIERS 
Once the Pareto frontier is created it is useful to curve fit the solutions so that 
points on the Pareto frontier can be quickly evaluated.  Unfortunately common curve 
fitting routines do a poor job of fitting the Pareto frontiers.  To fit the Pareto frontiers 
accurately a Neural Network (NN) is used.  A NN provides a fast and accurate way of 
curve fitting a series of data points.  NNs are analog computational systems whose 
structure is inspired by studies of the brain [48].  This curve fitting technique involves the 
use of Multilayer Perceptions (MLP) to learn a set of training data and therefore curve fit 
that data.  A MLP consists of a network of units with a series of information passing links 
or weightings.   Each connection of the inputs to the outputs results in a hidden layer 
between the vectors.  The weighting of this mapping between the inputs and the outputs 
is the learning algorithm used to optimize the network.  The number of hidden layers 
determines the speed and accuracy that the NN will train.  If there are too few hidden 
nodes then the network will not fit the data; if there are too many hidden nodes then the 
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network will take forever to train [49].  A summary of a back-propagation network 
structure is shown below as Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28: Back-Propagation Neural Network [49]. 
 
This figure depicts, a NN with one hidden layer.  To curve fit a general Pareto frontier of 
a 3 hidden node NN will be used.  The resulting equations for the NN follow as equations 
9 and 10. 
 
















=     (10) 
 
Where: A,B,C,D are fitting parameters 
H is the hidden node equations 
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The resulting curve fits range in R2 values from 0.92 to 0.99.  These resulting curve fits 
far exceed the curve fits obtained by conventional curve fitting methods. 
2.8 INFORMATION TO DECISION MAKER 
There is a significant amount of research in the operations management 
community about the need for the decision maker to be provided with not only the 
optimal solution for the requirements, but also the optimal points for the off nominal 
requirements.  This is especially true in spacecraft design, where life cycle costs can be in 
the billions of dollars and programs last for decades.  The long and costly programs are 
subject to the whims of the public and funding can either increase or decrease depending 
on the decision maker leading the project at the time.  Because of this instability it is 
important to have an understanding of the entire design space so that decisions can be 
made which will be robust to changing project budgets. 
Unfortunately although optimal engineering solutions can be found for a given set 
of requirements, organizational inertia can push these new techniques aside in favor of 
old less efficient ways.  The complications of applying new design techniques to industry 
are addressed in the literature [50,51,52 ].  As these references demonstrate adoption of a 
new method, especially a non-transparent method is very difficult regardless of the 
benefit offered.  Because of this non-acceptance, the method proposed in this thesis 
attempts to address these issues by adapting conventional conceptual design tools into the 
ROSETTA models through response surface equations.  This method also increases the 
transparency of the process by providing the decision maker with the entire set of 
solutions in the form of a Pareto frontier.  This frontier of optimal solutions allows the 
decision maker to choose the optimal solution from the best data available and does not 
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attempt to hand the decision maker a solution which he/she has not chosen.  This allows 
the decision maker to be invested in the solution to the architecture while avoiding non-
optimal configurations. 
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Now that the motivation for lunar exploration is set (Chapter 1) and the aerospace 
design process and the current reliability theories are described (Chapter 2), a new 
methodology to pull the traditional design discriminators to the front of the design 
process will be presented.  In this chapter, a description of the creation of the ROSETTA 
models use in this architecture tool will be covered.  This description will include the 
performance models as well as the dynamically changing fault tree analysis and the cost 
estimation techniques.   
The ROSETTA models combined with the conditioned inputs that define the 
lunar mode to be simulated and a life cycle cost calculation will be combined to provide 
the tools necessary to create a lunar architecture simulation.   The integration of the tools 
into an integrated framework that can quickly and accurately evaluate the lunar 
architectures will then be presented.  The results of this tool can then be combined into a 
Pareto frontier to guide the decision maker to producing the highest reliability 
architecture for a given life cycle cost. 
CHAPTER 3                                      




3.1 PERFORMANCE ESTIMATION USING ROSETTA MODELS AND RESPONSE 
SURFACE METHODOLOGY  
As noted in Chapter 2, ROSETTA models will be used to estimate the 
performance, cost, and reliability of the vehicles that constitute the lunar architecture to 
be simulated.  Each of the disciplines in the design structure matrix must be evaluated to 
complete the performance calculations for the vehicle.  As noted in Chapter 2 there are 
three different levels of fidelity for the ROSETTA models.  In this section the creation of 
the performance section of a level three Lunar Module ROSETTA model will be outline. 
3.1.1 CASE STUDY-LUNAR MODULE ROSETTA MODEL 
The Lunar Module ROSETTA model is given as an example to demonstrate the 
procedure to be followed in the creation of a ROSETTA model.  The Lunar Module 
ROSETTA model is a level three model capable of modeling all of the lunar modules 
implemented in the Apollo mission modes and the ESAS architecture.  The design 











Figure 29: Design Structure Matrix for ROSETTA Lunar Module 
 
As this DSM demonstrates, there are four separate disciplines are integrated to 
calculate the performance characteristics of the Lunar Module.  The reliability and cost 
models will be addressed in subsequent sections of this chapter.  As with most 
ROSETTA models, there is a strong coupling between the propulsion, trajectory and 
weights disciplines.  This coupling is addressed in the ROSETTA model through iteration 
in the Excel spreadsheet.  This iteration automatically occurs until the inputs to the 
different CAs are all consistent.  This represents a closed vehicle solution. 
A lunar module, as defined in this ROSETTA model, must be capable of 
transporting humans and/or cargo to and from the lunar surface.  To be able to simulate 
all of the Apollo lunar modes as well as the ESAS lunar surface module the ROSETTA 
model must be robust enough to simulate all of the burns necessary to complete the 




Table 9: Burn Summary of Lunar Landers Simulated in ROSETTA Model 
 LOI Descent Hover/Landing Ascent # Stages 
Apollo LOR  X X X 2 
Apollo EOR   X  1 
Apollo Direct   X  1 
ESAS X X X X 2 
 
 
As this table shows, there are multiple configurations that the Lunar Module ROSETTA 
model must accommodate to simulate all of the lunar mission modes under consideration.  
In addition to the different trajectory data, the ROSETTA model must be generic enough 
to simulate manned and unmanned missions (in EOR and Direct the CM acts as the 
habitat) for any number of crew.  The vehicles must also be able to support changing 
payload weights as the weights of the other vehicles in the mission change.  To facilitate 
these different mission requirements, the ROSETTA model was setup to parametrically 
scale based upon changing mission requirements.  A summary of the ranges of mission 
requirements that are defined by the ranges of the individual ROSETTA models is given 
as Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Mission Parameters Ranges for ROSETTA Lunar Module 
Mission Ranges Minimum Maximum 
Crew Number 0 6 
Payload to LS 500 kg 50,000 kg 
Payload to LLO 100 kg 50,000 kg 
Payload for LOI Burn 0 kg 50,000 kg 
Mission time 3 days 14 days 
On Orbit Delay 0 days 180 days 




This table gives the mission specific parameters that the ROSETTA model is able to 
accommodate.  There are also over 50 other performance based configuration inputs that 
the vehicle model uses to simulate a multitude of different lunar landers.  These 
configuration parameters have a large effect on the performance of the vehicle.  A 
summary of some of the configuration parameters is provided as Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Configuration Inputs for ROSETTA Lunar Module 
Structural Types Propellant Types Engine Cycle Types 
Aluminum LOX/LH2 Pressure Fed 
Aluminum-Lithium UDMH/N2O4 Expander 
Titanium LOX/CH4  
Graphite Epoxy   
Metal Matrix Composite   
 
 
The mission parameters (Table 10), the configuration inputs (Table 11), and the burn 
profiles (Table 9) are treated as inputs to the design structure matrix and define the 
configuration for the ROSETTA Lunar Module. 
   The propulsion discipline involves a Response Surface Equation (RSE) of 
REDTOP 2 engine performance conceptual design tool [53].  Each propellant 
combination and cycle type requires a different RSE.  These RSEs require the propellant 
type, cycle type, thrust level, chamber pressure, and O/F ratio as inputs.  The model then 
calculates the resulting Isp and engine T/W to the ROSETTA model [54].  This Isp and 
T/W are then passed to the trajectories and weights disciplines. 
 The trajectory discipline involves a RSE of Program to Optimize Simulated 
Trajectories (POST 3D) [55].  This program is an industry standard three degrees of 
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freedom trajectory simulator that optimizes the weight consumed in a trajectory.  The 
RSE of the POST simulation requires the total vehicle stage weight from the weights 
analysis and the thrust and Isp from the propulsion analysis [56].   The resulting ∆V for 
the trajectories are then passed to the weights analysis to calculate the total propellant 
required and the tank sizes. 
 The weights and sizing discipline uses a series of industry standard Mass 
Estimating Relationships (MERs) to approximate the vehicle weights [57].  These MERs 
combined with semi-empirical tank sizing relationships to calculate the size of the tanks 
necessary to hold the propellant [58].  The structural strengths and densities of the 
material types are defined from the Humble [59].  This propellant mass is calculated with 













LNIgV Pr0    (11) 
 
Where: g0 is the gravitational constant 
Mpropellant is the propellant mass 
Minert is the inert mass of the vehicle 
 
The calculated propellant mass is then combined with other MERs to produce the total 
vehicle mass of the system.  This vehicle mass is then iterated with the propulsion (via 
thrust and T/W ratios) and trajectory to close the lunar module vehicle design.  A 








































The Excel implementation of the ROSETTA model allows the vehicle’s performance to 
be calculated quickly and is portable to any computer operating Microsoft Office.  The 
resulting mass estimations for the vehicle weight can then be passed to the other 
ROSETTA models of the lunar architecture. 
3.2 RELIABILITY CALCULATIONS USING A DYNAMICALLY CHANGING FAULT 
TREE 
To model the reliability and safety disciplines in the ROSETTA model, a new 
approach was needed.  Traditionally, fault trees are used to calculate the reliability of a 
system based upon each assumed subsystem reliability.  This static approach is generally 
sufficient for calculating the reliability of a system and has been used for all types of 
systems, including the Space Shuttle.  Unfortunately, as described in Chapter 2, the FTA 
analysis is not sufficient to calculate the reliabilities of changing vehicle configurations 
since it requires that the number and placement of the subsystems be static to calculate 
the total reliability of the system.  For the methodology of this thesis, it is imperative that 
the fault trees change dynamically to adjust to the changing vehicle configurations, such 
as number of engines, propellant types, etc.  To accomplish this dynamically changing 
fault tree, a mathematical representation of the fault tree was created in Excel and was 
allowed to change based upon the input vehicle configurations.  These dynamically 
changing fault trees will be implemented in every ROSETTA model to accurately 
calculate the resulting vehicle reliability based upon the changing configurations.  The 
differences between a lunar lander with engine out and a generic lunar lander without 
engine out are shown as Figure 40 and Figure 41.  
 92
These dynamically changing fault trees must be able to not only calculate the loss 
of mission reliability of a vehicle but also the loss of crew safety.   These calculations 
differ by the severity of the failure and the ability of the crew to survive the failure type.  
For most instances, the difference between the types of failures will depend on the 
vehicle and the subsystem which failed.  For most models, the difference between LOM 
and LOC will be established via a percentage of subsystem failures that result in a LOC 
event.  Even if a LOC event occurs, it does not necessarily result in a loss of crew.  Some 
vehicles have emergency abort systems that will save the crew in the event of a LOC 
event occurs.  The success of these systems is still subject to the reliability of the crew 
abort system.  For vehicles with such an abort system, the LOC number is inflated by the 
reliability of that abort system via a parallel reliability calculation. 
 
CESeventevent RLOCLOCLOC *)1(* −=     (12) 
 
Where: LOC is the loss of crew probability of the system 
 LOCevent is the probability of a loss of crew event with the vehicle 
 RCES is the reliability of the crew escape system 
 
A summary of the individual subsystem reliability assumptions that are included in the 
reliability and safety analysis follow. 
3.2.1 GENERAL SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY MODELING METHODS 
The dynamic fault tree analysis integrated into this methodology requires that the 
individual subsystem reliabilities be defined and input into the base of the fault tree.  
These individual subsystem reliabilities are generally considered to be inputs into the 
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vehicle fault tree.  In the case of a propulsion subsystem, the subsystem reliabilities are 
highly dependant on the configuration of the vehicle.  The individual element reliabilities 
can be found in literature, but models have to be developed to calculate the total 
subsystem reliability that can be included in the dynamic fault tree analysis. 
The propulsion subsystem reliability is a combination of different reliability 
models combined to account for the possible failure modes of the each subsystem.  These 
reliability models include: 
 
• Common Cause Failure Model 
• Catastrophic Engine Failure Model 
 
Each of these models is combined into one branch of the dynamically changing fault tree 
analysis to provide the overall propulsion system reliability. 
Common Cause Failure Model 
Common Cause Failure (CCF) is a reliability technique that attempts to model the 
failures that are inherent due to flaws in all redundant systems in an element.   A standard 
definition of common cause failure is, “A subset of dependent events in which two or 
more component fault states exist at the same time, or in a short interval, and are direct 
result of a shared cause.” [60].  These CCFs usually occur in systems where multiple, 
usually redundant, components all share the same flaw.  This flaw can be a 
manufacturing, software, or other problem that is common to all redundant systems in an 
element.  An example of a CCF is a flaw in the materials properties found in many 
propellant tanks, which cause all tanks in a system to fail when stressed.  In this case a 
redundant system, such as multiple tanks of a fuel cell in a power system, can fail 
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simultaneously due to a materials flaw in the construction of many propellant tanks.  
Common cause failures are not uncommon in today’s spacecraft.  The space shuttle 
program recently had a suspected instance in a common cause failure when the electronic 
fuel cutoff switches in the external tank delayed the July launch of the Space Shuttle 
Discovery [61].  There are four hydrogen fuel sensors in the space shuttle external tank.  
It was suspected when one of the sensors failed that a manufacturing flaw could have 
possibly caused all of the sensors to fail.  This fear of a common cause failure caused the 
Discovery launch to be delayed nearly a month. 
There are many proposed methods to model CCF.  These methods include both 
explicit and implicit methods of modeling a CCF [62].  An explicit method treats the 
common cause as a separate event in the fault tree analysis.  An implicit method treats the 
common cause failure as an algebraic unreliability expression, which is then included in 
the reliability calculation input into the fault tree analysis.  In the methodology described 
in this thesis, an explicit method is chosen for extensibility because it is generally 
difficult to derive an algebraic expression of system unreliability [63]. 
There are many different explicit methods that can be chosen to model common 
cause failures in a dynamic fault tree analysis.  In this methodology a single parameter or 
β model will be used [64].  A single parameter model is a model that uses a single β 
parameter in parallel with the redundant components in a subsystem.  This β parameter is 
defined as a combination of independent failure rates and common cause failure rates as 









=       (13) 
 
Where: λc=failure rate due to common cause failures 
λI=failure rate due to independent failures 
 
This single parameter model is explicit and is therefore treated as an independent event in 
series with the component failure rate in the fault tree analysis.  An example of a 






Figure 31: Common Cause Failure Implementation into a Single Redundant System. 
 
As this fault tree shows the common cause failure is treated as a separate event, which is 
added in series with the redundant system.  For most cases the single parameter failure 
rate can be treated as a set value.  For this research a failure rate value of 0.10 was chosen 
based upon the work by Mosleh, et al. [60].   In this methodology, redundant systems will 
all be considered to have a common cause failure term.  Redundancy will be treated as a 
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k out of n system (for multiple redundancies) with a single parameter common cause 
failure added in series to this system. 
Catastrophic Engine Failure Rate 
Common cause failures are not the only specific breakdown of the subsystem 
system reliability used in this methodology.  Failure rates are broken down in this 
research according to the four types of failures defined in Huang et al [66].  This 
breakdown divides failure rates into four categories: 
 
• Catastrophic Failures 
• Non-Catastrophic Failures 
• Preventable Catastrophic Failures 
• Unnecessary Shutdown Failures 
 
The definition of these failures as well as their implementation within this research 
follows. 
 A catastrophic failure is defined as an uncontained failure the immediately results 
in a loss of vehicle.  This, in turn, will result in a loss of crew unless a crew abort system 
is in place.  Historically, catastrophic failure rates for engines range between 20% and 
40% [66].  This catastrophic failure rate was generally derived for propulsion subsystems 
but is generalized for all subsystems. 
 Non-catastrophic failure rates are considered failures that are contained by the 
failing element.  An example of this is a failure that causes the system to shutdown, but 
the vehicle can still operate with a redundant system.  The aforementioned shuttle main 
engine cutoff sensors are an example of a non-catastrophic failure.  If the sensor fails 
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“wet,” or the engine shuts down when fuel is still present, the failure is contained to this 
subsystem.  Since the ECO sensors have redundancy, this failure would not result in a 
loss of mission. 
 The third type of failure is the preventable catastrophic failure.  This type of 
failure would result in a catastrophic failure if the safety systems did not shut down the 
operating equipment.  An example of this would be an engine health management system 
shutting down an engine when redlines are exceeded.  If the health management system 
was not present, a catastrophic failure would have occurred; but it was prevented by the 
safety system. 
 The fourth and final type of failure is unnecessary shutdown failures.  These 
failures are a result of the safety systems sensor failure, where the operating element is 
shut down when no real failure has occurred.  This can be found in almost any avionics or 
health management system where redlines are too restrictive. 
 Each of these types of failures is represented as basic events in the fault tree 
analysis.  These failure rates can then be combined with the common cause failure rate to 
produce an entire subsystem failure rate.  A representation of what a propulsion system 
fault tree would look like with the CCF and catastrophic engine failure rates are included 




Figure 32: Fault Tree Representation of the Propulsion System for a Generic Launch 
Vehicle 
This figure shows a three engine propulsion system with engine out vehicle configuration 
represented as fault tree.  As this figure shows the catastrophic failure fraction rate for 
each engine must be treated as an independent event.  A catastrophic failure of any of the 
engines causes a failure of the entire vehicle.  Common cause failure is also treated much 
like a catastrophic failure rate in that it is an independent event which is in series with the 
actual elements of the vehicle.  The engine out system is treated as a k out of n system.  It 
should be noted that although the k out of n system increases the reliability, the addition 
of an extra engine catastrophic rate decreases the reliability over an ideal k out of n 
system. 
 To complete a dynamic fault tree analysis this fault tree must be mathematically 
described in the ROSETTA model.  To mathematically model this reliability, a 
catastrophic engine failure fraction was added to a k out of n system.  The mathematical 























    (15) 
 
Where: RPS is the reliability of the propulsion system 
RPS(EO) is the reliability of the propulsion system with engine 
out 
CF is the catastrophic failure rate 
RT is the single engine reliability 
PF is the preventable failure fraction 
UF is the unnecessary shutdown failure fraction 
NCFF is the non-catastrophic failure fraction 
N is the number of engines 
 
This model for loss of mission reliability can be extended to calculate the loss of crew 
reliability.  The loss of crew number includes a factor to account for the fact that the crew 
may survive a non-catastrophic failure.  That factor is included as a vehicle stage specific 
percentage of the trajectory where the crew can successfully survive a non-catastrophic 
failure.  The inclusion of this trajectory percentage for loss of crew follows. 
 
N



















   (17) 
 
Where: %T is the percentage of the trajectory where the crew can survive 
a non-catastrophic failure without a crew escape system 
RPS is the reliability of the propulsion system  
RPS(EO) is the reliability of the propulsion system with engine 
out 
 
These loss of mission and loss of crew systems representations can be combined with the 
common cause failure rate to calculate a total loss of mission and loss of crew expression.  
A summary of the analytical equations for the loss of mission and loss of crew 
reliabilities follow.  
 
Loss of Mission: 
N
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Where: β is the common cause failure percentage 
 
These equations are implemented in the ROSETTA models to address the subsystem 
reliabilities that are compiled in the development of the dynamically changing fault tree 
analysis. 
3.2.2 PROPULSION SYSTEM RELIABILITY MODELING 
Propulsion systems have multiple drivers that can lead to an engine failure.  This 
research breaks down the propulsion system reliabilities into different categories.  The 
propulsion system can be affected by: 
 
• Engine Cycle Type 
• Propellant Type 
• Reusability 
• De-rating Engines 
• Thrust Level 
 
The engine cycle type can affect the engine system reliability because the cycle type is a 
good indication of the complexity of the engine.   In this research, there will be two types 
of inspace engine cycle types considered and two types of launch vehicle engine cycle 
types considered.  For inspace engines, both pressure fed and expander cycle engines are 
considered.  These two types of engines are chosen to model all of the engines considered 
in the Apollo and ESAS mission mode architectures.  A pressure fed engine is a simple 
system that stores the propellants at high pressures in the propellant tanks.  This high 
 102
pressure provides the propellant transfer from the tanks to the combustion chamber.  This 
simple method results in a highly reliable engine but also results in higher weight, higher 
cost tanks.  An expander cycle is an engine cycle that uses the heating of the fuel in the 
nozzle to power the turbines of the pumps.  These pumps increase the complexity of the 
engine, but lower the tank weights since the tanks are allowed to operate at lower 








There are two types of launch vehicle engine cycle types considered.  The first 
cycle type is the gas generator cycle.  This cycle is widely used in launch vehicles and 
has been used on the Saturn and Delta family of launch vehicles.  The gas generator cycle 
utilizes a smaller combustion chamber or gas generator that provides the pressures to run 
the turbine systems.  These turbines then power the pumps that push the propellant to the 
combustion chamber and the gas generator.  A schematic of the gas generator cycle is 
included as Figure 34. 
 
 




The final type of engine cycle considered is the staged combustion cycle.  This 
cycle involves the presence of a preburner, which begins the combustion process by 
burning a small amount of propellant.  This combustion process drives the pumps and 
preheats the propellants as they enter the combustion chamber.  A staged combustion 
cycle type is the most complicated of the cycle types; but, since all of the propellant 
travels through the main nozzle, it provides the highest efficiency.  A schematic of a fuel-
rich staged combustion cycle is given as Figure 35. 
 
 
Figure 35: Schematic of Staged Combustion Engine Cycle [65] 
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As these figures show, the complexity, and therefore reliability, of each of 
propulsion subsystems varies depending on the propellant and engine cycle type.  These 
differences are accounted for by using table look-ups of propellant and engine cycle types 
as baseline reliabilities for the engines used in the ROSETTA models. 
 Reusability is another factor that can affect the reliability of a propulsion system.  
Reusability can increase the single flight reliability of an engine since reusable engines 
tend to be over designed for a single mission.  This over design results in higher design 
margins and therefore increased reliabilities.  Reusability also allows the engines to be 
studied post-flight and therefore possible problems can be addressed early and redesigns 
are possible before failures occur.  In the lunar architectures addressed in this research, 
there are no reusable elements and therefore reusability is not directly addressed.  
Reusable engines are used in certain architectures addressed in this research and therefore 
the higher single mission reliability is accounted for in the reliability baselines. 
 De-rating of engines is another method that can be used to increase the reliability 
of a system.  De-rating of a system involves operating an engine at a lower power level 
that the maximum design power level of the engine.  Historical evidence indicates that 
about 90% of failure modes and causes are power level related [66].  Models exist that 
attempt to quantify the reliability change as a function of the power level of the engine.  
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Where: TIFF is Throttle Insensitivity Failure Fraction 
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PL is the operational power level 
RF is reliability based factor dependant on fuel type 
 
This equation defines the de-rated reliability of an engine as a function of the 100% 
throttle reliability and multiplicative factors that are a function of the propellant type.  A 
graph of the reliability as a function of throttle level for the Space Shuttle Main Engine 
(SSME) is calculated from equation 10 and the TIFF factor defined in the ESAS final 




















Figure 36: De-rating Engine Reliability for the Space Shuttle Main Engine. 
 
As this figure indicates, the reliability of an engine falls off dramatically as the throttle 
percentage increases above 100%.   The de-rating of the engine only increases the 
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reliability slightly; and therefore, all engines will be assumed to run at 100% throttle for 
this research. 
 A final driver considered for the propulsion analysis is the reliability of changing 
the thrust level of an engine when compared to the existing baseline engine.  The 
reliability of every vehicle propulsion system changes as the vehicle scales.  This occurs 
because the engine reliability is a function of the size (thrust) of an engine.  In conceptual 
vehicle design, it is common to “rubberize” engines, or increase the engine thrust level as 
the vehicle grows.  The relationship between engine size and engine failure rate is 
established as a power function when compared to a baseline engine [67].  This 












tRatedThrusBLPRubbP   (23) 
 
Where: PFailure(Rubb) is the probability of failure of the rubberized engine 
PFailure(BL) is the probability of failure of the baseline engine 
RatedThrust is the new thrust level for the rubberized engine 
RatedThrustBL is the thrust level of the baseline engine 
 
In this reliability model the baseline engine is the propellant type and engine cycle type 
of the rubberized engine being evaluated.  This equation was evaluated for a staged 
combustion LOX/RP1 engine (RD-180) and a staged combustion LOX/LH2 engine 






















Figure 37: Rubberized Engine Reliability for the SSME and RD-180 based Engines 
 
As this figure depicts, the total engine reliability is a weak function of the thrust of the 
engine.  The RD-180 reliability is significantly lower than the SSME baseline reliability.  
This difference in reliability is due to the amount of inspection and evaluation that has 
gone into the reusable SSME as apposed to the expendable RD-180.  This model was 
incorporated into the ESAS final report and will be used in the propulsion reliability 
calculations for the dynamically changing fault trees of the ROSETTA model. 
 At the beginning of this research, engine testing was also considered a major 
driver for the total reliability of an engine.  An evaluation of existing engine data 
indicates that propulsion system configuration (propellant type and cycle type) is 
independent of the increase in reliability due to testing.  This difference between the 
inherent reliability and the demonstrated reliability is therefore constant for all engine 
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Figure 38: Engine Demonstrated Reliability as a Function of Testing 
 
As figure shows, there is a relationship between the number of engine tests and the total 
demonstrated reliability of the engine.  This relationship is independent of the number of 
test firings and will therefore not affect the lunar architecture selections that are made 
with this methodology. 
 The fact that there is a relationship between testing and reliability should not be 
completely ignored.  Even though the lunar architecture selection tool will not optimize 
based upon engine testing, the ability to model the increased cost and reliability of the 
system due to testing should be incorporated into the ROSETTA models.  To accomplish 
the increased cost with testing, a K factor was applied to the costing model as a function 
of the required number of engine tests to achieve the desired inputted engine reliability.  
This cost multiplier is described in Transcost and is presented below [38].   
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Figure 39: Costing K Factor for Engine Testing 
 
As this figure shows the K-factor for the cost of engine testing can either increase or 
decrease the total design, development, testing, and evaluation costs by up to 50%.  The 
costing model included in the ROSETTA models will be discussed in detail in Section 
3.3. 
 As the vehicle propellant type changes the total reliability and cost of that vehicle 
changes.  For example as the propellant of a Lunar module changes from a UDMH/N2O4 
pressure fed engine to an LOX/LH2 expander cycle engine the performance, cost, and 
reliability of the vehicle changes.  A comparison between each propellant type for a lunar 
lander using Apollo LOR requirements and pressure fed engines is given below as Table 
12, while the expander cycle propellant comparisons are given as Table 13. 
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Table 12: Comparison of Different Propellant Types for a Pressure Fed Apollo LM 
 UDMH/N2O4 LOX/CH4 LOX/LH2 
Dry Mass 4,216 kg 5,433 kg 7,863 kg  
Gross Mass 16,183 kg 18,114 kg 19,875 kg 
LOM  0.8918 0.8297 0.7942 
LOV 0.8941 0.8318 0.7962 
 
 
Table 13: Comparison of Different Propellant Types for an Expander Cycle Apollo LM 
 UDMH/N2O4 LOX/CH4 LOX/LH2 
Dry Mass 3,202 kg 3,423 kg 3,738 kg 
Gross Mass 12,474 kg 11,867 kg 10,436 kg 
LOM  0.8818 0.8807 0.8652 
LOV 0.8841 0.883 0.8674 
 
 
As these tables show, the dynamically changing fault trees account for the different 
engine cycle types and propellant types chosen in the ROSETTA models.  In comparing 
the pressure fed engines the engine reliabilities are higher for the hypergolic propellants, 
but are lower for the cryogenic LOX/CH4 and LOX/LH2 propellants.  This is a result of 
the increased tank sizes necessary for the pressure fed engines and the low densities of 
the cryogenic propellants.  As the engine cycle type is changed to expander cycle the tank 
weights drop significantly and the engine reliabilities play a much larger role in the 
vehicle reliability.   Therefore the hypergolic propellants have the highest reliability 
followed by the lower density higher energy cryogenic propellants. 
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3.2.3 STRUCTURAL SYSTEM RELIABILITY MODELING 
As with the propulsion subsystem the structural subsystem must also change with 
the changing vehicle configurations.  Generally, five different structural materials will be 





• Graphite Epoxy (or Graphite Epoxy Wrapped Aluminums for propellant 
tanks) 
• Metal Matrix Composites 
 
Of these five materials, aluminum and aluminum-lithium are widely used in spacecraft 
structures.  Titanium and graphite epoxy are widely used in aerospace systems, and metal 
matrix composites is new material that is being tested to be used in high strength light 
weight applications [68].  It is considered in the ROSETTA models that titanium, 
aluminum, and aluminum-lithium have high reliabilities due to the common use of these 
materials.  Graphite epoxy has a slightly lower reliability due to the fact that it is 
relatively new in manned spacecraft applications.  Metal matrix composites have the 
lowest reliability of any of the material due to the fact that they have never been used in 
manned spacecraft designs. 
 To model the changing reliabilities due to structural changes a table lookup is 
used to change the baseline reliability of the subsystem.  This baseline reliability is then 
compiled with the catastrophic and common cause failure rates to get the reliability of the 
tank subsystems.  The primary and secondary structural reliabilities are calculated much 
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the same way as the tank calculations.  A summary of these reliabilities is given in 
Appendix B. 
3.2.4 OTHER  SUBSYSTEMS  MODELING TECHNIQUE 
Each of the subsequent subsystems in the vehicle ROSETTA models is modeled 
in much the same way as the structural reliabilities.  The baseline reliability numbers are 
derived from the vehicle specific Apollo subsystem reliabilities [69].  These reliabilities 
are then adjusted for the ESAS ROSETTA models to adjust the Apollo reliabilities to 
account for increased reliability gained due to increased use and verification since the 
Apollo program.  This factor is vehicle specific and will be addressed in Chapter 4.  A 
summary of the subsystem reliabilities is given in Appendix B. 
3.2.5 CASE STUDY-LUNAR MODULE ROSETTA MODEL RELIABILITY MODEL 
Once the individual subsystem reliabilities are mathematically modeled the 
subsystems are compiled into one vehicle model.  This model is then incorporated into 
the ROSETTA mode and designed to change with the changing vehicle inputs.  As these 
vehicle inputs change the fault tree must also change.  The problem with static fault trees 

















Figure 41: Fault Tree of Lunar Module with Engine Out Capability 
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As these figures show adding a single engine out capability (a second engine to the 
operating engine) results in a drastic change to the fault tree.  This is difficult and time 
consuming to set up all of the possible options in a fault tree analysis.  The dynamically 
changing fault tree can adjust for redundancy (engine out) of any subsystem 
automatically in the spreadsheet tool. 
To verify the spreadsheet tool, two discrete lunar module configurations were 
constructed in Relex [33].  Once confirmed with the fault tree tool the dynamically 
changing fault tree was integrated in the ROSETTA models.  This model can accurately 
and quickly evaluate any vehicle configuration allowed by the performance models, 
including redundancy on any subsystem.  A screenshot of the mathematical 























































This figure shows a screenshot of the spreadsheet model of the dynamically changing 
fault tree analysis.  As this picture shows, each of the subsystem reliability inputs are 
adjusted by the redundancy and the catastrophic and common cause failure rates.  The 
resulting loss of mission reliabilities and loss of crew safeties are then calculated for each 
ROSETTA model.  These results are then passed to the architecture model to compile the 
lunar mission mode architecture reliability and safety.  A comparison of the resulting 
reliabilities with the Apollo estimates is given in Chapter 4. 
3.3 COST ESTIMATION USING NAFCOM BASED COST ESTIMATING 
RELATIONSHIPS 
To calculate the top level design discriminators, it is necessary to get an accurate 
cost model to predict the vehicle costs and compile architecture life cycle costs.  The 
baseline cost models are cost estimating relationships described in Chapter 2.  These 
CERs are weight based costing relationships that are based upon analogous systems to 
calculate the Design, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (DDT&E) costs as well as 
the Theoretical First Unit (TFU) costs.   These costs will then be compiled into a Life 
Cycle Cost (LCC) which will then be combined with the vehicle reliability to calculate 
the Pareto frontier which will be used to make the lunar architecture mode decision. 
3.3.1 BASELINE NAFCOM COST ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIPS FOR LUNAR 
ARCHITECTURES 
 As described in Chapter 2, the cost model used in the ROSETTA models is 
NAFCOM CER based.  The a and b terms are derived from analogous vehicles which can 
be obtained from NAFCOM 04 for all of the Apollo vehicles [70].  These subsystem 
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based costs are then compiled into a stage cost.  This stage cost is then multiplied by 
NAFCOM relationships for Program Management, Integration, Assembly and Checkout, 
System Test Operations, Ground Support Equipment, and System Engineering and 
Integration.  A cost margin of 20% is also applied to all vehicles which do not currently 
exist.  The complexity factors for the CERs are all baselined at one and manipulated via 
the vehicle configuration choices and the cost penalties for using off-nominal reliabilities.  
These CERs are then linked with the weights calculation page in the ROSETTA models 
so that as the vehicle scales the costs automatically recalculate.   
3.3.2 COMPLEXITY FACTORS 
The complexity factor portion of the CERs is adjusted based upon the vehicle 
configuration.  These complexity factors adjust for the fact that some materials are more 
expensive per pound than others.  An example of this is that a tank made out of Titanium 
will weigh less than a tank made out of aluminum, but the titanium tank should cost more 
than the aluminum tank.  A summary of the structural complexity factors is given as 
Table 14 [71]. 
 
Table 14: Complexity Factors for Tank Structural Materials 









As this table shows, the cost per pound of different spacecraft materials varies greatly.  
Aluminum is the cheapest and most widely used material.  Graphite epoxy is currently 
estimated to be 5 times the price per pound of Al; however, the actual cost of a tank could 
be less than that of aluminum because the weight of the tank is significantly lighter due to 
the higher strength and lower density of graphite epoxy.   
3.3.3 COST ESTIMATION FOR OFF-NOMINAL RELIABILITIES 
Once the baseline costs are calculated, it is necessary to calculate the cost of off 
nominal reliabilities of subsystems.  It is possible that the actual reliability may be higher 
or lower than the assumed reliability of the subsystem.  If uncertainty is applied to the 
subsystem reliability, it is necessary to evaluate the costs of changing the reliabilities off 
of the baseline.  To calculate the costs of off nominal reliabilities, a reliability cost model 
was formulated by the ReliaSoft Corporation [72].  This cost model assumes an 
exponential behavior of the cost of increasing the reliability of the system.  The ReliaSoft 












−=    (24) 
 
Where: Ci is the subsystem cost  
f is the feasibility of increasing the subsystem reliability 
Ri is the subsystem reliability 
Ri,min is the minimum reliability of the subsystem 
Ri,max is the maximum reliability of the subsystem 
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The cost of increasing reliability is obtained from this model.  Unfortunately this cost 
model does not take into account any information about the current state of the art 
reliability of the component.  To account for this reliability, the exponential equation 
above was normalized by the exponential curve for the state of the art reliability.  This 
results in a K-factor which can be applied to the CERs as a complexity factor to adjust 
the costs of increasing a component’s reliability beyond the state of the art.  This equation 


























    (25) 
Where: K is the complexity factor applied to the CER  
RSOA is the state of the art subsystem reliability  
 
This model can then be directly applied to the CERs via equation 26. 
 
bWaKCost )(*=      (26) 
 
Where: C is the subsystem cost.  
 
The resulting subsystem costs can be compiled and the total vehicle DDT&E and TFU 
costs can be calculated.  These vehicle costs can then be included into the lunar 
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architecture selection tool to calculate the architecture Life Cycle Costs (LCC).  A 
comparison of the resulting costs and the Apollo costs are given in Chapter 4. 
3.3.4 LIFE CYCLE COST CALCULATOR 
 Once the vehicle costs are calculated for each of the vehicles in the lunar 
architecture, the total life cycle costs for the architecture can be calculated.  The life cycle 
cost calculator used in this thesis spreads the DDT&E out over a specified number of 
years at the beginning of the program.  This DDT&E is spread as a Beta function over the 
specified number of years.  Once the DDT&E is paid, a flight rate is assumed and the 
cost per flight is calculated based upon the production costs for the elements.  This 
production cost is calculated from the TFU costs and a learning curve rate as described in 
Chapter 2.  This learning curve diminishes the cost of subsequent production vehicles 
because of the knowledge gained in producing the previous vehicle.  For this research a 
learning curve rate of 90% was assumed.  The top level inputs to the life cycle cost 
calculator are: 
 
• Start year for the program 
• Total number of years of the program 
• Number of years to spread DDT&E 
• Flight rate (number of flights per year) 
• Learning curve rate 
 
From the top level data and the DDT&E and TFU costs of the different architecture 
elements, a total life cycle cost can be calculated.  A typical cost spreading for a lunar 



















































Figure 43: Life Cycle Cost Spreading for a Lunar Architecture 
 
In this example, the four architecture elements’ DDT&E were spread over the first nine 
years of the program starting in 2010.  The program continues for another 16 years to 
give a total program life of 25 years.  For the 16 flight years, a flight rate of 2 flights per 
year is assumed.  The resulting 32 flights are then compiled with the DDT&E to calculate 
the total LCC.  The production vehicles decrease in cost via the learning curve rate of 
90%.  The total LCC is then used along with the loss of mission reliability to calculate the 
individual points on the Pareto frontier.  This generic baseline mission profile (number of 
years, DDT&E spreading, learning curve, and start year) will be used for all architecture 
comparisons made in this research. 
 The life cycle cost described in this methodology does not include an operations 
cost, nor does it include a disposal cost.  The operations cost is highly dependant on the 
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workforce and includes political aspects, both of which are difficult to quantify.  The 
disposal cost is a small percentage of the LCC and is needed for all lunar architectures.  
Like the Apollo program and soon the space shuttle program, the program elements 
continue to be utilized long after the vehicle is retired.  Because of these reasons the 
disposal cost is difficult to quantify and will not directly affect the lunar architecture 
decision. 
3.3.5 CASE STUDY-LUNAR MODULE ROSETTA MODEL COSTING MODEL 
As with the reliability model described in the previous section, the cost model 
described above was implemented in the ROSETTA models included in the lunar 
architecture selection tool.  The CERs are implemented in a spreadsheet along with the 
NAFCOM a and b coefficients to calculate the subsystem DDT&E and TFU costs.   The 
complexity factors for each of the subsystems are calculated as product of the original 
CER complexity factors calculated from the configuration type and the K-factor 
calculated from the reliability sheet.  Each of these subsystem costs are then compiled to 
obtain the stage costs for the vehicle.  These CERs are then linked with the weights 
calculated in the performance sections of the ROSETTA model to automatically update 
the subsystem costs as the vehicle scales. 
The stage costs calculated from the NAFCOM relationships and the exponential 
cost-reliability model are then complied into an overall vehicle DDT&E and TFU.  The 
resulting DDT&E and TFU are then passed to the architecture life cycle cost calculator to 
compute the total LCC of the system.  A screen shot of the spreadsheet implementation of 












3.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF ROSETTA MODELS IN A LUNAR ARCHITECTURE 
SELECTION TOOL 
Once the ROSETTA models are completed for each of the vehicles required in 
the lunar mission mode, the vehicles must be integrated into a lunar architecture selection 
tool.  To complete the lunar architecture DSM, the individual vehicle models must be 
included in an integrated framework to pass the vehicle mass, costs, and reliabilities 
between the elements of the architecture.  ModelCenter is an integrated framework 
ideally set up to integrate multiple Excel based models and pass information between the 
models [73].  Each of the ROSETTA models were wrapped in ModelCenter wrappers 
and vehicle masses, costs, and reliabilities are then passed between the different 
ROSETTA models to complete the lunar architecture. 
A separate inputs and cost accumulator module were also included in the 
integrated framework.  The inputs module conditioned the vehicle level inputs so that the 
full lunar architecture is simulated.  An example of this is that the Inputs page takes a 
user’s selection of the lunar orbit rendezvous mission mode and sets the individual 
vehicles to perform the proper burns to complete the lunar orbit rendezvous.  The cost 
accumulator module calculates the life cycle cost for the lunar architecture and performs 
the yearly cost spreading necessary to create Figure 43.  The resulting methodology is 
summarized in the flow chart presented as Figure 45.  As this figure shows, the method 
involves a series of architecture inputs to be selected by the user.  Once the mission mode 
and architecture inputs are selected, a Monte Carlo analysis randomly generates vehicle 
inputs which result in a design space exploration.  The Pareto frontier is then taken from 
that design space exploration. 
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Figure 45: Monte Carlo Methodology of Lunar Architecture Selection 
 
3.4.1 OPTIMIZATION OF LUNAR VEHICLES 
The first design problem to be solved by this methodology is the lunar vehicle 
selection problem.  For a given architecture mode, there are hundreds of thousands of 
different vehicle configurations that can accomplish the mission.  Each of these vehicle 
configurations has an associated mass, cost, and reliability.  To find the series of optimal 
Pareto solutions for the lunar vehicle a Monte Carlo analysis was completed for the 
vehicle ROSETTA model.  This Monte Carlo analysis consisted of a series of 50,000 
random sets of design variables created from a uniform distribution placed on each 
variable.  The results of the Monte Carlo analysis for an Apollo-like lunar module are 
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Figure 46: Monte Carlo Design Space Exploration of Apollo-like Lunar Module 
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The Pareto frontier created in Figure 47 depicts the optimal points from the design space 
exploration of the Apollo-like lunar module.  As the number of design variables 
increases, the number of Monte Carlo simulation necessary to define the Pareto frontier 
increases exponentially.  For a lunar module of 10 design variables, 50,000 runs is 
sufficient to define the design space.   As the number of design variables increases to the 
50 to 100 design variables necessary to define a lunar architecture, the Monte Carlo 
analysis exploration of the design space is no longer adequate.  To investigate lunar 
architectures a Genetic Algorithm as described in Chapter 2 is applied to the lunar 
architecture framework.  This integration of the GA and the lunar architecture model is 
shown as Figure 48. 
 
 
Figure 48: Integrated Lunar Architecture Selection Tool with Genetic Algorithm 
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As this figure shows, the GA takes the place of the Monte Carlo analysis and an Overall 
Evaluation Criteria (OEC) is used as the objective function of the optimizer.  This 
method is stochastic in that the initial population is randomly generated, but as a result of 
the higher objective function solution stay in the simulation longer, more points are 
evaluated around the Pareto frontier than a Monte Carlo analysis for a given number of 
simulations.  The GA is solved for a given weighting (α) on the OEC. The OEC is given 
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The baseline LCC and R are different for the different lunar modes that are optimized.  
Each baseline is either the baseline numbers computed for the Apollo mission modes or 
the ESAS baseline.  Each baseline was verified in Chapter 4 and then simulated using the 
generic lunar mission cost spreading shown in Figure 43.  A summary of the LCC and 
reliability baselines is given as Table 15. 
 
Table 15: OEC Baseline Values for Each Lunar Mode 
Mission Mode Baseline LCC Baseline Reliability 
Apollo LOR $72,210 M 0.5245 
Apollo EOR $96,392 M 0.3572 
Apollo Direct $87,975 M 0.5315 





This method optimizes the Pareto frontier on an OEC constructed of loss of mission 
reliability and life cycle cost.  This weighting (α) is then changed and the GA is rerun to 
find a second point on the Pareto frontier.  The aforementioned procedure continues until 
enough points in the Pareto frontier are defined to adequately evaluate the Pareto frontier.  
A comparison of the Monte Carlo analysis and the GA implementation of the lunar 
architecture selection tool are given as Figure 49. 
Figure 49 demonstrates the fact that the GA solves the Pareto frontier at least as 
accurately as the Monte Carlo analysis.  In fact the GA finds slightly better solutions.  
This is a result of the fact that the GA is evaluating more points around the solution that 
the purely random Monte Carlo analysis.  The GA also found the Pareto frontier in 
approximately 25,000 function calls.  This was completed in half the time it took the 
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Figure 49: Comparison of Monte Carlo Analysis and Genetic Algorithm for an Apollo-
like Lunar Module 
   
The given method of defining the Pareto frontier through the use of a GA will be 
implemented in all subsequent lunar architecture selection problems and the resulting 
Pareto frontiers will then be used by the decision maker to define the ideal lunar 
architecture for a given LCC. 
3.5 IMPLEMENTATION OF UNCERTAINTY IN LUNAR ARCHITECTURE 
SELECTION TOOL 
Once the methodology of optimizing a lunar architecture is set, it is necessary to 
address the uncertainty in the individual vehicle ROSETTA models.  As noted in Chapter 
2, the uncertainty in the ROSETTA models will be addressed with a Monte Carlo 
analysis.  The Monte Carlo analysis will be conducted by applying triangular 
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distributions to the subsystem reliabilities and the catastrophic engine fractions in each of 
the ROSETTA models.  The range of the triangular distributions will be set to be 90-
110% of the baseline failure rates.  The range of the catastrophic engine failure rates will 
be set to 10-20%.  Once these distributions are set each optimized Pareto points will be 
evaluated through a 10,000 run Monte Carlo simulation to address the uncertainty 
associated with reliability of the architecture. 
As noted in Section 3.3.3, the cost of off-nominal reliabilities will also be 
addressed.  As the Monte Carlo analysis changes the subsystem reliabilities, the cost 
model will also adjust the vehicle costs to take into account the increase or decrease in 
reliability.  The result will be a Probability Density Function (PDF) on the cost and 
reliability of the system.  Once this PDF is defined, it can be integrated and the 
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) can be found.  Once this CDF is created error 
bars can be applied to the resulting Pareto frontiers to get a 10% and 90% confidence 
band.  This resulting band will define the limits (best and worst case scenarios) of the 
lunar architecture mode.  These best and worst case scenarios can then be compared 




CHAPTER 4                                                             
VALIDATIONS OF LUNAR ARCHITECTURE SIMULATION 
 
 
Chapter 3 described the method that is used to supply the decision maker with the 
ability to choose different optimized lunar architectures based upon the high level design 
discriminators such as cost, reliability, and safety.  This method is then applied to 
different baseline lunar architecture modes to determine the Pareto frontier for each of 
these modes.  The Pareto frontiers supply the decision maker with information about the 
most reliable architecture selections for changing budgets (life cycle costs) of the lunar 
program.  To baseline this technique, the three Apollo modes that were under 
consideration in the 1960s (Earth Orbit Rendezvous, Lunar Orbit Rendezvous, and Lunar 
Direct Missions) were simulated and compared with the solutions obtained in the Apollo 
Program.  To baseline the models with current vehicle design techniques; the Exploration 
System Architecture Study (ESAS) (EOR-LOR) mission mode was also simulated and 
compared with the baseline values.  Once the procedure is verified, it was used to 
calculate the optimal Pareto frontiers for each of the mission modes. 
To verify this design methodology and to validate the accuracy of the ROSETTA 
models, each of the mission modes under consideration was simulated and compared 
with the solutions obtained using the conventional conceptual design techniques.  To 
accomplish this simulation a complete ROSETTA model was created for each of the 
vehicles in the lunar architectures.  These ROSETTA models were individually validated 
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and then compiled into a lunar architecture using a ModelCenter integration environment 
[73].  This ModelCenter based simulations will then be used to compute the performance, 
cost, reliability, and safety for each of the lunar mission modes.  These results 
(performance, cost, and reliability) are then compared with the results from a 
conventional conceptual design process to validate the method and the results of each of 
the lunar architecture simulations. 
4.1 APOLLO LUNAR ORBIT RENDEZVOUS BASELINE 
Perhaps the most recognizable mission mode for lunar exploration is the Apollo 
Lunar Orbit Rendezvous mission mode.  The LOR mission mode was originally 
championed by John Houbolt, a NASA Langley engineer [7].   This mission mode 
involved the use of a single Saturn V (C-5) launch vehicle to launch a three person 
Command Module (CM), a hypergolic pressure fed service module (SM), and a two 
person, two stage hypergolic pressure fed Lunar Module (LM).  This mission mode is 
demonstrated in Figure 50. 
 
 
Figure 50: Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mission Mode [4]. 
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As this figure depicts, the Apollo LOR concept involves a single launch of a Saturn V 
launch vehicle.  The Saturn V is a three stage launch vehicle consisting of an S-I C first 
stage, and S-II second stage and an S-IV B third stage.  The three man crew resides in the 
Command Module (CM) during the ascent.  The CM is an Aluminum capsule designed to 
carry the crew to the low lunar orbit and return them to the Earth.   Once in Low Earth 
Orbit (LEO) the S-IV-B performs a burn (Trans Lunar Injection (TLI)) to propel the 
vehicle stack to the Moon.  The Service Module (SM) enters the stack (Lunar Module 
(LM) and CM) into Low Lunar Orbit (LLO). The Lunar Module is designed to take two 
men (via a separate habitat) to the lunar surface from low lunar orbit.  The third man 
remains in the CM for the duration of the lunar surface mission. The LM is a two stage 
vehicle that uses common propellants as the SM.  The staging point for the LM is at the 
lunar surface.   The Lunar Ascent Module then returns the two man lunar crew to LLO 
and rendezvous with the CM and the SM.  The SM propels the CM to earth by 
performing the trans-earth injection (TEI) burn. The CM subsequently enters the Earth’s 
atmosphere and descends via parachutes for a water touch down. A compilation of the 
design choices made in the Apollo LOR mission is given below as Table 16 and Table 
17. 
 
Table 16: Propellant Choices for Apollo LOR. 
Vehicle Propellants Engine Engine Number 
S-I-C LOX/RP1 F-1 (Gas Generator) 5 
S-II LOX/LH2 J-2 (Gas Generator) 5 
S-IV B LOX/LH2 J-2 (Gas Generator) 1 
SM UDMH/N204 Pressure Fed 1 
LM Descent UDMH/N204 Pressure Fed 1 
LM Ascent UDMH/N204 Pressure Fed 1 
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Table 17: Structure Choices for Apollo LOR. 
Structure Main Tanks Pressurant Tanks Other Structure 
S-I-C Al Ti Al 
S-II Al Ti Al 
S-IV B Al Ti Al 
CM NA Al Al 
SM Al Ti Al 
LM Descent Al Ti Al 
LM Ascent Al Ti Al 
 
 
It is important to note that the Apollo LOR mission mode assumes the same engines for 
the second and third stages of the Saturn V.  This is important because the DDT&E for 
this engine can be shared by both stages.  The same is true for the LM descent engine and 
the SM engine.  These engines used the same propellant and are approximately the same 
thrust levels so a cost benefit also occurs.   
The Apollo LOR was simulated in ModelCenter using ROSETTA models and the 
methods described in Chapter 3.  The simulation involved the creation of ROSETTA 
models for the Command Module, the Service Module, the Lunar Module, and the Saturn 
V.  These ROSETTA modules were then wrapped in ModelCenter to integrate the 
performance characteristics of the mission mode.  The Architecture Cost Model (ACM) 
was also integrated to compile the costs of the different vehicles can then calculate the 
total Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of the mission mode. 
Each of the ROSETTA models were constructed using Response Surface 
Methods for performance calculations, NAFCOM based cost estimations, and 
dynamically changing fault trees for the reliability analysis.  The original subsystem 
reliabilities for the fault tree analyses were derived from the Apollo Reliability and 
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Quality Assurance Program Quarterly Status Report [69].  These reliabilities were 
compiled in the dynamic fault trees to calculate the Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of 
Crew (LOC) values for each of the ROSETTA models.  A screen shot of the 
ModelCenter tool is given as Figure 51. 
 
 
Figure 51: ModelCenter Based Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Simulation [73]. 
 
As this figure demonstrates, ModelCenter treats the design problem like a Design 
Structure Matrix (DSM).  Each of the contributing analyses is a vehicle in the lunar 
architecture.  The first box is a program to condition the inputs so that a single model can 
be used to evaluate each of the mission modes with minimal model changes.  The final 
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box is the Architecture Cost Model which compiles the performance, costs, and 
reliabilities and applies the cost spreading over the life of the architecture to obtain the 
Life Cycle Cost.  The Apollo LOR DSM contributing analysis order is set up so the 
architecture can be computed as a completely feed-forward system.  The resulting 
simulation has 83 design variables and each closed architecture can be computed in less 
than five seconds. 
The Apollo LOR baseline was computed using this ROSETTA based simulation 
tool.  The 83 design variables were set and the ROSETTA models were evaluated to 
close the Apollo LOR mission mode.  The performance results were compared between 
the simulation results and the actual Apollo LOR vehicle weights [74].  The results are 
given as Table 18. 
 
Table 18: Comparison of Apollo LOR Performance Results. 
 Apollo Baseline ROSETTA Models % Diff 
CM 5,922 kg 6,024 kg 1.72% 
SM 24,721 kg 24,917 kg 0.79% 
LM 16,437 kg 16,183 kg -1.54% 
Stack 47,079 kg 47,124 kg 0.09% 
S-I-C 2,278,712 kg 2,279,540 kg 0.04% 
S-II 483,951 kg 477,181 kg -1.40% 
S-IV 122,723 kg 128,378 kg 4.61% 
CES 4,161 kg 4,106 kg -1.32% 
On Pad 2,936,627 kg 2,936,329 kg -0.01% 
 
 
As this table shows, the mass results for the ROSETTA models are within 5% of the 
actual vehicle weights.  The biggest discrepancy is on the Saturn IV-B stage.  This large 
discrepancy may be due to the fact that any errors in the stack weight are compounded in 
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the TEI stage since it must perform the large delta V (~10,000 ft/s) required for that burn.  
The entire stack weight is within 0.01% of the actual mass of the Saturn V vehicle at the 
pad.  These mass estimations are very accurate and have to do with the fact that very few 
manned space vehicles have been built and the MERs used in the ROSETTA models 
have been based upon this limited vehicle set which includes the Apollo vehicles. 
 The mass estimates for the Apollo LOR mission mode are very accurate; and 
therefore, a mass-based cost comparison can be made between the Apollo architecture 
costs and the ROSETTA model calculated costs.  As noted previously, these Cost 
Estimating Relationships (CERs) are bottoms-up subsystem based costing methods. 
These NAFCOM based CERs scale according to the mass of the subsystems and the 
complexity of the subsystem as compared with the baseline.  The resulting simulation 
costs are then compared with the NAFCOM published cost for the Apollo vehicles.  The 
comparison of Design Development Testing & Evaluation (DDT&E) is given as Table 19 
and the Theoretical First Unit (TFU) costs are given as Table 20. 
 
Table 19: Apollo LOR Design Development Testing and Evaluation Cost Comparison. 
$M 2004 Apollo ROSETTA Models % Diff 
CSM $10,505 M $10,773 M 2.55% 
LM $6,752 M $6,639 M -1.67% 
Saturn V $13,887 M $13,744 M -1.03% 





Table 20: Apollo LOR Theoretical First Unit Cost Comparison. 
$M 2004 Apollo ROSETTA Models % Diff 
CSM $294 M $309 M 5.10% 
LM $651 M $733 M 12.60% 
Saturn V $901 M $832 M -7.71% 
Total TFU $1,846 M $1,874 M 1.49% 
 
 
As these tables show, the costs are very close for each of the vehicles in the Apollo LOR.  
DDT&E costs are within 3% for all of the elements of the architecture.  The error 
associated with the TFU costs is slightly higher.  The main difference is in the TFU of the 
LM.  This higher cost of 12% results in a difference of $82 million dollars.  Even with 
this difference, the total TFU is only off by 1.49%, or $8 million dollars, for the first 
vehicle.  The ROSETTA calculated cost to first vehicle is $33.03 Billion which is less 
than 0.1% off the actual cost to first vehicle of $32.99 Billion. 
 The dynamically changing fault tree analysis incorporated in each ROSETTA 
model calculates the total vehicle reliability based upon the assumed subsystem 
reliabilities and the vehicle configurations.  The reliability analysis was conducted for 
each of the ROSETTA models in the Apollo LOR, and the results were compared with 
those published in the Apollo Reliability and Quality Assurance Program Quarterly 






Table 21: Apollo LOR Loss of Mission Reliability Comparison. 
 Apollo ROSETTA Models % Diff 
CSM 0.7662 0.7648 -0.19% 
LM 0.8894 0.8918 0.27% 
Stack 0.6815 0.6820 0.08% 
Saturn V 0.7639 0.7690 0.66% 
LOM 0.5206 0.5245 0.75% 
 
 
As this table shows, the resulting Apollo LOR reliability calculations are within 1% of 
the actual calculated Apollo LOR LOM reliabilities.  This high level of accuracy is 
achieved because of the subsystem reliabilities are derived from the actual Apollo 
numbers.  The total calculated LOM is 0.5245, or a loss of mission in every 2.10 flights.  
The demonstrated LOM of the Apollo LOR system is 1 loss in 7 flights or 0.87.  For 
comparison purposes, the different lunar mode reliabilities will be based upon the 
calculated reliabilities and not the demonstrated reliabilities of the LOR. 
 The ROSETTA model accurately calculates the performance, cost, and reliability 
of the Apollo LOR mission mode.  These ROSETTA models, combined in the 
ModelCenter environment, will then be used to find the Pareto frontiers of the ideal 
reliabilities for the varying budgets of the LOR program. 
4.2 APOLLO DIRECT MISSION MODE BASELINE 
The Apollo Direct (DIR) is a second mission mode considered by the Apollo 
project.  This mission mode was actually the first considered by NASA and requires the 
largest vehicles.  This mission mode involved the use of a large Saturn derived NOVA 
launch vehicle.  This massive launch vehicle would launch a vehicle stack which would 
take three men to the surface of the Moon and return them to Earth. The Nova launch 
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vehicle launches a three person Command Module (CM), a hypergolic pressure fed 
service module (SM), a LOX/LH2 expander cycle Lunar Breaking Module (LBM) and a 
stage hypergolic pressure fed Lunar Touch Down Module (LTDM).  This mission mode 




Figure 52: Direct Mission Mode [4]. 
 
As this figure depicts, the Direct mission concept involves a single launch of a Nova 
launch vehicle.  The Nova launch vehicle is a three stage launch vehicle derived from the 
Saturn V launch vehicle.  The Nova vehicle has 8 F-1 derived engines and 8 J-2 derived 
engines on the second stage.  The third stage of the Nova vehicle is similar to the S-IV-B 
stage with one J-2 derived engine.  The CM is similar to the CM used by the Apollo LOR 
in that it is a three man Aluminum capsule.  Once in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), the third 
stage of the NOVA performs a burn (Trans Lunar Injection (TLI)) to propel the stack to 
the Moon.  The LBM slows the vehicle stack at the moon and descends the stack towards 
the lunar surface.  The LBM then stages and the LTDM hovers and lands the entire stack 
(CM and SM) on the lunar surface.  Finally, the CEV acts as the lunar habitat on the lunar 
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surface and the SM provides the power for the surface missions.  After the lunar surface 
mission the SM performs the ascent from the lunar surface and the TEI burn. The CM 
then directly enters the Earth’s atmosphere and descends via parachutes for a water touch 
down. A compilation of the design choices made in the Apollo Direct mission is given 
below as Table 22 and Table 23. 
 
Table 22: Propellant Choices for Apollo Direct. 
Vehicle Propellants Engine Engine Number
Nova 1st Stage LOX/RP1 F-1 Derived (Gas Generator) 8 
Nova 2nd Stage LOX/LH2 J-2 Derived (Gas Generator) 8 
Nova 3rd Stage LOX/LH2 J-2 Derived (Gas Generator) 1 
SM UDMH/N204 Pressure Fed 1 
LBM LOX/LH2 Expander 1 
LTDM UDMH/N204 Pressure Fed 1 
 
 
Table 23: Structure Choices for Apollo Direct. 
Structure Main Tanks Pressurant Tanks Other Structure 
Nova 1st Stage Al Ti Al 
Nova 2nd Stage Al Ti Al 
Nova 3rd Stage Al Ti Al 
CM NA Al Al 
SM Al Ti Al 
LBM Al Ti Al 
LTDM Al Ti Al 
 
 
As with the Apollo LOR mission mode, the Apollo Direct mission mode assumes the 
same engines for the second and third stages of the launch vehicle.  This is important 
because the DDT&E for this engine can be shared by both stages.  It is interesting to note 
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that the LBM uses RL-10 based LOX/LH2 expander cycle engines.  This propellant 
choice is made to limit the weight of the launched vehicle stack 
As with the Apollo LOR mission mode, the Direct mission was simulated in 
ModelCenter using ROSETTA models and the methods described in Chapter 3.  The 
simulation involved the use of the same ROSETTA models as Apollo LOR for the 
Command Module, the Service Module, the Lunar Module, and the Saturn V.  These 
ROSETTA models were made generic enough to change the burn structure in the models 
so that the same model could accomplish both mission modes.  The main differences 
between the modes are that the CM had to be adapted to travel to the lunar surface, The 
LM descent stage acts as only a LTDM, eliminating the ascent stage and the crew 
compartment, and a LBM had to be added to the architecture.  These ROSETTA modules 
were then wrapped in ModelCenter to integrate the performance characteristics of the 
mission mode.  The Architecture Cost Model (ACM) was modified to accumulate the 
mass, cost, and reliabilities of all of the architecture vehicles to calculate the total Life 
Cycle Costs (LCC) of the mission mode. 
As with the Apollo LOR mission mode, the subsystem reliabilities for the Direct 
mission modes were derived from the Apollo Manned Lunar Landing Program Mode 
Comparison [75].  These reliabilities were compiled in the dynamic fault trees to 
calculate the Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC) values for each of the 
ROSETTA models.  A screen shot of the Direct mission mode ModelCenter tool is given 
as Figure 53. 
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Figure 53: ModelCenter Based Direct Mission Simulation [73]. 
 
As this figure depicts, the Direct mission mode simulation is very similar to the Apollo 
LOR.  The main differences are the order of the contributing analyses and introduction of 
a LBM.  As with the Apollo LOR model the first box is a program to condition the 
inputs.  This is important for the Direct mission mode since this contributing analysis 
changes the model inputs so that the individual vehicles perform the appropriate burns of 
the architecture.  The final box is the Architecture Cost Model which compiles the 
performance, costs, and reliabilities and applies the cost spreading over the life of the 
architecture to get the Life Cycle Cost.  The Direct DSM contributing analysis order is 
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setup so the architecture can be computed as a completely feed-forward system.  For the 
Direct mode the SM can be evaluated before the LM because in this mode the LM 
requires the mass of the SM to size the vehicle.  In the Apollo LOR the LM mass must be 
calculated before the SM since the SM performs the LOI burn with the LM as payload.  
The LBM is calculated just before the launch vehicle since the LBM requires the closed 
masses of the CM, SM, and LTDM, since those elements are payloads for the LBM.  The 
resulting simulation has 96 design variables and each closed architecture can be 
computed in less than five seconds. 
The Apollo Direct baseline was computed using this ROSETTA based simulation 
tool.  The 96 design variables were set and the ROSETTA models were evaluated to 
close the Apollo Direct mission mode.  Because of the limited data availability of the 
actual Apollo Direct modes comparison and the similarity of the Apollo Direct models to 
the Apollo LOR models, a separate validation of the Apollo Direct results was not 
simulated. 
 
Table 24: Comparison of Apollo Direct to Apollo LOR Performance. 
 Apollo LOR ROSETTA Apollo Direct ROSETTA  
CM 6,024 kg 6,661 kg 
SM 24,917 kg 35,972 kg 
LM 16,183 kg 15,278 kg 
LBM NA 74,140 kg 
Stack 47,124 kg 132,051 kg 
LV 2,279,540 kg 7,416,468 kg 




As this table shows, the Direct mission has a huge weight penalty over the LOR mission.  
This is mainly due to the fact that the entire three crew CM is taken to the surface and 
modified for lunar surface operations.  The Apollo Direct has an extra staging event 
(LBM) and the mass is still much greater that that of the Apollo LOR.  The main problem 
of this mission mode is the enormous mass of the launch vehicle.  The 7.5 M kg gross 
mass far exceeds that of the Saturn V.  In fact the mass of the system is the main reason 
that the Direct mission mode was abandoned and the Earth Orbit Rendezvous mode was 
created [7]. 
The Direct mission costs and reliabilities were not well established during the 
Apollo mode selection process.  It was qualitatively determined that the LOR mission 
mode would be cheaper and faster than the Direct mission mode because of the lower 
system mass and the continuation of existing programs in 1965.  A comparison of the 
Apollo Direct and Apollo LOR mission mode costs calculated from the Apollo LOR 
based NAFCOM CERs is given below as Table 25 and Table 26. 
 
Table 25: Apollo LOR and DDT&E Cost Comparison. 
$M 2004 Apollo LOR ROSETTA Apollo Direct ROSETTA 
CSM $10,773 M $11,555 M 
LM $6,639 M $4,086 M 
LBM NA $5,206 M 
LV $13,744 M $17,627 M 




Table 26: Apollo LOR and Direct Theoretical First Unit Cost Comparison. 
$M 2004 Apollo LOR ROSETTA Apollo Direct ROSETTA 
CSM $309 M $392 M 
LM $733 M $366 M 
LBM NA $337 M 
LV $832 M $1,334 M 
Total TFU $1,874 M $2,431 M 
 
 
As indicated by these tables, the Apollo Direct has significantly higher costs than the 
Apollo LOR.  This is not surprising since the Apollo Direct has significantly higher mass 
than the Apollo LOR using similar technologies.  The Apollo Direct cost just under $7 
Billion dollars (22%) more to develop and over $500 million (30%) more to produce the 
first unit.   
 A dynamically changing fault tree analysis similar to the Apollo LOR mission 
mode was also incorporated into the Direct ROSETTA Model.  This reliability analysis 
was conducted for each of the ROSETTA models in the Apollo Direct and the differences 
between the Apollo LOR and the Apollo Direct were compared with those published in 
the Apollo Mission Mode Analysis [75].  The resulting reliability comparisons are given 
in Table 27. 
 
Table 27: Comparison of Apollo Direct and Apollo LOR Reliability. 
 Apollo LOR ROSETTA Apollo Direct ROSETTA 
CSM 0.7648 0.8437 
LM 0.8918 0.9393 
LBM NA 0.9279 
LV 0.7690 0.7228 
LOM 0.5245 0.5315 
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As this table shows, the resulting Apollo Direct reliability calculations are slightly higher 
than the Apollo LOR reliabilities.  This is mainly due to the higher CSM reliability 
caused by the elimination of the lunar rendezvous.  The LM has a significantly higher 
reliability for the Apollo direct because the LM is strictly a touchdown stage, without a 
habitat.  This simpler model results in a higher reliability. The Nova reliability is slightly 
lower than the Saturn V reliability due to the larger vehicle with more engines required 
for the Nova launch vehicle.  The total loss of mission reliability is slightly higher for the 
Direct mission, but the higher cost and uncertainty with the larger launch vehicle resulted 
in the creation of a hybrid mission mode known as Earth Orbit Rendezvous. 
4.3 EARTH ORBIT RENDEZVOUS MISSION MODE 
As a result of the high weight and cost of the Nova launch vehicle an alternative 
mission mode was evaluated.  Werner Von Braun championed the EOR approach as a 
viable alternative to the favored Direct approach [7].  This mission mode was very 
similar to the Direct mission mode except that the launches were split between two 
launch vehicles.  The Earth Orbit Rendezvous (EOR) involves all of the elements of the 
Direct mission mode with two Saturn V launch vehicles.  The first Saturn V launches a 
tanker vehicle in place of a S-IV-B containing all of the necessary oxidizer to perform the 
TLI burn by the second crewed S-IV-B.  The second vehicle launches the same stack as 
the Direct mode except the S-IV only contains enough oxidizer for the ascent.  A 
rendezvous occurs between the tanker vehicle and the crewed stack to transfer the liquid 






Figure 54: EOR Mission Mode [4]. 
 
As this figure shows, the EOR mission concept involves a single launch of two Saturn V 
launch vehicles.  The Saturn V vehicles are common; and therefore, both versions of the 
vehicle have to be calculated for any stack weight and the larger vehicle used for both 
launches.  A compilation of the design choices made in the Apollo EOR mission is given 
below as Table 28 and Table 29. 
 
Table 28: Propellant Choices for Apollo EOR. 
Vehicle Propellants Engine Engine Number 
S-I-C  LOX/RP1 F-1 (Gas Generator) 5 
S-II LOX/LH2 J-2 (Gas Generator) 5 
S-IVB LOX/LH2 J-2 (Gas Generator) 1 
SM UDMH/N204 Pressure Fed 1 
LBM LOX/LH2 Expander 1 




Table 29: Structure Choices for Apollo EOR. 
Structure Main Tanks Pressurant Tanks Other Structure 
S-I-C  Al Ti Al 
S-II Al Ti Al 
S-IVB Al Ti Al 
Tanker Al Ti Al 
CM NA Al Al 
SM Al Ti Al 
LBM Al Ti Al 
LTDM Al Ti Al 
 
 
As with the Apollo Direct mission mode, the EOR mission was simulated in 
ModelCenter using ROSETTA models and the methods described in Chapter 3.  The 
simulation involved the use of the same ROSETTA models as Apollo Direct for the 
Command Module, the Service Module, the Lunar Module, LBM, and the Saturn V.  
These ROSETTA models were made generic enough to change the burn structure in the 
models so that the same model could accomplish both mission modes.  The main 
difference is that there are two Saturn V launch vehicles.  Each of these vehicle contains 
a calculation for both the manned and unmanned versions of the vehicle so that the larger 
vehicle can be used for both launches.  These ROSETTA modules were then wrapped in 
ModelCenter to integrate the performance characteristics of the mission mode.  The 
Architecture Cost Model (ACM) was modified to accumulate the mass, cost, and 
reliabilities of all of the architecture vehicles and calculate the total Life Cycle Costs 
(LCC) of the mission mode. 
As with the Apollo Direct mission mode, the subsystem reliabilities for the EOR 
mission modes were derived from the Apollo Manned Lunar Landing Program Mode 
Comparison [75].  These reliabilities were compiled in the dynamic fault trees to 
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calculate the Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC) values for each of the 
ROSETTA models.  A screen shot of the EOR mission mode ModelCenter tool is given 
as Figure 55. 
 
 
Figure 55: ModelCenter Based EOR Mission Simulation [73]. 
 
As this figure shows, the EOR mission mode simulation is very similar to the Apollo 
Direct mission mode.  The main difference between the Apollo Direct and the Apollo 
EOR is the inclusion of a second Saturn V model, which has the ability to calculate both 
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the manned S-IVB upper stage as well as the tanker upper stage.   The Saturn V launch 
vehicle was also modified so that the S-II stage in the tanker provides enough delta V to 
travel to LEO without the assistance of a S-IVB.  The Saturn V was further modified so 
that the S-IVB only carries enough oxidizer to perform the LEO insertion.  The TLI 
oxidizer is then transferred by the tanker vehicle which is put into orbit by the unmanned 
Saturn V.  Each of the Saturn V ROSETTA models calculates the masses of both variants 
so that the largest required stages can be used by both variants.  The separate models are 
used only to calculate the different reliabilities and costs for the vehicles.  The resulting 
simulation has 96 design variables (the Saturn V tanker shares the crewed inputs) and 
each closed architecture can be computed in less than five seconds. 
The Apollo EOR baseline was computed using this ROSETTA based simulation 
tool.  The 96 design variables were set and the ROSETTA models were evaluated to 
close the Apollo EOR mission mode.  As with the Apollo Direct the Apollo EOR was 
compared with the Apollo LOR mission modes in Table 30. 
 
Table 30: Comparison of Apollo Mission Modes. 






CM 6,024 kg 6,661 kg 6,661 kg 
SM 24,917 kg 35,972 kg 35,972 kg 
LM 16,183 kg 15,278 kg 15,278 kg 
LBM NA 74,140 kg 74,140 kg 
Stack 47,124 kg 132,051 kg 132,051 kg 
LV Cargo NA NA 3,781,757 kg 
LV 2,279,540 kg 7,416,468 kg 3,849,397 kg 
On Pad 2,326,664 kg 7,548,519 kg 7,763,205 kg 
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As this table shows, the EOR mission has the same spacecraft weight as the direct 
mission.  The launch vehicle weight is split between the two launch vehicles.  The overall 
mass on the pad is similar to the Direct mission, since there is a significant weight 
penalty associated with the separate launch vehicle (i.e. tanker vehicle).   
As with the Apollo Direct mission, the Apollo EOR was compared with both the 
Apollo Direct and Apollo LOR mission modes.  The comparison of the Apollo Direct, 
LOR, and Apollo EOR mission mode costs calculated from the Apollo LOR and based 
NAFCOM CERs is given below as Table 31 and Table 32. 
 
Table 31: Apollo EOR, LOR and Direct Design Development Testing and Evaluation 
Cost Comparison. 






CSM $10,773 M $11,555 M $11,555 M 
LM $6,639 M $4,086 M $4,086 M 
LBM NA $5,206 M $5,206 M 
LV Cargo NA NA $ 2,396 M 
LV $13,744 M $17,627 M $14,880 M 
Total DDTE $31,156 M $38,109 M $37,759 M 
 
 
Table 32: Apollo EOR, LOR, and Direct Theoretical First Unit Cost Comparison. 






CSM $309 M $392 M $392 M 
LM $733 M $366 M $366 M 
LBM NA $337 M $337 M 
LV Cargo NA NA $944M 
LV $832 M $1,334 M $1,006 M 
Total TFU $1,874 M $2,431 M $3,046 M 
 
 155
As these tables show, the Apollo EOR does not offer significant cost savings over the 
Direct mission mode.  The high cost is mainly due to the need to fly two launch vehicles 
per mission.  The DDT&E costs are very similar between the EOR and the Direct 
mission.  The DDT&E of the cargo version of the Saturn V is only 15% of the manned 
vehicle, since most of the components are common between the Saturn V crew and cargo 
and the development is already counted in the crewed vehicle.  The TFU of the EOR is 
higher than that of the Direct mission because two Saturn V launch vehicles are 46% 
more costly than a single Nova vehicle.  It should be noted that these costs are strictly 
DDT&E and TFU.  Facility costs and operations costs are not included in this analysis.  
 A dynamically changing fault tree analysis, similar to the Apollo Direct mission 
mode, was also incorporated into the EOR ROSETTA Models.  This reliability analysis 
was conducted for each of the ROSETTA models in the Apollo EOR and the differences 
between the Apollo LOR and the Apollo Direct were compared with those published in 
the Apollo Mission Mode Analysis [75].  The resulting reliability comparisons are given 
in Table 33. 
 
Table 33: Reliability Comparison of Apollo EOR, Direct, and Apollo LOR. 






CSM 0.7648 0.8437 0.8437 
LM 0.8918 0.9393 0.9393 
LBM NA 0.9279 0.9279 
LV Cargo NA NA 0.6653 
LV 0.7690 0.7228 0.7301 
LOM 0.5245 0.53151 0.3572 
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As this table shows, the resulting Apollo EOR reliability calculations are far below that 
of both the Apollo LOR and the Apollo Direct.  This low reliability number is mainly due 
to the fact that two of the lowest reliability vehicles are needed for EOR to successfully 
complete its mission.  The spacecraft portion of the EOR architecture is exactly the same 
as that of the Direct missions.  
4.4 APOLLO LUNAR ARCHITECTURE DECISION 
In 1965, NASA set out with finding the ideal way of transporting humans to the 
lunar surface.  To accomplish this goal, each of the different mission modes was 
compared based upon feasibility (performance), economics, and reliability.  To calculate 
the differences each mode was evaluated independently and compared via trade studies.  
This decision can be reevaluated and confirmed using the models created in this thesis.  
From the performance results summarized in Table 30, it is obvious that the Direct 
mission mode requires a launch vehicle so large that it would dwarf all previous launch 
vehicles.  This vehicle would require investments in new engine programs, facilities, and 
operations, which are far outside the limits of the experience in the 1960s and today.  
Even if these outside factors are ignored, the Direct mission is still costly for a reliability 
only slightly higher than that of LOR.  A summary of the baseline Apollo results is given 







Table 34: Summary of Apollo Lunar Architecture Decision 






Total Mass 2,326,664 kg 7,548,519 kg 7,763,205 kg 
DDT&E $31,157 M $38,109 M $37,759 M 
TFU $1,873 M $2,431 M $3,046 M 
Total Cost to First Vehicle $33,031 M $40,540 M $40,805 M 
LOM 0.5245 0.53151 0.3572 
LOC 0.6900 0.7440 0.7438 
 
 
The LOC numbers for the different architectures are similar for the three modes.  
The main discrepancy between LOM and LOC for the EOR is due to the fact that the 
second launch has little effect on the safety of the crew.  There is a small chance of LOC 
during the rendezvous in Earth orbit, but this risk is mitigated by the lower LOC for the 
smaller launch vehicle Saturn V as compared with the Nova vehicle of the Direct mission 
mode.  From this data, LOR is obviously the lowest cost and mass between the Apollo 
lunar modes.  This low cost and relatively high LOM reliability drove the LOR decision.  
This is verified in Von Braun’s enumeration of why the LOR mode was chosen [7]: 
 
1). LOR mode appeared most likely to be accomplished by the end of the 
decade 
2).  LOR has the highest performance margins (lowest mass) 
3). The separation of the reentry vehicle and the lunar landing vehicle 
constituted the two most critical tasks in producing a lunar spacecraft and 
separating these two function into two separate elements was bound to 
simplify development of the spacecraft system….(lowest cost). 
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The comments of Von Braun are verified in the analysis conducted via the ROSETTA 
models.  The LOR has the lowest mass and cost.  Reliability is not mentioned in Von 
Braun’s comments, since reliability was treated qualitatively at this level of the Apollo 
decision.  A separate issue that drove the LOR decision as noted in Von Braun’s first 
comment is the Apollo program was under a strict schedule.  This schedule aspect is not 
modeled in the ROSETTA models and is treated as an outside variable to the lunar 
architecture selection. 
4.5 EXPLORATION SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE STUDY BASELINE 
To verify that the methodology laid out in Chapter 3 can also be used on current 
lunar architecture designs the ESAS lunar architecture was simulated.  The Exploration 
system architecture was laid out in Chapter 1.  As Figure 3 shows the ESAS architecture 
is a combination of the Apollo EOR and LOR architectures.    The ESAS architecture 
team set out with ambitious goals of sending 4 humans to the Moon for a total of 14 days.  
This far exceeds the Apollo mission goals of 3 people (2 to the lunar surface) for a total 
of 3 days on the surface.  The ESAS team set out with the requirement to keep weight 
and costs to a minimum while designing the system to have a greater reliability than 
previous manned spaceflight projects.  To accomplish these goals the ESAS architecture 
combined the LOR architecture with the EOR launch structure.  Using a LOR spacecraft 
design allowed the spacecraft elements of the architecture to retain the low weight 
allowed by the leaving the command module (known as the Crew Exploration Vehicle 
(CEV)) in low lunar orbit, while a dedicated lunar module travels to the surface.  
Unfortunately, there isn’t a launch vehicle capable of reproducing the performance of the 
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Saturn V launch vehicle.  To solve this problem, the ESAS team split the launches of the 
spacecraft into two separate launches, much like the Apollo EOR architecture.  The main 
difference between the Apollo EOR launch vehicles and the ESAS EOR is that the launch 
vehicles are not common.  The Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) has a much lower payload 
capacity than the Cargo Launch vehicle (CaLV).  Because of this difference in payload 
capacity the CEV and the SM are launched on the CLV while the LM and Earth 
Departure Stage (EDS) are launched on the CaLV.  The differences between Apollo and 
LOR architecture modes are given below as Table 35. 
 
Table 35: Comparison of Apollo LOR and EOR to ESAS (EOR-LOR) 
  Apollo LOR Apollo EOR ESAS
Crew to Surface 2 3 4 
Lunar Surface Stay 3 3 14 
Launch Vehicles 1 (Saturn V) 2 (Saturn V) 2 (CLV & CaLV) 
TLI Burn S-IVB  S-IVB  EDS (CaLV) 
LOI Burn SM SM LM 
Decent to Lunar Surface LM LBM LM 
Ascent from Lunar Surface LM SM LM 
TEI SM SM SM 
Entry Descent and Landing CM CM CEV (CM) 
 
 
As this table shows, there is also a difference between the Apollo LOR and ESAS 
LOR burn structures in that the LM performs the breaking maneuver into LLO in the 
ESAS architecture, while the SM performs the breaking maneuver in the Apollo LOR 
architecture.  This difference is driven by the fact that the SM gross mass is limited by the 
payload capacity of the CLV.  To keep the SM gross mass down, the LOI insertion burn 
is performed by the LM and not the SM.   
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The ESAS architecture team completed a series of trade studies to attempt to find 
the optimal configuration choices for the EOR-LOR architecture.  A compilation of the 
design choices made in the ESAS architecture is given below as Table 36 and Table 37. 
 
Table 36: Propellant Choices for ESAS. 
Vehicle Propellants Engine Engine Number 
CLV 1st Stage HTPB 4-Segment RSRM 1 
CLV 2nd Stage LOX/LH2 SSME (Staged Comb) 1 
CaLV Booster HTPB 5-Segment RSRM 2 
CaLV 1st Stage LOX/LH2 SSME (Staged Comb) 5 
CaLV 2nd Stage LOX/LH2 J-2 (Gas Generator) 2 
SM LOX/CH4 Pressure Fed 1 
LM Descent LOX/LH2 Rl-10 Expander 1 
LM Ascent LOX/CH4 Pressure Fed 1 
 
 
Table 37: Structure Choices for ESAS. 
Structure Main Tanks Pressurant Tanks Other Structure 
CLV 2nd Stage Al-Li Gr-Ep Al-Li 
CaLV 1st Stage Al-Li Gr-Ep Al-Li 
CaLV 2nd Stage Al-Li Gr-Ep Al-Li 
CEV NA Gr-Ep Al 
SM Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Al 
LM Descent Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Al-Li 
LM Ascent Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Al-Li 
 
 
Graphite Epoxy wrapped tank are prevalent in the ESAS mission mode.  This is a new 
technology that was not available in the Apollo era and is therefore only available in the 
ESAS architecture.  The ESAS architecture also takes advantage of existing engine 
programs.  The SSME and 4-segment solid rocket boosters are both products of the 
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shuttle program and are therefore only a minimal amount of DDT&E (air-start SSME, 
control for SRB, etc.).  The J-2 engine also has a reduction in DDT&E cost due to the 
fact that it is a derivative of an Apollo style engine that was already been proven.  The 
RL-10 used on the LM descent engine also has spacecraft heritage (Atlas and Delta 
launch vehicles) and would only require minimal DDT&E to be used as a lunar descent 
engine (deep throttleability).  These engine cost reductions allow the EOR-LOR mission 
mode with seven different engines to be viable. 
The EOR-LOR mission mode was simulated in ModelCenter using ROSETTA 
models and the methods described in Chapter 3.  The simulation involved the use of the 
Apollo era ROSETTA models for the Command Module, the Service Module, the Lunar 
Module, as well as the creation of the CLV and CaLV models.  The Apollo era models 
required modifications in subsystem reliabilities and engine reliabilities so that the 
resulting LOM and LOC numbers were correct for 2007 technologies.  These ROSETTA 
modules were then wrapped in ModelCenter to integrate the performance characteristics 
of the mission mode.  The Architecture Cost Model (ACM) was also integrated to 
compile the costs of the different vehicles to then calculate the total Life Cycle Costs 
(LCC) of the mission mode. 
As with the Apollo modes, each of the different ROSETTA models were 
constructed using Response Surface Methods for performance calculations, NAFCOM 
based cost estimations, and dynamically changing fault trees for the reliability analysis.  
As noted above, the subsystem reliabilities (ECLSS, Avionics, Guidance and Navigation) 
were modified so that the baseline numbers were in line with current 2007 technologies.  
These reliabilities were compiled in the dynamic fault trees to calculate the  
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LOM and LOC values for each of the ROSETTA models.  A screen shot of the 
ModelCenter tool constructed for the ESAS mission mode is given as Figure 56 . 
 
 
Figure 56: ModelCenter Based ESAS Simulation [73]. 
 
As with the Apollo mission modes, the ESAS mission mode was treated as a DSM in 
ModelCenter.  The main difference between the ESAS architecture simulation and the 
Apollo simulation is the order of the contributing analyses.  In the ESAS simulation, the 
SM must be calculated before the LM.  This is because the LM must perform the LOI 
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burn with the SM and CM (CEV) as payload.  This LOR breaking performed by the LM 
is unique for the ESAS architecture. 
The ESAS baseline was computed using this ROSETTA based simulation tool.  
The 86 design variables were set and the ROSETTA models were evaluated to close the 
ESAS mission mode.  The performance results were compared between the simulation 
results and the actual ESAS vehicle weights as given in the ESAS final report [13].  The 
results are given as Table 38. 
 
Table 38: Comparison of Apollo LOR Performance Results. 
 ESAS (Report) ROSETTA Models % Diff 
CEV 9,506 kg 9,526 kg 0.21% 
SM 13,647 kg 13,668 kg 0.15% 
LM 45,864 kg 45,180 kg -1.49% 
Stack 69,017 kg 68,374 kg -0.93% 
CLV 805,309 kg 803,473 kg -0.23% 
CaLV 2,900,288 kg 2,861,257 kg -1.35% 
Total 3,774,614 kg 3,733,104 kg -1.10% 
 
  
As this table shows, the mass results for the ROSETTA models are within 2% of the 
vehicle weights as they are calculated in the ESAS final report.  The biggest discrepancy 
is on the LM.  This discrepancy is only 300kg over a gross mass of over 45,000kg.  
 The mass estimates for the ESAS mission mode are very accurate and therefore a 
mass-based cost comparison can therefore be completed.  Unfortunately, the calculated 
ESAS costs are not publicly available and therefore the ESAS costs can only be 
compared with the Apollo mission mode costs demonstrated in Table 39. 
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Table 39: ESAS Design Development Testing and Evaluation Cost Comparison. 
$M 2004 ESAS Apollo LOR Apollo EOR 
CEV/SM $10,763 M $10,505 M $11,555 M 
LM $7,013 M $6,752 M $4,086 M 
LBM NA NA $5,206 M 
Crew LV $4,990 M $13,887 M $ 2,396 M 
Cargo LV $9,174 M NA $14,880 M 
Total $32,663 M $31,144 M $37,759 M 
 
 
Table 40: ESAS Theoretical First Unit Cost Comparison. 
$M 2004 ESAS Apollo LOR Apollo EOR 
CEV/SM $528 M $294 M $392 M 
LM $990 M $651 M $366 M 
LBM NA NA $337 M 
Crew LV $161 M $901 M $944M 
Cargo LV $719 M NA $1,006 M 
Total TFU $4,388 M $1,846 M $3,046 M 
  
 
As these tables show, the DDT&E for the ESAS structure is simulated to be slightly more 
than that of the Apollo LOR, but less than the Apollo EOR.  This is a surprising result 
since the ESAS architecture is billed as a low cost architecture.  The high DDT&E can be 
attributed to the size of the vehicles necessary to take 4 crew to the surface for 14 days 
with almost twice the volume per crew member as Apollo.  That is twice the crew of the 
Apollo LOR and one and a half times the crew of the Apollo EOR.  The surface stay time 
is almost five times the surface stay time of both Apollo missions.  So taking these facts 
into account the ESAS architecture is actually an inexpensive architecture when 
compared to Apollo.   This can be demonstrated as a cost per man hour on the moon.   
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Table 41: Cost per Man Hour on the Moon 
 ESAS Apollo LOR 
DDTE $32,663 M $31,144 M 
TFU $4,388 M $1,846 M 
Total ($M) $37,051 M $32,990 M 
People on Surface 4 2 
Days on Surface 14 3 
Man Hours on Moon 1,344 144 
Cost per Man-Hour ($M) $28 M $229 M 
 
 
As this table shows the ESAS cost per man-hour is an order of magnitude less than the 
Apollo LOR architecture.  As with the Apollo EOR, ESAS requires the development of 
two separate launch vehicles.  These vehicles account for 43% of the total DDT&E of the 
ESAS architecture.  It should also be noted that the launch vehicles have heritage 
engines.  These heritage engines are given a cost reduction to account for the decreased 
cost. 
 The dynamically changing fault tree analysis incorporated in each ROSETTA 
model calculates the total vehicle reliability based upon the assumed subsystem 
reliabilities and the vehicle configurations.  This reliability analysis was conducted for 
each of the ROSETTA models in the ESAS mission mode and the results were compared 
with those published in the ESAS final report [13].  The resulting reliability comparisons 




Table 42: Apollo LOR Loss of Mission Reliability Comparison. 
 ESAS (Report) ROSETTA Models % Diff 
CEV NA 0.9957 NA 
SM NA 0.9884 NA 
LSAM NA 0.9719 NA 
CLV 0.9976 0.9972 -0.04% 
CaLV 0.9911 0.9883 -0.28% 
Total 0.9380 0.9427 0.50% 
 
 
As this table shows, the ROSETTA model LOM reliability calculations via the 
dynamically changing fault trees are very close to the calculated reliability from the 
ESAS report.  The CEV, SM, and LSAM reliabilities are not publicly available, but the 
overall LOM reliabilities for the mission are publicly available via the ESAS final report.  
The overall calculated mission reliability is within 1% of the published ESAS numbers.  
The ESAS reliabilities are much higher than the Apollo LOM numbers due to the 
increased subsystem reliability through technologies that have matured between the 
1960s and the today.  ECLSS, Avionics, and Guidance systems have all matured 
throughout the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs.  Because of this 
maturity, the subsystem failure rate is assumed to be 10% of that of the Apollo systems.  
The engine reliabilities are assumed to be the same as that of the Apollo era.   
 The calculated ESAS reliabilities result in a LOM probability of 0.9427 or one 
loss of mission in every 17.5 missions.  This reliability is far superior to the Apollo Era 
calculated and demonstrated reliabilities.  This increased reliability is a result of the 
higher subsystem reliabilities as well as the improved launch vehicle reliabilities.  The 
CLV has a calculated failure rate of 1 in 357 flights and the CaLV has a calculated failure 
rate of 1 in 85 flights.  These vehicles have a combined launch vehicle reliability of 
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0.9855, or a failure rate of 1 in 69 missions.  This reliability is far higher than the 
calculated Saturn V reliability of 0.7690, or a failure rate of 1 in every 4 missions.  This 
increased reliability is a function of the experience gained in the Space Shuttle program 
which matured most of the subsystems (engines, avionics, and structures) in use in the 
ESAS launch vehicles. 
4.6 COMPARISON OF EXPLORATION SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE STUDY MISSION 
MODE AND APOLLO LOR MISSION MODE 
 The ESAS architecture is a program which is touted as a mission mode that has 
greater capacities than Apollo at a much lower cost.  As tables Table 39 and Table 40 
show the DDT&E and TFU of ESAS is comparable to that of the Apollo LOR mission 
mode.  This is attributed to the higher capacity of the ESAS mission (4 crew, twice the 
volume per crew, 14 days on the surface) over the Apollo Missions.  This section 
compares the Apollo LOR mission mode with the ESAS LOR-EOR mission mode for a 3 
crew, 3 day lunar surface stay with a volume per crew of the Apollo era 3.315 m3.  This 
comparison keeps the configurations choices (propellants, engine types, etc.) for the 
different mission modes, but compares the modes with the same architecture 
requirements.  It should be noted that even with the architecture requirements change for 
the ESAS (Apollo) mission, the performance requirements are not completely the same 
since the ESAS architecture has the ability to reach any point on the moon whereas the 
Apollo architectures are restricted to an equatorial landing site.  A comparison of the 
ESAS Report, Apollo LOR, and ESAS architecture with the Apollo mission parameters is 
included as Table 43 .   
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Table 43: Comparison of ESAS and Apollo LOR Performance Results for a Three Crew 
Mission. 
$M 2004 ESAS Report ESAS (Apollo) Apollo LOR 
CEV 9,526 kg 5,184 kg 6,024 kg 
SM 13,668 kg 8,680 kg 24,917 kg 
LM 45,180 kg 35,854 kg 16,183 kg 
Spacecraft Total 68,374 kg 49,718 kg 47,124 kg 
Crewed Launch Vehicle 803,473 kg 725,818 kg 2,279,540 kg 
Cargo Launch Vehicle 2,861,257 kg 2,560,347 kg NA 
Total 3,733,104 kg 3,335,883 kg 2,326,664 kg 
 
 
As this table shows, the ESAS (Apollo) spacecraft weights are comparable with the 
Apollo LOR weights.  The CEV weight is significantly lower due to the higher 
technology of the avionics and ECLSS systems over the Apollo systems.  The SM weight 
is significantly lower for the SM because of the elimination of the LOI burn from the 
ESAS vehicle.  The higher costs of the ESAS architecture could also be attributed to a 
conservative percentage (10%) put on the DDT&E of the heritage engines used in ESAS.  
The ESAS service module also has advantage of the use of higher performance 
propellants (LOX/CH4 vs. UDMH/N2O4).  The LM is significantly heavier for the ESAS 
mission mode because of the addition of the LOI burn to the LM.  This increased Delta V 
adds to the propellant requirements for the LM.  The spacecraft stack weights are slightly 
higher for the ESAS (Apollo) since the ESAS mode requires increased hardware to break 
the spacecraft into two separate launches.  This separation of launches, as well as the 
performance requirement to reach any point on the Moon, results in a slightly higher 
spacecraft weight. 
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 Even with the slightly higher weights of the ESAS (Apollo) architecture over the 
Apollo LOR, the resulting DDT&E costs are significantly lower.  This lower DDT&E is 
due to the fact that the ESAS architectures use existing engines for most of the spacecraft 
and launch vehicles (SSME, RL-10, and SRBs).  The decreased engine costs result in a 
significantly lower DDT&E for the system.  A summary of the DDT&E costs for the 
different architectures is given as Table 44. 
 
Table 44: Comparison of ESAS and Apollo LOR Design, Development, Testing and 
Evaluation Results for a Three Crew Mission. 
$M 2004 ESAS Report ESAS (Apollo) Apollo LOR
CEV $5,356 M $4,306 M $6,258 M
SM $5,407 M $4,386 M $4,513 M
LM $7,014 M $6,259 M $6,639 M
Crewed Launch Vehicle $4,990 M $4,353 M $13,476 M
Cargo Launch Vehicle $9,174 M $8,411 M NA 
Total $31,941 M $27,714 M $31,158 M
 
 
The Theoretical First Unit costs for ESAS (Apollo) architectures are similar to the 
Apollo LOR architecture.  The ESAS (Apollo) TFU costs are higher because of the high 
costs of the pump fed engines used for the ESAS (Apollo). The Apollo LOR uses cheaper 
pressure fed engines.  The ESAS (Apollo) also has more components (two launch 
vehicles) which required different manufacturing lines and usually result in higher costs.  




Table 45: Comparison of ESAS and Apollo LOR Theoretical First Unit Results for a 
Three Crew Mission. 
$M 2004 ESAS Report ESAS (Apollo) Apollo LOR 
CEV $191 M $151 M $140 M 
SM $337 M $260 M $169 M 
LM $990 M $859 M $733 M 
Crewed Launch Vehicle $162 M $141 M $832 M 
Cargo Launch Vehicle $719 M $645 M NA 
Total $2,399 M $2,056 M $1,874 M 
 
 
When the ESAS (Apollo) and the Apollo LOR architectures are compared to the ESAS 
(Apollo) architectures, the ESAS vehicles have a slightly higher weight due to the 
addition of a second launch vehicle and the requirement to land at any point on the 
surface of the Moon.  The DDT&E costs for the ESAS (Apollo) vehicles are lower than 
those of the Apollo LOR vehicles because of the use of existing engines to lower the 
engine DDT&E costs.  The TFU costs are higher for the ESAS (Apollo) architecture 
because of the use of complex pump fed engines over the cheaper and simpler pressure 
fed engines.   
4.7 VALIDATION CONCLUSIONS 
The lunar architecture selection tool created in this research provides accurate 
answers for the performance, cost, and reliability of the lunar architectures simulated.  
These lunar architectures included both historical and current designs with varying 
mission modes.  When actual costs were available, the performance, cost, and reliability 
calculations were all within 10% for all of the simulated architectures.  The mass of the 
architectures was particularly accurate, falling within 2% for all mission modes.  When 
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the comparison data was not available for an architecture mode it was baselined against 
the other modes calculated and differences in mass, cost, and reliability were scrutinized.  
As expected, the EOR and Direct spacecraft were the heaviest of the Apollo modes.  The 
EOR mission provided the lowest reliability due to the two launch vehicles, but the loss 
of crew more comparable with the other modes since the second launch has little effect 
on the safety of the crew.  The Direct mission LOR had a similar loss of crew number as 
the EOR, but the single larger launch vehicle actually resulted in a lower life cycle cost 
than the two smaller vehicles.  This result was surprising.  The DDT&E was higher for 
the Direct mission, but the cost of two launch vehicles per mission pushed the LCC cost 
of the EOR higher than the LCC of the Direct mission. 
The ESAS mission was also validated against the ESAS final report findings.  The 
ESAS ROSETTA simulation was found to be within 2% of the total spacecraft mass.  
The reliability findings were also within 1 % for the entire mission.  The cost numbers 
were not available for comparison, so the ESAS mode was compared with the Apollo 
cost numbers.  It was found that the ESAS mode was more expensive than expected for 
the baseline missions (approximately that of Apollo).  This high cost was a result of the 
greater mission capabilities of the ESAS mission over the Apollo.  To compare apples to 
apples, the ESAS mission was resimulated with the Apollo mission requirements.  This 
comparison resulted in a lower DDT&E cost for ESAS mission as expected.  The TFU 
cost was still significantly higher for the ESAS mission because of the two launch 




CHAPTER 5                                                         
APPLICATION OF LUNAR ARCHITECTURE 
METHODOLOGY FOR DIFFERENT LUNAR MODES 
 
 
Chapter 3 described the method that is used to supply the decision maker with the 
ability to choose different optimized lunar architectures based upon the high level design 
discriminators.  This tool was then created in an integrated environment with a 
combination of ROSETTA models.  Chapter 4 provided a validation of this tool against 
the historical Apollo lunar architecture modes and the current design methodology of the 
ESAS team.  This chapter applies the lunar architecture tool to the various mission modes 
described in Chapter 4 to create the ideal Pareto frontiers.  These Pareto frontiers contain 
the idea architecture element configurations for the mission modes, which will be used by 
the decision maker to find the ideal reliability for a given architecture cost. 
5.1 CREATION OF PARETO FRONTIERS FOR DIFFERENT LUNAR MISSION 
MODES 
In Chapter 4, the methodology of this thesis was baselined against the existing 
lunar architectures.  Now that the ROSETTA models and the ModelCenter tool has been 
successfully verified against existing vehicles and design techniques, the methodology 
outlined in Chapter 3 will be implemented to find the ideal Pareto frontier for each of the 
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mission modes under consideration.  To create the ideal Pareto frontiers of the reliability 
and costs of each of the lunar architectures, a genetic algorithm was added to the models 
verified in Chapter 4 to find the optimal vehicle configurations for a specific weighting 
on the Overall Evaluation Criteria (OEC).  The weightings on the OEC was then changed 
systematically from a 100% cost-centric to 100% reliability-centric design and then 
optimized at each weighting point.  The combination of these points creates the ideal 
Pareto frontier for the mission mode. 
The GA was configured to control the design variables for each of the vehicles in 
the lunar mode.  The objective function is the OEC comprised of LOM reliability and 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC) which was given as equation 27.  A GA was chosen as the 
optimization scheme of choice due to the high percentage of discrete variables (propellant 
type, structure type, engine cycle type, etc.).  The GA was set up to have a population 
size of 200 with 15 participants in the tournament portion of the GA.  The crossover rate 
probability was set at 70% with a mutation rate of 10%. The GA was required to continue 
iterating until 10 generations are completing without improving the OEC. 
To compare the different Pareto frontiers, generic lunar mission requirements 
were created and compiled in a lunar campaign.  Each mission mode was compared on 
for a 20 year lunar campaign.  This campaign involved a spread of the DDT&E over the 
first 9 years of the campaign.  After this initial development phase, a flight rate of 2 
missions per year was assumed for the remaining 16 years of the campaign.  The 
resulting costs for the 32 flights and the DDT&E were compiled to create a total Life 
Cycle Cost (LCC) of the campaign.  This LCC was then compiled into the OEC, via an 
Excel worksheet, to be optimized by the GA. 
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The lunar architecture selection tool requires top level performance requirements 
to evaluate the lunar architectures.  To compare each of the ideal Pareto frontiers to the 
baseline Apollo modes each of the Apollo architectures simulated had the same Apollo 
top level performance requirements.  A summary of those requirements for each of the 
Apollo modes is given as Table 46. 
 
Table 46: Architecture Inputs for the Apollo Lunar Architecture modes 
 LOR DIR EOR 
Total Crew 3 3 3 
Crew to Surface 2 3 3 
Number of Lunar Flights/Yr 2 2 2 
Number of Program Yrs 20 20 20 
Time on Lunar Surface 3 3 3 
Number of Days SM Provides Power 9 3 3 
Number of Days LM Provides Power 3 9 9 
Crew Escape System Y Y Y 
CM Volume/Crew 4.69 4.69 4.69 
Commonality w/SM and LM Engines Y Y Y 
 
 
Once the top level constraints are defined, there are a number of vehicle level design 
variables that can be changed by the lunar architecture selection tool.    These variables 
change the performance, cost, and reliability of each of the vehicle elements.  These 
vehicle changes then cascade throughout the entire architecture and affect the 
performance, cost, and reliability of all of the other vehicle elements of the system.  A 
morphological matrix of the design variables that can be changed for each of the elements 
in a lunar architecture is included as Table 47 for the CM, Table 48 for the LM, Table 49 
for the SM, and Table 50 for the launch vehicle. 
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Table 47: Morphological Matrix for Command Module ROSETTA Model 
Structure Type Al Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep MMC 
Battery Power 0 kW-hr 150 kW-hr    
Battery SED 0 kW-hr/kg 0.25 kW-hr/kg    
RCS Type LOX/LH2 LOX/CH4 UDMH/N2O4   
Avionics Redundancy 0 1    
ECLSS Redundancy 0 1    
Power Redundancy 0 1    
Parachute Redundancy 0 1    
 
 
Table 48: Morphological Matrix for Lunar Module ROSETTA Model 
Payload to LS 0 50000    
Payload to LLO 0 10000    
Number of Stages 1 2    
Ascent Fuel Type LOX/LH2 LOX/CH4 UDMH/N2O4   
Fuel Type LOX/LH2 LOX/CH4 UDMH/N2O4   
Fuel Cell Power  0 kW 100 kW    
Battery Power  0 kW-hr 150 kW-hr    
Battery SED 0 kW-hr/kg 0.25 kW-hr/kg    
T/W @ LS 1.80 3    
T/W @ LLO Descent 1.80 5    
EO on Ascent Stage 0 1    
EO on Descent Stage 0 1    
# Ascent Engines 1 5    
# Descent Engines 1 5    
Area Ratio Ascent  50 150    
Area Ratio Descent  50 150    
Ascent Cycle Type Expander Pressure    
Descent Cycle Type  Expander Pressure    
Ascent Tanks Al Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep MMC 
Descent Tanks Al Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep MMC 
Crew Comp. Material Al Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep MMC 
He Tank Material Al Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep MMC 




Table 49: Morphological Matrix for Service Module ROSETTA Model 
Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/CH4 UDMH/N2O4   
Engine Type Expander Pressure    
Structural Material Al Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep MMC
Engine Redundancy 0 1    
Power Redundancy 0 1    
TPS Type MLI Cryo-cooler    
Pressurant Material Al Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep MMC
RCS Type LOX/LH2 LOX/CH4 UDMH/N2O4   
Number of Engines 1 5    
 
 
Table 50: Morphological Matrix for Launch Vehicle ROSETTA Model 
Stage 1 Engine Type Gas Generator Staged-Combustion    
Stage 1 Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1    
Stage 1 Structure Type Al Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep MMC 
Stage 1 # Engines 1 10    
Stage 1 T/W 1.2 2    
Stage 2 Engine Type Gas Generator Staged-Combustion    
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1    
Stage 2 Structure Type Al Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep MMC 
Stage 2 # Engines 1 10    
Stage 2 T/W 0.5 2    
Stage 3 Engine Type Gas Generator Staged-Combustion    
Stage 3 Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1    
Stage 3 Structure Type Al Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep MMC 
Stage 3 # Engines 1 10    
Stage 3 T/W 0.5 2    
Crew Escape System Y N    
EO 1st Stage 0 1    
EO 2nd Stage 0 1    
EO 3rd Stage 0 1    
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These morphological matrices give a subset of the total amount of inputs that the lunar 
architecture selection tool can manipulate to arrive at the ideal Pareto frontier for a given 
mission mode.   
5.2 LUNAR ORBIT RENDEZVOUS MISSION MODE OPTIMIZATION 
The optimization scheme outlined in Chapter 3 and validated in Chapter 4 is 
implemented into a lunar architecture selection tool to simulate the Apollo Lunar Orbit 
Rendezvous mission mode.   The design variables above are optimized via a genetic 
algorithm to find the optimal OEC for a given weighting.  This weighting on the OEC is 
then systematically changed from 100% reliability-centric to 100% cost-centric.  Each 
optimized point is then plotted to produce a Pareto frontier of the Apollo LOR 
architecture.  The optimized Pareto frontier for 10 different weightings of the OEC is 
given as Figure 57.  The actual inputs chosen for by the genetic algorithm represented by 
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Figure 57: Pareto Frontier of the Apollo LOR Architecture 
 
Rel 90% Rel 80% Rel 70% Rel 60% Rel 50% Rel 40% Rel 30% Rel 20% Rel 10% Rel Cost Apollo
Structure Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al 
RCS Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic
Avionics Red 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
ECLSS Red 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power Red 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parachute Red 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Propellant Type LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 Hypergolic LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 Hypergolic
Engine Type Expander Expander Pressure Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Structure Type Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al 
Engine Red 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power Red 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pressurant Mat Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Al 
Ascent Fuel Type Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic
Descent Fuel Type LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 Hypergolic LOX/CH4 Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic
T/W LS 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
T/W LLO 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Engine Red Ascent 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Engine Red Descent 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AR Ascent 75 75 75 75 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 75
AR Descent 75 75 150 150 150 139.2857143 150 128.5714286 128.5714286 128.5714286 139.2857143 75
Ascent Engine Cycle Type Pressure Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Descent Engine Cycle Type Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Pressurant Mat Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti GrEp Ti
Structure Type Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al 
Stage 1 Engine Type Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Gas Gen
Stage 1 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1
Stage 1 Structure Type Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al 
Stage 2 Engine Type Gas Gen Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Gas Gen
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2
Stage 2 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al 
Stage 3 Engine Type Gas Gen Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Gas Gen
Stage 3 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2
Stage 3 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al 
Stage 1 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Stage 2 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0







Figure 58: Summary of GA Produced Inputs for Apollo LOR Architecture 
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 This Pareto frontier shows the expected dimensioning returns shape of increased 
reliability as a function of cost.  The summary of the inputs shows how the different 
configuration choices are made as the weighting for the OEC changes.  Some interesting 
observations can be made from the changing inputs driven by the GA and the weighting 
on the OEC.  First, the redundancy changes dramatically as the weighting on the OEC 
changes.  In the 100% reliability-centric optimization, redundancy exists on all 11 
elements of the architecture.  This is expected since the solution is independent of cost 
and therefore any increase in reliability (especially through redundancy) is chosen.  This 
100% reliability centric model utilizes mostly titanium structures in the vehicle designs.  
This is because titanium results in a lighter vehicle and with lower thrust engines, and 
therefore a higher reliability.  Propellant types vary throughout the architecture vehicles, 
but LOX/CH4 and the hypergolic propellants are most prevalent.  Methane becomes an 
option because it offers higher performance (smaller engines with greater reliability) than 
hypergolic propellants, yet is more reliable than hydrogen due to the increased density of 
the fuel. 
 As the weighting increased towards 100% cost-centric, the propellant and 
structure types change as well as the redundancy in the system.  The all cost optimization 
results in an all aluminum main structure with higher strength materials for the high 
pressure pressurant tanks.  These structures are chosen because Al is the cheapest 
material per pound, while the higher strength materials are needed for the pressurant 
tanks due to the high weight (and cost) associated with the use of aluminum for those 
tanks. 
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 It is interesting to look at the results of the changes in redundancy as the 
weighting on the OEC is changed from 0% reliability-centric to 100% reliability-centric.  
As expected, there are no redundant components in the 0% reliability-centric weighting.  
As the weighting increases to 10%, redundancy is added to the second stage of the Saturn 
launch vehicle.  This is the first element of the architecture to gain redundancy.  This is 
the case because of a balance between the reliability gained and the cost in mass and 
actual dollars of adding a redundant component.  The second stage engine is added first 
because the engines on the second stage are generally lower reliability than that of the 
first stage engines (due to air start) and have a lower reliability than the third stage, due to 
the fact that 5 engines are operating instead of 1 engine on the third stage. 
 The second element to gain redundancy is the first stage of the Saturn launch 
vehicle.  This occurs because of the fact that there are again 5 engines operating and the 
addition of a redundant engine adds significantly to the reliability of the system.  This 
also occurs because there is very little mass penalty for adding a first stage engine 
because that extra weight is only carried by the first stage.   
As the weighting is increased more component and subsystem redundancies are 
added as a compromise between weight, cost, and reliability.  A general rule is that the 
lower reliability of the system the earlier a redundant component is going to be added.  
Unfortunately it is not that simple, since an extra pound on the CM does translates too 
many extra pounds on the launch vehicle due to the gear ratio of the architecture.  This 
gear ratio simply states that an extra pound on the CM, must be pushed by the SM which 
adds several extra pounds, which must then be launched which adds pounds 
exponentially according to the rocket equation (equation 9).  This exponential 
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relationship greatly affects the mass and therefore cost of the system.  This gear ratio for 
the Apollo LOR components is demonstrated in Table 51. 
 













CM 1,167 kg 0 kg 0 kg 0 kg 0 kg 0 kg 
SM 1,697 kg 3,595 kg 3,614 kg 0 kg 0 kg 0 kg 
LM 0 kg 0 kg 7,521 kg 0 kg 0 kg 0 kg 
S-I-C 127,400 kg 125,100 kg 454,900 kg 34,780 kg 11,310 kg 4,312 kg 
S-II 27,200 kg 26,700 kg 103,000 kg 7,427 kg 3,415 kg 0 kg 
S-IVB 7,600 kg 7,460 kg 23,120 kg 3,075 kg 0 kg 0 kg 
Total 165,000 kg 162,800 kg 592,200 kg 45,280 kg 14,730 kg 4,312 kg 
GR 165 163 592 45 15 4 
 
 
This table demonstrates the effect of 1000 kg of dry weight growth on a vehicle element 
and the resulting stack growth.  The gear ratio is highest for the lunar module.  This is 
because of the high ∆V that must be performed by the stages as well as the fact that the 
LM is payload for both the SM and the Saturn V elements.  Because the CM is not 
payload for the lunar module, but is for the SM and the Saturn lowers the gear ratio when 
compared to the LM.  The CM gear ratio is higher than that of the SM because of the fact 
that the CM is carried as payload of the CM.  The gear ratio of the CM is not higher 
because of the fact that the CM has little onboard propellant, so the increase in dry weight 
has a small affect on the gross weight of the CM.  The Saturn stages have increasing gear 
ratios as you increase the stage of the vehicle.  As with the LM, this is because the uppers 
stages act as payload for the lower stages.  This table shows that a pound growth on the 
LM has the greatest impact on the total vehicle stack for the Apollo LOR architecture.  
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This directly impacts the order of increasing subsystem redundancy in the Apollo LOR 
architecture.  A summary of the increase of redundant components as the weighting on 
the OEC becomes more reliability-centric is shown as Figure 59. 
 
 
Figure 59: Redundancy in the Apollo LOR Pareto Frontier 
 
As figure shows, the redundancy steadily increases to the maximum of eleven redundant 
components as the weighting on the reliability increases.  The final redundant component 
added is the parachute redundancy.  This is the last redundant component added because 
the descent system for the CM is generally considered a high reliability system and an 
extra parachute adds a significant weight to the top of the lunar architecture.   
 As noted in Figure 57, the optimal Pareto frontier is significantly higher reliability 
and lower cost than the baseline Apollo architecture.  These optimal points are able to 
retrieve higher reliabilities and lower costs than the baseline Apollo because of the 
 183
constraints placed on the Apollo project.  Chapter 1 discussed how the Apollo lunar mode 
decision was made under intense schedule pressure placed on it by the John F. Kennedy’s 
decree that the Apollo program would send a man to the moon before the end of the 
decade.  This schedule constraint is not modeled in this methodology and therefore 
pushes the Apollo LOR Pareto frontier optimal past the Apollo baseline.  The schedule 
based design choices of hypergolic propellants and limited redundancy pushed the Apollo 
baseline off the optimal result.  A comparison of the Apollo baseline to the optimal 
reliability Pareto point for the same Apollo cost, and the optimal cost point to the Apollo 
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Table 52: GA Input Differences Between Apollo Baseline and Pareto Frontier 





Avionics Red 1 0 0 
ECLSS Red 1 0 0 C
M
 
Power Red 1 0 0 
Propellant Type LOX/CH4 LOX/LH2 Hypergolic 
SM
 
Engine Type Expander Expander Pressure 
Descent Fuel Type LOX/CH4 Hypergolic Hypergolic 
Engine Red Ascent 1 0 0 
Engine Red Descent 0 0 0 
AR Ascent 75 150 75 
AR Descent 150 128.5714286 75 




Descent Engine Cycle Type Expander Expander Pressure 
Stage 1 Engine Type Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Gas Gen 
Stage 1 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 
Stage 1 Structure Type Al Al Al  
Stage 2 Engine Type Gas Gen Staged-Comb Gas Gen 
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 
Stage 2 Structure Type Al Al Al  
Stage 3 Engine Type Gas Gen Staged-Comb Gas Gen 
Stage 3 Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 
Stage 3 Structure Type Al Al Al  
Stage 1 Engine Out 1 1 0 












Figure 60 demonstrates that a cost improvement of almost $9 B FY2004 dollars can be 
saved over the 20 year life of the program, while keeping the same reliability as the 
baseline Apollo architecture.  If the life cycle cost was kept constant, an increase in LOM 
reliability of 0.1137 can be obtained.  This also translates into an increase in LOC safety 
of 0.0803. 
 As with reliability, LOC safety Pareto frontier can also be created.  The Pareto 
frontier is very similar to the curve calculated for LOM since the LOM and LOC are 
similar for a given architecture.  To calculate this Pareto frontier, the LOC safety 
numbers were calculated for the given LOM Pareto frontier points.  The simulation could 
be reoptimized for LOC, but since the dependencies on LOM and LOC are interrelated 
and the Pareto frontier is of similar shape, the LOC of the optimized LOM points was 
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Figure 61: LOC Pareto Frontier for Apollo LOR 
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The Pareto frontier can be translated into a single curve fit to accurately predict 
the optimal reliability or safety for a given life cycle cost.  To fit this analysis a 3 node 
neural network was used to fit the Pareto frontier.  The resulting R2 of this neural network 
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Figure 62: Neural Network Curve Fit of Pareto Frontier 
  
 An uncertainty analysis can also be performed on the optimal Pareto frontiers for 
both LOM and LOC. Monte Carlo simulation was completed to accomplish this 
uncertainty analysis.  This Monte Carlo simulation was accomplished with triangular 
distributions on the subsystem reliabilities and catastrophic engine fractions.  The 
resulting 90% confidence (highest cost, lowest reliability) and 10% confidence (lowest 
cost, highest reliability) are plotted against the baseline results.  A summary of the LOM 
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Figure 64: LOC Pareto Frontier Uncertainty 
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The resulting Pareto frontiers and their uncertainties can now be presented to the decision 
maker to show the affect of increasing or decreasing the cost of the system affects the 
reliability and the safety of the system.  As shown with the Apollo baseline when the 
decision maker is not bogged down with the details of the performance, huge savings in 
cost and reliability can result.  
5.3 EARTH ORBIT RENDEZVOUS MISSION MODE OPTIMIZATION 
As with the LOR, the Apollo EOR mission mode as described in Chapter 4 is 
optimized using the methodology outline in Chapter 3.  Design variables similar to those 
presented in section 5.1were optimized via a genetic algorithm to find the optimal OEC 
for a given weighting.  This weighting on the OEC is then systematically changed from 
100% reliability-centric to 100% cost-centric.  Each optimized point is plotted to produce 
a Pareto frontier of the Apollo EOR architecture.  The optimized Pareto frontier for 10 
different weightings of the OEC is given as Figure 57.  The actual inputs chosen for by 












30,000 80,000 130,000 180,000 230,000 280,000












Figure 65: Pareto Frontier of the Apollo EOR Architecture 
 
Rel 90% Rel 80% Rel 70% Rel 60% Rel 50% Rel 40% Rel 30% Rel 20% Rel 10% Rel Cost Apollo
Structure Ti Ti Al-Li Al-Li Ti Ti Al Al Al Al AL Al
RCS Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic LOX/LH2 Hypergolic
Avionics Red 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ECLSS Red 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power Red 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parachute Red 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Propellant Type LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 Hypergolic
Engine Type Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Structure Type Ti Ti Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Engine Red 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power Red 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pressurant Mat Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Ti
Ascent Fuel Type Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic
Descent Fuel Type Hypergolic LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic
T/W LS 2.857142857 2.714285714 2.142857143 2.714285714 2.714285714 2.857142857 2 2.142857143 2.428571429 2.714285714 2.428571429 2.1
T/W LLO 2 2 2.428571429 2.428571429 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.85
Engine Red Ascent 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
Engine Red Descent 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AR Ascent 117.8571429 128.5714286 117.8571429 128.5714286 96.42857143 85.71428571 139.2857143 85.71428571 75 85.71428571 96.42857143 75
AR Descent 85.71428571 75 96.42857143 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
Ascent Engine Cycle Type Pressure Expander Pressure Pressure Pressure Pressure Pressure Expander Expander Pressure Pressure Pressure
Descent Engine Cycle Type Pressure Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Pressurant Mat Ti Ti Al-Li Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Gr-Ep Ti
Structural Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Stage 1 Engine Type Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Gas Gen
Stage 1 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1
Stage 1 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Stage 2 Engine Type Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2
Stage 2 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Stage 3 Engine Type Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen
Stage 3 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2
Stage 3 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al-Li Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al AL Al
Stage 1 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Stage 2 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Stage 3 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Fuel Type Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic LOX/LH2
Engine Red 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AR 75 139.2857143 139.2857143 139.2857143 128.5714286 150 139.2857143 150 150 150 150 75
Engine cycle Type Pressure Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander
Tank Material Ti Ti Al Ti Al-Li Ti Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Al
Pressurant Mat Ti Ti Al Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Ti
Structural Material Al-Li Al Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al









Figure 66: Summary of GA Produced Inputs for Apollo EOR Architecture 
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 As with the LOR architecture, this Pareto frontier of the EOR architecture shows 
the expected dimensioning returns shape of increased reliability as a function of cost.  
The summary of the inputs shows how the different configuration choices are made as the 
weighting for the OEC changes.  As noted in Chapter 4, the main burn profiles, and 
therefore vehicle sizes, are significantly different between the EOR and LOR modes.  
The EOR model also includes a second launch vehicle and a Lunar Breaking Module 
(LBM).  Some interesting observations can be made from the changing inputs driven by 
the GA and the weighting on the OEC.  As with the Apollo LOR, the redundancy 
changes dramatically as the weighting on the OEC changes.  In the 100% reliability-
centric optimization, redundancy exists in 11 of the 12 elements of the architecture.  The 
one redundant element which is not included is the parachute redundancy.  This is 
because the gear ratio is higher for the EOR mission mode and the added weight of the 
extra parachute actually increases the size of the vehicles so much that the degradation in 
the other subsystem reliabilities outweighs added reliability to the parachute system.  
Propellant types vary throughout the architecture vehicles.  LOX/LH2 is much more 
prevalent in the EOR system because of the higher weight penalties with taking the entire 
system to the lunar surface.  This makes the higher performing hydrogen propellants 
enter into the optimized system. 
 It is interesting to look at the results of the changes in redundancy as the 
weighting on the OEC is changed from 0% cost-centric to 100% reliability-centric.  As 
with the Apollo LOR architecture, there are no redundant components in the cost-centric 
weighting.  As the weighting increases to 10%, redundancy is added to both the first and 
second stages of the Saturn launch vehicle. This happens because of the higher 
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percentage of the architecture reliability that results from the launch vehicle due to the 
fact that there are two separate launch vehicles in the architecture.   Command module 
redundancy does not appear until the weighting is 70% reliability centric.  This is due to 
the high gear ratio of the EOR architecture and the fact that the command module must 
be taken all the way to the lunar surface. 
 As with the Apollo EOR, the optimal Pareto frontier is significantly higher 
reliability and lower cost than the baseline EOR architecture.  These optimal points are 
able to retrieve higher reliabilities and lower costs than the baseline Apollo because of the 
constraints placed on the Apollo project.  A comparison of the Apollo EOR baseline to 
the optimal reliability Pareto point for the same Apollo EOR cost, and the optimal cost 
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Figure 67: Comparison of Apollo EOR Baseline to Pareto Frontier Optimal Points 
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Table 53: GA Input Differences Between Apollo EOR Baseline and Pareto Frontier 
  Improved 
Reliability 
Improved Cost EOR 
Structure Al-Li AL Al 
RCS Hypergolic LOX/LH2 Hypergolic 
Avionics Red 1 0 0 
ECLSS Red 1 0 0 




Parachute Red 0 0 0 
Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 Hypergolic 
Engine Type Expander Expander Pressure 
Engine Red 0 0 0 
Power Red 0 0 0 
SM
 
Pressurant Mat Ti Gr-Ep Ti 
Ascent Fuel Type Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic 
Descent Fuel Type LOX/CH4 Hypergolic Hypergolic 
T/W LS 2.7 2.4 2.1 
T/W LLO 2.4 2 1.85 
Engine Red Ascent 0 0 0 
Engine Red Descent 0 0 0 
AR Ascent 129 96 75 
AR Descent 75 75 75 




Pressurant Mat Ti Gr-Ep Ti 
Stage 1 Engine Type Gas Gen Staged Comb Gas Gen 
Stage 1 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 
Stage 2 Engine Type Staged Comb Gas Gen Gas Gen 
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 
Stage 3 Engine Type Staged Comb Gas Gen Gas Gen 
Stage 3 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 
Stage 3 Structure Type Al-Li AL Al 
Stage 1 Engine Out 1 0 0 




Stage 3 Engine Out 1 0 0 
Fuel Type Hypergolic Hypergolic LOX/LH2 
Engine Red 1 0 0 
AR 139 150 75 
Engine cycle Type Expander Expander Expander 
Tank Material Ti Gr-Ep Al 
Pressurant Mat Ti Gr-Ep Ti 





T/W 2 2 1.85 
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From Figure 67 it is shown that a cost improvement of almost $ 24 B FY2004 dollars can 
be saved over the 20 year life of the program, while keeping approximately the same 
reliability as the baseline Apollo architecture.  If the life cycle cost was kept constant an 
increase in LOM reliability of 0.1406 can be obtained.  This also translates into an 
increase in LOC safety of 0.0512. 
 As with reliability, LOC safety Pareto frontier can also be created.  The Pareto 
frontier is very similar to the curve calculated for LOM since the LOM and LOC are 
similar for a given architecture.  To calculate this Pareto frontier the LOC safety numbers 
were calculated for the given LOM Pareto frontier points.  As with LOR, the EOR 
simulation was optimized for LOM with LOC calculated as an output.  The Pareto 










30,000 80,000 130,000 180,000 230,000 280,000









Figure 68: LOC Pareto Frontier for Apollo EOR 
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As with the LOR analysis, an uncertainty analysis can also be performed on the 
optimal Pareto frontiers for both LOM and LOC.  To accomplish this uncertainty analysis 
a Monte Carlo simulation was completed.  This Monte Carlo simulation was 
accomplished with triangular distributions on the subsystem reliabilities and catastrophic 
engine fractions.  The resulting 90% confidence (highest cost, lowest reliability) and 10% 
confidence (lowest cost, highest reliability) are plotted against the baseline results.  As 
with LOR, the uncertainties increased as the cost and reliabilities increased.  This 
uncertainty band can then be used to determine the limits of the cost and reliabilities for 
the different Pareto points used for the lunar architecture selection.  A summary of the 
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Figure 70: EOR Mission LOC Pareto Frontier Uncertainty 
 
The resulting Pareto frontiers and their uncertainties can now be presented to the decision 
maker to show that increasing or decreasing the cost of the system affects the reliability 
and the safety of the system.   
5.4 DIRECT MISSION MODE OPTIMIZATION 
The Apollo Direct mission mode was optimized in much the same way as the 
Apollo LOR and EOR architectures.  In fact, the Apollo Direct mission is very similar to 
the EOR mission except that the two launches of the EOR mission are combined into one 
large launch vehicle.  Because of the similarities between the EOR and Direct missions, 
the simulations of the two modes are almost exactly the same, with the exception of the 
aforementioned launch vehicle ROSETTA models.  The design variables similar to those 
presented in section 5.1 were optimized via a genetic algorithm to find the optimal OEC 
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for a given weighting.  This weighting on the OEC is then systematically changed from 
100% reliability-centric to 100% cost-centric.  Each optimized point is plotted to produce 
a Pareto frontier of the Apollo EOR architecture.  The optimized Pareto frontier for 10 
different weightings of the OEC is given as Figure 71.  The actual inputs chosen for the 
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 The Apollo Direct Pareto frontier has the same dimensioning returns shape as the 
other Apollo mission modes analyzed in this research.  Some interesting observations can 
be made from the changing inputs driven by the GA and the weighting on the OEC.  The 
redundancy changes dramatically as the weighting on the OEC changes.  As with the 
Apollo EOR mission, in the 100% reliability centric optimization redundancy exists in 11 
of the 12 elements of the architecture.  The one excluded redundant element is the 
parachute redundancy.  Propellant types vary throughout the architecture vehicles and 
LOX/LH2 is prevalent in the Direct mission due to the high gear ratio of this mission 
mode.  The subsystem redundancy increases as the weighting on the OEC is changed 
from 0% cost-centric to 100% reliability-centric.  The Apollo Direct mission is unique in 
that the LBM required LOX/LH2 propellants for the low cost solutions.  This propellant 
choice is necessary to reduce the overall weight of the spacecraft stack and therefore the 
size of the Nova launch vehicle.  Another interesting note in the Direct mission mode is 
that the Nova launch vehicle consistently uses LOX/RP1 propellants.  These lower 
performing propellants are used because of the immense tank sizes necessary for the 
LOX/LH2.  The LOX/RP1 requires a heavier overall vehicle, but a lower dry weight 
which is the variable which directly affects cost.   
The optimal Pareto frontier is significantly higher reliability and lower cost than 
the baseline EOR architecture.  These optimal points are able to retrieve higher 
reliabilities and lower costs than the baseline Apollo because of the constraints placed on 
the Apollo project.  A comparison of the Apollo Direct baseline to the optimal reliability 
Pareto point for the same Apollo Direct cost, and the optimal cost point to the Apollo cost 





































Table 54: GA Input Differences Between Apollo Direct Baseline and Pareto Frontier 
  Increased 
Reliability 
Improved Cost Direct 
Structure Al-Li Al Al 
RCS Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic 
Avionics Red 1 0 0 




Power Red 1 0 0 
Propellant Type LOX/CH4 LOX/LH2 Hypergolic 
Engine Type Expander Expander Pressure 
Power Red 1 0 0 S
M
 
Pressurant Mat TI Gr-Ep Ti 
Ascent Fuel Type Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic 
Descent Fuel Type LOX/LH2 Hypergolic Hypergolic 
T/W LS 2 2 2.1 
T/W LLO 2 2 1.85 
Engine Red Ascent 1 1 0 
Engine Red Descent 1 0 0 




Descent Engine Cycle Type Expander Expander Pressure 
Stage 1 Engine Type Gas Gen Staged Comb Gas Gen 
Stage 1 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 
Stage 2 Engine Type Staged Comb Staged Comb Gas Gen 
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 
Stage 2 Structure Type Al-Li Al Al 
Stage 3 Engine Type Staged Comb Staged Comb Gas Gen 
Stage 3 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 
Stage 3 Structure Type Al-Li Al Al 
Stage 1 Engine Out 1 0 0 




Stage 3 Engine Out 1 0 0 
Fuel Type Hypergolic LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 
Engine Red 1 0 0 
AR 139.2857143 139.2857143 75 
Engine cycle Type Expander Expander Expander 
Tank Material Al-Li Gr-Ep Al 









From Figure 73 it is shown that a cost improvement of almost $ 23 B FY2004 dollars can 
be saved over the 20 year life of the program while keeping approximately the same 
reliability as the baseline Apollo architecture.  If the life cycle cost was kept constant an 
increase in LOM reliability of 0.1465 can be obtained.  This also translates into an 
increase in LOC safety of 0.0722. 
 As with reliability, LOC safety Pareto frontier can also be created.  The Pareto 
frontier is very similar to the curve calculated for LOM, since the LOM and LOC are 
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Figure 74: LOC Pareto Frontier for Apollo Direct 
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This Pareto frontier is calculated from the safety analysis in the ROSETTA model on the 
optimized LOM Pareto frontier.  This safety analysis results in a LOC of 0.8161 for the 
same cost as the Apollo Direct baselines LOC of 0.7440.  This translates into a decrease 
of one loss of crew over the 20 year life of the program. 
 As with the other Apollo modes, an uncertainty analysis can also be performed on 
the optimal Pareto frontiers for both LOM and LOC.  To accomplish this uncertainty 
analysis a Monte Carlo simulation was completed.  This Monte Carlo simulation was 
accomplished with triangular distributions on the subsystem reliabilities and catastrophic 
engine fractions.  The resulting 90% confidence (highest cost, lowest reliability) and 10% 
confidence (lowest cost, highest reliability) are plotted against the baseline results.  A 
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Figure 76: Direct Mission LOC Pareto Frontier Uncertainty 
 
The uncertainty analysis provides the decision maker with some certainty about the cost 
and reliability that can be obtained with the optimal lunar architectures.  The resulting 
Pareto frontiers and their uncertainties can now be presented to the decision maker to 
show how increasing or decreasing the cost of the system affects the reliability and the 
safety of the system.  
5.5 SUMMARY OF APOLLO MISSION MODES 
Each of the Apollo mission modes evaluated in 1965 as a solution to the Apollo 
program have been evaluated with the new methodology described in this research.  The 
Apollo analysis was reproduced in this tool, the decision reevaluated, and a series of 
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optimal solutions were found.  In each mode, a Pareto frontier was found that exceeded 
the reliability estimates and cost goals.  A summary of the cost savings or reliability 
increases that can be achieved by evaluating points around the baseline is given as Table 
55. 
 
Table 55: Differences Between Pareto Frontiers and Apollo Baselines 
$M LOR %Diff EOR %Diff Direct %Diff 
LCC $8,958 12% $23,582 25% $22,536 26% 
LOM 0.11 21% 0.14 39% 0.15 28% 
LOC 0.08 12% 0.05 7% 0.07 9% 
 
 
As this tables shows, the cost savings to achieve the same reliability as the baseline is at 
least $8.9 B FY2004.  The reliability gains can be on the order of 20-40% for reliability 
and 7-10% for safety.   Cost savings of up to 36% over the Apollo baselines can be 
achieved with the application of this methodology. 
5.6 CURRENT DESIGN PRACTICES COMPARISON-EXPLORATION SYSTEM 
ARCHITECTURE STUDY (EOR-LOR) MISSION MODE 
Now that the each Apollo lunar mode has been evaluated, a current lunar 
architecture can be examined.  The ESAS architecture is an EOR-LOR based mission 
architecture currently being evaluated in response to President Bush’s Vision for Space 
Exploration (VSE).  As described in Chapter 4, the ESAS architecture expands upon the 
Apollo mission with a 4 crew, 14 day lunar surface stay.  The ESAS architecture was 
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simulated in much the same way as the Apollo lunar modes. A summary architecture 
inputs is given as Table 56. 
 
Table 56: Architecture Inputs for the ESAS Lunar Architecture 
 ESAS 
Total Crew 4 
Crew to Surface 4 
Number of Lunar Flights/Yr 2 
Number of Program Yrs 20 
Time on Lunar Surface 14 
Number of Days SM Provides Power 6 
Number of Days LM Provides Power 14 
Crew Escape System Y 
CM Volume/Crew 7.95 
Commonality w/SM and LM Engines N 
 
 
As this table shows, the ESAS architecture inputs are more ambitious than the Apollo 
inputs.  The uncertainty associated with the definition of the lunar campaign that will be 
used for the ESAS architecture resulted in the same baseline architecture of a 20 year, 32 
flight campaign to be used, 
The design variables for the ESAS spacecraft are exactly the same as the variables 
for the Apollo spacecraft.  This is because the same ROSETTA models (with different 
burn profiles) was used.  The main difference is the launch vehicle ROSETTA models.  
In the case of ESAS, a CLV and CaLV model was created to evaluate the launch vehicle 
performance, cost, and reliability.  A summary of the morphological matrices for the 







Table 57: Morphological Matrix for Crew Launch Vehicle ROSETTA Model 
Stage 1 Engine Type 4-seg SRB 5-seg SRB    
Stage 2 Engine Type Gas Generator Staged-Combustion    
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1    
Stage 2 Structure Type Al Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep MMC 
Stage 2 # Engines 1 10    
Stage 2 T/W 0.5 2    
Crew Escape System Y N    




Table 58: Morphological Matrix for Cargo Launch Vehicle ROSETTA Model 
Stage 1 Engine Type 4-seg SRB 5-seg SRB    
Core Engine Type Gas Generator Staged-Combustion    
Core Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1    
Core Structure Type Al Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep MMC 
Core # Engines 1 10    
Core T/W 0.5 2    
EDS Engine Type Gas Generator Staged-Combustion    
EDS Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1    
EDS Structure Type Al Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep MMC 
EDS  # Engines 1 10    
EDS T/W 0.5 2    
Crew Escape System Y N    
EO Core 0 1    




The design variables are optimized via a genetic algorithm to find the optimal 
OEC for a given weighting.  This weighting on the OEC is then systematically changed 
from 100% reliability-centric to 100% cost-centric.  Each optimized point is then plotted 
to produce a Pareto frontier of the ESAS architecture.  The optimized Pareto frontier for 
10 different weightings of the OEC is given as Figure 77.  The actual inputs chosen by 
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 For the ESAS architecture, 13 GA points were evaluated as opposed to the 
standard 10 points of the Apollo architecture modes.  These extra GA points were to fully 
fill out the Pareto frontier and add points near the ends of the Pareto frontiers.  The 
summary of the inputs shows how the different configuration choices are made as the 
weighting for the OEC changes.  Some interesting observations can be made from the 
changing inputs as driven by the GA and the weighting on the OEC.  First, the 
redundancy disappears much earlier (lower cost weightings) than in the Apollo 
architectures.  This is because the subsystem reliabilities are much higher for the current 
vehicles and thus the cost of adding redundancy is not justified.   
As with the EOR and Direct Apollo architectures, the 100% reliability-centric 
optimization redundancy exists on 10 of 11 elements of the architecture.  The parachute 
redundancy is again omitted because it decreases the overall reliability of the system as 
shown in the EOR architecture.  Launch vehicle engine redundancy first appears on the 
CaLV (1st than 2nd stages) and then on the CLV.  This occurs because the CaLV is a 
completely rubberized (can parametrically scale) system, whereas the CLV is limited in 
scalability by the solid rocket booster first stage which is considered static.  Redundancy 
on the CEV does not occur until the weighting is 99% reliability centric due to the high 
weight penalty and minimal resulting reliability increase with the already high reliability 
of the subsystem. 
The LSAM or LM descent engine redundancy appears at a much lower reliability 
weighting than any of the Apollo modes.  This is due to the fact that the LSAM has a four 
engine configuration on the descent propulsion system.  This four engine system has a 
much lower reliability than a single engine system of the same thrust.   Therefore the 
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weight penalty of adding an extra engine is only a quarter of the weight of adding a 
similar thrust single engine system.  As with Apollo, the propellant types vary throughout 
the architecture vehicles, but LOX/CH4 and LOX/LH2 are most prevalent.  The methane 
and hydrogen propellants both offer a higher performance (Isp) over the hypergolic 
propellants; and, because of the ambitious requirements for the ESAS architecture, the 
higher performance is needed.  A summary of the redundancy in the ESAS architecture is 
given as Figure 79. 
 
 
Figure 79: Redundancy in the ESAS Pareto Frontier 
 
As this figure shows, the redundancy steadily increases to the maximum of ten redundant 
components as the weighting on the reliability increases.  The final components added are 
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the CM redundancies, due the high gear ratio of the ESAS design and therefore the high 
weight penalty associated with adding CEV mass to the system. 
 As noted in Figure 57, the optimal Pareto frontier has significantly higher 
reliability and lower cost than the baseline ESAS architecture.  These optimal points are 
able to retrieve higher reliabilities and lower costs than the baseline ESAS architecture.  
This difference in solution could be due to political constraints placed on the ESAS 
project, but are more likely a result of the design process used to evaluate the ESAS 
baseline.  As noted earlier in this thesis, the ESAS architecture team used an old 
fashioned philosophy of calculating baseline cases and trade studies off the baseline case.  
This methodology allows the entire design space to be evaluated and the best solutions 
chosen without the biases of the involved designers.  A comparison of the Apollo 
baseline to the optimal reliability Pareto point for the same Apollo cost, and the optimal 
cost point to the Apollo cost is given as Table 59. 
Figure 80 shows that a cost improvement of $27 B FY2004 dollars can be saved 
over the 20 year life of the program, while keeping the same reliability as the baseline 
ESAS architecture.  If the life cycle cost was kept constant, an increase in LOM 
reliability of 0.0274 can be obtained.  This also translates into an increase in LOC safety 
of 0.0148.  The smaller increase in reliability and safety can be attributed to the already 
high reliability of the baseline system.  In terms of flights, this small reliability increase 
changes the LOM from 1 in 17 flights to a 1 in 33 flights and the LOC from 1 in 25 
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Table 59: GA Input Differences Between ESAS Baseline and Pareto Frontier 





Structure Al-Li Al Al 
Avionics Red 1 0 0 




Power Red 1 0 0 
Propellant Type LOX/CH4 LOX/LH2 LOX/CH4 
Engine Type Pump Pump Pressure 
Structure Type Al Al GrEp 
Engine Red 1 0 0 
Power Red 1 0 0 
SM
 
Pressurant Mat Ti MMC GrEp 
Ascent Fuel Type LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 
Descent Fuel Type LOX/CH4 Hypergolic LOX/LH2 
T/W LS 2 2 2.1 
T/W LLO 2 2 4.5 
Engine Red Ascent 1 0 0 
Engine Red Descent 1 1 0 
AR Ascent 96 150 150 
AR Descent 150 150 150 
Ascent Engine Cycle Type Expander Expander Pressure 
Descent Engine Cycle Type Expander Expander Pressure 
Tank Material Al Al GrEp 
Crew Compartment Mat Al-Li GrEp GrEp 




Structure Type Al-Li Al-Li GrEp 
Stage 2 Engine Type Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb 
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 




EO 2nd Stage 1 0 0 
Stage 1 Engine Type Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb 
Stage 1 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 
Stage 1 Structure Type Al Al Al-Li 
Stage 2 Engine Type Gas Gen Staged Comb Gas Gen 
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 
Stage 2 Structure Type Al-Li Al Al-Li 









As with reliability, a LOC safety Pareto frontier can also be created.  The Pareto 
frontier is very similar to the curve calculated for LOM, since the LOM and LOC are 
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Figure 81: LOC Pareto Frontier for ESAS 
 
As with the Apollo architectures, in this Pareto frontier the LOC safety numbers were 
calculated for the given LOM Pareto frontier points.  The simulation could be 
reoptimized for LOC, but since the dependencies on LOM and LOC are interrelated and 
the Pareto frontier is of similar shape, the LOC of the optimized LOM points was used 
for the Pareto frontier.   
 An uncertainty analysis can also be performed on the optimal Pareto frontiers for 
both LOM and LOC.  To accomplish this uncertainty analysis, a Monte Carlo simulation 
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was completed.  This Monte Carlo simulation was accomplished with triangular 
distributions on the subsystem reliabilities and catastrophic engine fractions.  The 
resulting 90% confidence (highest cost, lowest reliability) and 10% confidence (lowest 
cost, highest reliability) are plotted against the baseline results.  A summary of the LOM 
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Figure 83: ESAS LOC Pareto Frontier Uncertainty 
 
The resulting Pareto frontiers and their uncertainties can now be presented to the decision 
maker to demonstrate how increasing or decreasing the cost of the system affects the 
reliability and the safety of the system.  As shown with the Apollo baseline, when the 
decision maker is not bogged down with the details of the performance, large savings in 
cost and reliability can result.  
5.7 SUMMARY OF ESAS LUNAR ARCHITECTURE SELECTION 
In section 5.5, the Apollo architecture modes were found to be suboptimal.  This 
sub-optimality was attributed to the design methodology and the schedule constraint 
placed upon the design team.  The ESAS architecture study was also found to be 
suboptimal.  The ESAS architecture achieved a suboptimal solution in much the same 
way as the Apollo architecture.  The same trade study methodology was used to evaluate 
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the politically driven baseline case, and the trade studies off of that baseline did not 
investigate the whole design space.  The method proposed in this research identifies the 
ideal set of solutions outside the political biases of the design team.  The resulting ESAS 
architecture is $27 Billion less expensive over the entire life of the program.  A summary 
of the ESAS savings is given as Table 60. 
 








DDTE $31,941 $31,538 1% $20,075 37% 
TFU $2,399 2,064 14% $1,550 35% 
LCC $84,514 $76,760 9% $57,104 32% 
LOM 0.9427 0.9701 3% 0.9440 0% 
LOC 0.9602 0.9749 2% 0.9619 0% 
 
 






LOM  0.0573 0.0299 48% 
LOC 0.0398 0.0251 37% 
 
 
In this table, the ESAS (Cost) column denotes the optimal ESAS architecture that has 
approximately the same cost as the ESAS baseline.  The ESAS (Rel) column denotes the 
ESAS architecture that has approximately the same reliability as the ESAS architecture.  
Table 61 shows the percentage decrease in the failure rate as opposed to the traditional 
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reliability percent difference.  This is a true measure in the reduction of failures due to the 
increased reliability of the system. 
As these results show, the Pareto Frontier method eliminates the biases of the 
designers and the decision maker and presents only the important design criteria to the 
decision maker (cost, reliability, and safety).  The results are up to 40% reduction of cost 
while maintaining the equivalent reliability and 50% reduction in failure rate keeping the 
same costs.   
A second advantage is that the family of solutions is presented to the decision 
maker.  Because this Pareto frontier plots the entire range of solutions as the proposed 
budget changes, the solution for the optimal reliability is already solved.  This allows the 
decision maker to make choices based not only on his point solution budget, but also 
based on his projected project budget.     
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CHAPTER 6                                                             
LUNAR ARCHITECTURE MODE SELECTION AND 
ANALYSIS 
 
Chapter 5 described the usefulness of the methodology presented in this thesis to 
solve the ideal architecture elements for a given lunar architecture mode.   Once the 
optimal architectures are selected through the Pareto frontier, it naturally follows that the 
different lunar modes can be compared to find the ideal lunar architecture mode, as well 
as the ideal elements in the mode to produce the ideal lunar campaign.  This campaign 
selection method is a useful extension of the architecture analysis presented in the 
previous chapter.  Chapter 6 describes the method to compare the different lunar modes 
and portrays the results of this analysis for the Apollo lunar mode selection. 
6.1 COMPARISON OF APOLLO LUNAR ARCHITECTURE SELECTION 
The three Pareto frontiers calculated for the Apollo lunar architecture modes can 
be presented to the decision maker on the same axis.  The combination of these modes 
will show the decision maker the difference between the optimal architecture elements of 
the different lunar architecture mission modes.  This analysis will then be compared with 
the Apollo mission mode analysis of the early 1960s.   
As noted early in this thesis, the Apollo LOR mission mode was selected by 
NASA as the preferred way to travel to the moon.   This decision was made based upon 
the LOR mode having the smallest vehicles and therefore the highest performance 
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margins.  LOR also offered similar costs and reliabilities to the other lunar modes 
considered.  Chapter 5 described how the more optimal solutions could be obtained for 
all three mission modes.  These ideal Pareto frontiers can then be compared to see if the 
Apollo decision changes as a result of the comparison of the ideal solutions.  This 
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Figure 84: Mission Mode Selection for Apollo Lunar Architectures LOM 
 
As this figure indicates, the Apollo LOR and Apollo Direct mission modes both have 
similar LOM reliabilities for the low cost optimal solutions.  As the LCC increases and 
the reliability increases, the Direct mission mode results in a higher reliability than the 
LOR mission mode.    The EOR mission mode has the same spacecraft mission as the 
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Direct but breaks the launch into two separate launch vehicles.  This results in 
significantly lower mission reliability than both the Direct and EOR mission modes.   
 As this mission mode selection shows, the solutions for the Pareto frontiers have 
the same general trend as the original Apollo baselines in the Apollo mission mode 
selection of the 1960s.  The LOR and Direct have similar LOM reliabilities yet the Direct 
has a slightly higher cost.  The EOR mission mode, treated as an alternative for the LOR 
mode, never approaches the reliability of the other two modes and is therefore never 
considered. 
 The Apollo Direct Pareto frontier and the Apollo LOR Pareto frontiers are very 
similar for the low LCC costs.    As Figure 85 shows, the LOR mission mode has the 
least expensive solutions of the 3 mission modes.  This low cost is attributed to the low 
mass the of the LOR architecture when compared with the Direct architecture that must 
take the entire CM to the surface of the moon.  The Direct mission, in turn, has a slightly 
higher reliability due to the use of a single pressure vessel for the crew and the fact that a 
lunar orbit rendezvous is not necessary for this mode.  As the LCC increases past $66 B 
FY2006, the Direct mode becomes the most optimal solution.  Unfortunately, due to the 
nature of the two mission modes, both modes can not be pursued concurrently.  
Therefore, the decision maker must decide whether the budget is likely to be greater than 
or less than the $66 B crossover.  If the budget is likely to be higher the Direct mission 
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Figure 85: Zoomed in Comparison of Pareto Frontiers for Apollo LOR and Direct 
 
This combination of mission modes shows the decision maker exactly how each mission 
mode’s optimal solution changes with increasing LCC.  The mission mode can be chosen 
based upon the projected budget of the project.  This result verifies the Apollo decision 
maker’s solution in the early 1960s.  The Apollo LOR mission has the lowest cost for a 
similar reliability to the direct missions for the low cost solutions. 
 This combination of Pareto frontiers can also be completed for the LOC safety for 
the various Apollo lunar architectures.  As noted in Chapter 5, these LOC safety numbers 
are not optimized, but rather based upon the optimal LOM solutions.  A summary of the 
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Figure 86: Mission Mode Selection for Apollo Lunar Architectures LOC 
 
This LOC solution is very different than the LOM solution presented as Figure 84.  In 
this model, the difference between the LOC solutions and the LOM solutions is mainly in 
the EOR architecture.  The drastic increase in the LOC over the LOM of the EOR 
architecture is due to the unmanned launch of the Saturn V-like launch vehicle.  The 
launch vehicle is the lowest reliability system in all of the Apollo lunar architectures.  
The EOR system requires two of these low reliability launches; and, therefore the 
reliability of the system is decreased.  The LOC safety of each of the missions is not as 
greatly affected by the launch vehicle due to the crew abort systems, which exist on all 
crewed launch vehicles considered.  Also, the cargo launch of the EOR system has very 
little impact on the LOC of the system since the cargo launch carries a tanker and 
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therefore decreases the safety of the system due to the rendezvous of the tanker and the 
spacecraft stack in LEO.  This affect is somewhat mitigated by the smaller launch vehicle 
of the EOR architecture when compared with the Direct architecture.   
 The resulting safety solutions of Figure 86 show that the EOR, although closer 
than the LOM, still is never the ideal solution for the Apollo system.  The LOR is again 
the solution for the lowest cost system.  As the LCC increases, the safety solution quickly 
changes to the Direct mission.  This is because of the low safety associated with two 
habitats and the lunar orbit rendezvous.  It can be argued that the two habitats actually 
increase the reliability of the system due to the lifeboat nature of the second habitat.  The 
fact that the CM is a single habitat that is taken to the surface results in a system that is 
designed to be robust and more survivable than a smaller, lower margin habitat on the 
LM. 
6.2 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS APPLIED TO ARCHITECTURE SELECTION 
The lunar mode selection problem is similar to the lunar architecture selection 
problem in that uncertainty can be applied to the systems to determine the ideal solution 
with uncertainty bands on the mission modes.  As with the individual Pareto frontiers, the 
90% and 10% confidence bands will be applied to the lunar architecture modes to 
determine the best and the worst case scenarios.    As with the original Pareto frontiers, 
triangular distributions were placed on the subsystem reliabilities and catastrophic engine 
failure rates.  A Monte Carlo simulation was then completed on the models by running 
10,000 points for each element in the optimized architecture.  The 10% confidence 
solution is defined as the design point where 10% of the costs are below and 10% of the 
reliabilities are higher.  This is considered the best case solution.  The 90% confidence 
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solution is defined as the design point where 90% of the costs are below and 90% of the 
reliabilities are above the baseline.  This is considered the worst case solution.  These 
uncertainties can be plotted with the baseline solutions to determine the most robust lunar 
mode solution with respect to uncertainty.  The best case scenarios for LOM are 
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Figure 87: Best Case LOM Scenario for Apollo Lunar Modes 
 
As this figure shows, the best case scenario solution is very similar to the baseline 
solution.  The costs are significantly lower and the reliabilities are higher but the relative 
answers between the different mission modes are the same.  The lowest cost solution is 
still the LOR and the Direct solution quickly overtakes the LOR as the LCC increases 
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past $64 Billion.  This is slightly lower than the $67 Billion of the baseline mission.  The 
worst case scenario is also similar in trends to the baseline solution.  The worst case 
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Figure 88: Worst Case LOM Scenarios for Apollo Mission Modes 
 
As noted for the best case scenario, the worst case scenarios have the same trends as the 
baseline mission mode selections.  The crossover point for the Direct and LOR missions 




Table 62: Comparison of Crossover Points for Apollo LOR and Direct Mission Modes 
 LCC Reliability 
Best Case $64,628 0.5985 
Worst Case $67,445 0.5807 
Baseline $65,684 0.5896 
 
 
As this table shows, the crossover point changes slightly due the Monte Carlo uncertainty 
calculations.   
Due to the small differences between the LOR and Direct mission modes, the 
combination of the best and worst case scenarios can be a useful selection tool for the 
selection of the mission modes.  If the uncertainty bands overlap a definitive selection 
cannot be made between the modes.  A summary of these mission mode comparisons 
based upon uncertainty is given as Figure 89.  As this figure shows, the uncertainty bands 
for LOR and Direct overlap for the low LCC solutions.  This shows that both LOR and 
Direct are equally good solutions for the low cost mission.  As the LCC increases, the 
Direct mission becomes significantly higher than the LOR mission.  Therefore as the 
LCC increases past $ 90 B the Direct worst case scenario has a higher solution than even 
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Figure 89: Uncertainty Bands for Apollo Mission Mode Selections 
 
The same analysis can be completed for the best and worst case scenarios for the 
LOC for the Apollo mission modes.  This analysis is completed based upon a Monte 
Carlo simulation of 10,000 runs of each element in the optimized Pareto frontier 
solutions.   This simulation is actually the same as the LOM simulation since the LOC 
numbers are based upon the reliabilities of the subsystems and the different 
configurations in the ROSETTA models.  A summary of the best and worst case 
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Figure 90: Comparison of Uncertainty Bands for LOC of Apollo Mission Modes 
 
As this figure shows, the LOR mission safety is still the only low cost solution for 
optimal points.  As the LCC increases, the Direct mission mode and the LOR overlap and 
therefore either mission mode can be selected.  As the LCC increases, the Direct becomes 
the clear LOC solution from $75 B to $100 B range.  As the LCC increase past $100 B, 
both the EOR and Direct mission modes uncertainties make either mode a viable solution 
for the optimal Pareto frontiers.  The Direct mode is very flat from the $100 B LCC range 
and up.  The configuration elements change but the optimal LOC solution is then driven 





6.3 LUNAR MODE SELECTION VIA PARETO FRONTIERS 
As described in the previous sections, different mission modes can be evaluated 
via the combination of the Pareto frontiers.  These Pareto frontiers can then be combined 
to find the optimal mission mode for a given LCC range.  The mission mode solution 
obtained with these Pareto frontiers is very similar to the solution obtained in the 1960s 
Apollo mission mode evaluation.  The LOR architecture provides the highest LOM for 
the low cost LCC solutions.  As the LCC is increased, the mission mode solution became 
the Direct mission.  Unfortunately, the Direct mission was considered unfeasible due to 
large launch vehicle needed and the schedule constrictions of the Apollo era [7].  This 
constraint forced the EOR architecture to be considered.  This architecture had a 
significantly higher cost and lower reliability than the LOR architecture.  The 
infeasibility of the Direct mission with respect to schedule, and the low reliability and 




CHAPTER 7                                                             
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The goal of this research was to develop a lunar architecture selection tool that 
would revolutionize the design process by presenting the decision maker with the ideal 
cost and reliability solutions.  This goal was accomplished through the adaptation of the 
current design process to include fast acting parametric ROSETTA models with 
dynamically changing cost and reliability analyses.  These new parametric tools were 
then combined in an integrated framework to evaluate the optimal Pareto frontiers for a 
given lunar mode.  The developed Pareto frontiers present the optimal cost and reliability 
solutions to the decision maker without bogging down the decision maker with the 
performance details of the architecture elements. 
7.1 CONCLUSIONS 
The objectives of this research were specified in three different goals set out in 
section 1.3.  The first goal is restated below: 
 
• Goal 1: Create a methodology to bring design discriminators, such as cost and 
reliability to the forefront of the design process. 
 
This goal was accomplished by completing a survey of existing design techniques and 
adapting these techniques to create an optimal Pareto frontier of the costs and reliabilities 
of a given architecture.  These Pareto frontiers present the decision maker with the top 
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level design discriminators of cost and reliability without cluttering the decision with 
specific performance design decisions.  These design decisions are automatically chosen 
by the optimizer to find the ideal cost and reliability solutions for a given weighting on 
the overall evaluation criteria.   
 
• Goal 2: Create and validate a tool that can quickly and efficiently evaluate 
lunar architectures to provide accurate reliability and cost information 
to the decision maker. 
 
This goal was achieved through the combination of ROSETTA models and the creation 
of a dynamically changing reliability and cost analysis.  The approximation of the 
performance of each of the elements of the architectures was obtained using a response 
surface methodology of the existing legacy conceptual design tools.  The dynamically 
changing fault trees were created to accurately model the reliability and the safety of each 
of the vehicle elements as the configurations changed.  Each of these vehicles ROSETTA 
models was then combined in an integrated framework to quickly pass the performance, 
cost, and reliability variables between the different architecture elements.  A life cycle 
costing tool was also included to calculate the costs of each architecture configuration for 
a generic lunar campaign.  Once the architecture was closed for a given set of design 
variables, a genetic algorithm is used to find the optimal set of design variables for a 
given weighting on the overall evaluation criteria.  The weighting on the OEC were then 
changed to create the Pareto frontier for the given architecture mode.  A summary of this 
methodology is given as Figure 91. 
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Figure 91: Integrated Lunar Architecture Selection Tool (Revisited) 
 
This method is validated against historical lunar architectures (Apollo) as well as current 
design studies (ESAS).  The results of the tool are within 2% for the mass, reliability and 
costs of the lunar architectures.   
  
• Goal 3: Apply the tool to existing lunar architecture modes so that the optimal 
reliability  lunar mode can be evaluated for changing life cycle costs 
 
This third goal was evaluated for the three Apollo architectures considered in the 
Apollo mode selections as well as the ESAS final report architecture. A series of optimal 
Pareto solutions were found for each of the lunar architecture modes.  In each mode, a 
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Pareto frontier was found that exceeded the reliability estimates and cost goals.  A 
summary of the cost savings or reliability increases that can be obtained using this 
methodology is given as Table 63. 
 
Table 63: Differences Pareto Frontiers and Baselines 
$M LOR %Diff EOR %Diff Direct %Diff ESAS Diff 
LCC $8,958 12% $23,582 25% $22,536 26% $27, 410 32% 
LOM 0.11 21% 0.14 39% 0.15 28% 0.0274 3% 
LOC 0.08 12% 0.05 7% 0.07 9% 0.0147 2% 
 
 
As this tables shows, the cost savings to achieve the same reliability as the baseline is at 
least $8.9 B FY2004.  The reliability gains can be on the order of 20-40% for reliability 
and 7-10% for safety on the Apollo modes.  The increase in reliability and safety is 
smaller for the ESAS architecture because the ESAS system has included reliability 
analysis in the design methodology and the baseline already has a high reliability.  Cost 
savings of up to 32% over the baselines can be achieved with the application of this 
methodology.   
These point solutions do not fully convey the power of this methodology.  The 
Pareto frontier created can present the decision maker with all the possible optimal cost, 
reliability, and safety solutions.  Therefore, the decision maker is not constrained to a 
single cost solution.  All of the cost solutions for a mission mode are presented; and, 
therefore the architecture can be chosen based upon the projected budget as well as the 
current budget solution. 
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Optimizing a single lunar mode can be achieved, but this method can be 
implemented for multiple mission modes to find the ideal architecture and mission mode 
for a lunar campaign.  This method of decision making is new because it can provide the 
decision maker with a comparison of the different ideal architectures for the mission 
modes.  The ideal mission mode can then be determined from this analysis.  This was 
verified with the Apollo lunar mission mode selection results.  It was found that even 
with the new optimized solutions, the Apollo LOR has the best low LCC solutions.  The 
Apollo Direct mission becomes the optimal solution as the LCC increases.  The EOR 
solution never enters as the optimal solution.   
This mode analysis changed slightly as LOC was calculated.  For these Pareto 
frontiers, the EOR and Direct analyses had almost identical LOC numbers due to the 
commonality of the vehicles used in the architectures.  The LOR solution was only 
optimal for the minimal LCC, while the Direct mission was optimal for all LCC greater 
than $65 B. 
Uncertainty analysis is added to the Pareto frontiers to find the most robust, 
optimal solution.  This uncertainty analysis proved that at the lowest cost solutions either 
LOR or Direct could be chosen.  As the LCC increases, the Direct mission mode and the 
LOR overlap and therefore either mission mode can be selected.  As the LCC increases, 
the Direct becomes the clear LOC solution from $75 B to $100 B range.  As the LCC 
exceeds $100 B, both the EOR and Direct mission modes uncertainties make either mode 
a viable solution for the optimal Pareto frontiers.  The Direct mode is very flat from the 
$100 B LCC range and up.  The configuration elements change, but the optimal LOC 
solution is then driven to the $100 B solution. 
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In conclusion, this method can accurately and quickly evaluate lunar 
architectures.  The dynamic calculations of performance, cost, and reliability allow the 
decision maker to be presented with information about the cost and reliability of multiple 
optimal solutions.  These optimal solutions, presented as a Pareto frontier, can be used to 
select the best lunar architecture and mission mode for any design budget.  The resulting 
solutions can save between $9 and $27 B for the same reliability when compared over a 
32 flight lunar campaign.  For the same cost, this method can increase the reliability from 
3% to 28%.  These reliability numbers are somewhat misleading due to the high 
reliability of the ESAS architecture.  The 3% reliability increase for the ESAS LOM 
translates into a 48% decrease in the failure rate of the ESAS architecture. 
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
This methodology produced a series of ideal solutions for different lunar 
architectures.  These solutions, presented as a Pareto Frontier, allow the decision maker 
to view the ideal reliability as a function of the life cycle cost of the system.  This 
methodology was verified and validated against the Apollo mission modes and the ESAS 
final mission mode.  Although successful, there are certain areas of this process that can 
be improved.  These improvements are enumerated below: 
 
• Evaluate other potential lunar campaigns. 
 
Although the ESAS and each of the Apollo mission modes were considered in 
this research, there are plenty of other potential candidate campaigns to consider for 
future lunar initiatives.  This includes changing the number of crew and lunar stay 
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durations to evaluate which lunar campaign could provide the lowest cost and highest 
reliability for other lunar campaigns. 
 
• Include safety in the overall evaluation criteria and optimize. 
 
This improvement would add a third axis to the lunar architecture selection tool.  
For this research, LOC was treated as a byproduct of the reliability of the system.  This 
method worked well for the architectures considered, but as the lunar campaigns and 
lunar architectures become more exotic, it may become necessary to optimize with LOC 
included in the OEC.  This addition would add a third axis to the Pareto frontiers and 
would somewhat complicate the presentation to the decision maker.  Because of this 
complication, the inclusion of safety in the optimization should only be considered if it 
adds to the information the decision maker needs to choose an ideal architecture.   
 
• Evaluate the scientific benefit of a lunar architecture. 
 
This improvement would add a second layer to the lunar architecture selection 
tool.  The scientific benefit of a mission can be treated as a benefit of the lunar campaign 
which would allow the architecture level variables to be traded based upon increasing the 
scientific benefit with cost, safety, and reliability as constraints.   This would allow the 
scientific benefit to be optimized, while the Pareto frontiers created in this analysis can be 
treated as constraints. 
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• Add the time value of money to the life cycle cost calculator 
 
This simple addition to the method would allow the different funding profiles to 
be compared.  The timeframe of the investments would affect the selection of the ideal 
lunar architecture.    Although this did not affect the lunar architectures evaluated in this 
research, other architectures could have competing DDT&E and TFU costs.  This 
improvement would account for the difference between high DDT&E and high TFU 
architectures. 
 
• Add a operations cost model to the ROSETTA models 
 
This improvement to the cost model would complete the life cycle costing model.    
This improvement will allow the total costs of the lunar architecture to be calculated.  
This change will allow the cost model to include facility changes and workforce changes 
necessary to implement the lunar architecture. 
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APPENDIX A 
Lunar Architecture Tool Simulation Results 
 
Rel 90% Rel 80% Rel 70% Rel 60% Rel 50% Rel 40% Rel 30% Rel 20% Rel 10% Rel Cost Apollo
Structure Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al 
RCS Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic
Avionics Red 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
ECLSS Red 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power Red 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parachute Red 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Propellant Type LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 Hypergolic LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 Hypergolic
Engine Type Expander Expander Pressure Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Structure Type Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al 
Engine Red 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power Red 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pressurant Mat Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Al 
Ascent Fuel Type Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic
Descent Fuel Type LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 Hypergolic LOX/CH4 Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic
T/W LS 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
T/W LLO 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Engine Red Ascent 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Engine Red Descent 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AR Ascent 75 75 75 75 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 75
AR Descent 75 75 150 150 150 139.2857143 150 128.5714286 128.5714286 128.5714286 139.2857143 75
Ascent Engine Cycle Type Pressure Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Descent Engine Cycle Type Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Pressurant Mat Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti GrEp Ti
Structure Type Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al 
Stage 1 Engine Type Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Gas Gen
Stage 1 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1
Stage 1 Structure Type Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al 
Stage 2 Engine Type Gas Gen Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Gas Gen
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2
Stage 2 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al 
Stage 3 Engine Type Gas Gen Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Staged-Comb Gas Gen
Stage 3 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2
Stage 3 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al 
Stage 1 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Stage 2 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Stage 3 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gross Mass 7,738 7,972 7,972 7,972 7,201 6,638 6,638 6,024 6,024 6,024 5,987 6024
Dry Mass 6,747 6,977 6,977 6,977 6,220 5,776 5,776 5,174 5,174 5,174 5,168 5174
DDTE 9,958 9,535 9,535 9,535 9,012 8,686 8,686 6,259 6,259 6,259 6,255 6259
TFU 231 204 204 204 188 163 163 140 140 140 140 140
Total Cost 10,190 9,740 9,740 9,740 9,200 8,849 8,849 6,399 6,399 6,399 6,395 6399
CB LOV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CB LOC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CB DDTE 9,958 9,535 9,535 9,535 9,012 8,686 8,686 6,259 6,259 6,259 6,255 6259
CB TFU 231 204 204 204 188 163 163 140 140 140 140 140
Gross Mass 26,507 27,720 31,191 20,575 19,280 18,866 14,505 14,169 14,169 14,169 14,025 24917
Dry Mass 7,727 8,266 7,952 4,758 4,653 4,629 4,327 4,302 4,302 4,302 4,239 5523
DDTE 6,238 5,356 5,426 4,365 4,343 4,333 4,278 4,268 4,268 4,268 4,257 4514
TFU 260 164 195 123 122 121 121 120 120 120 119 169
Total Cost 6,498 5,520 5,622 4,489 4,465 4,454 4,399 4,389 4,389 4,389 4,376 4682
CB LOV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CB LOC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CB DDTE 6,238 5,356 5,426 4,365 4,343 4,333 4,278 4,268 4,268 4,268 4,257 4514
CB TFU 260 164 195 123 122 121 121 120 120 120 119 169
Gross Mass 14,337 14,201 12,929 12,929 11,708 12,199 11,708 12,213 12,213 12,213 12,154 16183
Dry Mass 4,055 4,231 3,676 3,676 3,349 3,223 3,349 3,221 3,221 3,221 3,204 4216
DDTE 11,036 7,015 6,567 6,567 6,249 5,655 6,249 5,653 5,653 5,653 5,645 6639
TFU 1,278 665 640 640 615 609 615 609 609 609 608 733
Total Cost 12,314 7,681 7,207 7,207 6,863 6,264 6,863 6,262 6,262 6,262 6,253 7372
CB LOV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CB LOC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CB DDTE 11,036 7,015 6,567 6,567 6,249 5,655 6,249 5,653 5,653 5,653 5,645 6639
CB TFU 1,278 665 640 640 615 609 615 609 609 609 608 733
Gross Mass 5,329,494 4,260,028 3,640,152 2,359,303 2,210,576 2,793,673 2,488,652 2,445,466 2,445,466 2,414,226 2,380,747 2936359
Dry Mass 286,762 248,176 235,181 175,115 166,811 187,047 170,140 167,924 167,924 157,910 155,019 181532
DDTE 29,125 15,039 14,201 13,555 13,241 12,870 12,552 12,401 12,401 12,385 12,347 13746
TFU 2,507 978 883 815 794 776 738 733 733 713 704 832
Total Cost 31,632 16,017 15,084 14,370 14,035 13,646 13,290 13,134 13,134 13,098 13,051 14578
CB LOV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CB LOC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CB DDTE 29,125 15,039 14,201 13,555 13,241 12,870 12,552 12,401 12,401 12,385 12,347 13746
CB TFU 2,507 978 883 815 794 776 738 733 733 713 704 832
Gross Mass 48,582 49,893 52,093 41,476 38,189 37,703 32,851 32,407 32,407 32,407 32,166 47125
Dry Mass 18,529 19,474 18,605 15,411 14,222 13,628 13,452 12,697 12,697 12,697 12,612 14913
DDTE 56,358 36,946 35,729 34,023 32,844 31,543 31,764 28,581 28,581 28,565 28,504 31158
TFU 4,276 2,011 1,923 1,783 1,719 1,670 1,637 1,603 1,603 1,583 1,571 1874
Total Cost 60,634 38,957 37,653 35,805 34,563 33,213 33,401 30,184 30,184 30,149 30,075 33031
CB LOV 0.6588 0.6534 0.6479 0.6382 0.6300 0.6194 0.6130 0.5599 0.5599 0.5356 0.4939 0.5245
CB LOC 0.7830 0.7803 0.7782 0.7702 0.7619 0.7465 0.7430 0.6786 0.6786 0.6786 0.6515 0.6900
CB DDTE 56,358 36,946 35,729 34,023 32,844 31,543 31,764 28,581 28,581 28,565 28,504 31158
CB TFU 4,276 2,011 1,923 1,783 1,719 1,670 1,637 1,603 1,603 1,583 1,571 1874
Average/Yr 150,048 81,017 77,869 73,085 70,510 68,130 67,633 63,701 63,701 63,253 62,925 72210















Figure 92: Simulation Outputs for Apollo LOR Architecture 
240 
Rel 90% Rel 80% Rel 70% Rel 60% Rel 50% Rel 40% Rel 30% Rel 20% Rel 10% Rel Cost Apollo
Structure Ti Ti Al-Li Al-Li Ti Ti Al Al Al Al AL Al
RCS Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic LOX/LH2 Hypergolic
Avionics Red 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ECLSS Red 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power Red 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parachute Red 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Propellant Type LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 Hypergolic
Engine Type Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Structure Type Ti Ti Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Engine Red 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power Red 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pressurant Mat Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Ti
Ascent Fuel Type Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic
Descent Fuel Type Hypergolic LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic
T/W LS 2.857142857 2.714285714 2.142857143 2.714285714 2.714285714 2.857142857 2 2.142857143 2.428571429 2.714285714 2.428571429 2.1
T/W LLO 2 2 2.428571429 2.428571429 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.85
Engine Red Ascent 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
Engine Red Descent 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AR Ascent 117.8571429 128.5714286 117.8571429 128.5714286 96.42857143 85.71428571 139.2857143 85.71428571 75 85.71428571 96.42857143 75
AR Descent 85.71428571 75 96.42857143 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
Ascent Engine Cycle Type Pressure Expander Pressure Pressure Pressure Pressure Pressure Expander Expander Pressure Pressure Pressure
Descent Engine Cycle Type Pressure Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Pressurant Mat Ti Ti Al-Li Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Gr-Ep Ti
Structural Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Stage 1 Engine Type Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Gas Gen
Stage 1 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1
Stage 1 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Stage 2 Engine Type Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2
Stage 2 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Stage 3 Engine Type Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen
Stage 3 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2
Stage 3 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al-Li Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al AL Al
Stage 1 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Stage 2 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Stage 3 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Fuel Type Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic LOX/LH2
Engine Red 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AR 75 139.2857143 139.2857143 139.2857143 128.5714286 150 139.2857143 150 150 150 150 75
Engine cycle Type Pressure Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander
Tank Material Ti Ti Al Ti Al-Li Ti Al-Li Ti Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Al
Pressurant Mat Ti Ti Al Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Ti
Structural Material Al-Li Al Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
T/W 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.85
Gross Mass 8259 8259 8556 7785 6203 6203 6661 6661 6661 6661 6621 6661
Dry Mass 7078 7078 7369 6612 5259 5259 5709 5709 5709 5709 5703 5709
DDTE 10759 10759 10443 9904 7260 7260 6738 6738 6738 6738 6734 6738
TFU 334 334 305 288 226 226 197 197 197 197 197 197
Total Cost 11093 11093 10748 10192 7486 7486 6935 6935 6935 6935 6931 6935
CB LOV 0.9756 0.9756 0.9756 0.9685 0.9311 0.9311 0.9311 0.9311 0.9311 0.9311 0.9045 0.9311
CB LOC 0.9778 0.9778 0.9778 0.9728 0.9352 0.9352 0.9352 0.9352 0.9352 0.9352 0.9085 0.9352
CB DDTE 10759 10759 10443 9904 7260 7260 6738 6738 6738 6738 6734 6738
CB TFU 334 334 305 288 226 226 197 197 197 197 197 197
Gross Mass 33527 29771 21751 17506 14993 14993 15721 15721 15721 15535 15471 35972
Dry Mass 6019 4733 4589 3181 2984 2984 3041 3041 3041 2960 2955 5241
DDTE 6900 6666 4868 4192 4118 4118 4140 4140 4140 4113 4111 4818
TFU 272 259 156 131 127 127 128 128 128 127 126 196
Total Cost 7172 6925 5024 4323 4245 4245 4268 4268 4268 4240 4238 5013
CB LOV 0.9255 0.9248 0.9122 0.9049 0.9049 0.9049 0.9049 0.9049 0.9049 0.8968 0.8968 0.9062
CB LOC 0.9262 0.9257 0.9137 0.9063 0.9063 0.9063 0.9063 0.9063 0.9063 0.9001 0.9001 0.9106
CB DDTE 6900 6666 4868 4192 4118 4118 4140 4140 4140 4113 4111 4818
CB TFU 272 259 156 131 127 127 128 128 128 127 126 196
Gross Mass 16938 13968 10311 8928 7383 7383 8157 8157 8157 8110 8062 15278
Dry Mass 7119 6280 4170 3631 2949 2949 3013 3013 3013 2998 2976 5728
DDTE 10631 3924 3032 2827 2498 2498 1885 1885 1885 1880 1872 3720
TFU 1167 293 229 211 187 187 189 189 189 188 187 367
Total Cost 11798 4217 3261 3038 2685 2685 2073 2073 2073 2068 2059 4087
CB LOV 0.9417 0.9419 0.9400 0.9401 0.9402 0.9402 0.9329 0.9329 0.9329 0.9329 0.9300 0.9393
CB LOC 0.9429 0.9431 0.9412 0.9413 0.9414 0.9414 0.9342 0.9342 0.9342 0.9342 0.9319 0.9405
CB DDTE 10631 3924 3032 2827 2498 2498 1885 1885 1885 1880 1872 3720
CB TFU 1167 293 229 211 187 187 189 189 189 188 187 367
Gross Mass 133418 91616 72369 60201 50786 47374 50954 50577 50100 49512 49264 74140
Dry Mass 13307 6732 5684 4518 3950 2649 2916 2802 2607 2504 2493 8853
DDTE 6219 3695 3537 3232 3092 2831 2890 2876 2846 2829 2826 5206
TFU 565 286 275 242 230 207 213 211 207 205 205 337
Total Cost 6784 3982 3812 3475 3322 3038 3104 3087 3053 3034 3031 5543
CB LOV 0.9591 0.9569 0.9570 0.9570 0.9571 0.9501 0.9501 0.9501 0.9425 0.9395 0.9395 0.9279
CB LOC 0.9604 0.9582 0.9582 0.9583 0.9583 0.9514 0.9513 0.9513 0.9452 0.9429 0.9429 0.9291
CB DDTE 6219 3695 3537 3232 3092 2831 2890 2876 2846 2829 2826 5206
CB TFU 565 286 275 242 230 207 213 211 207 205 205 337
Gross Mass 8724376 8100356 5031056 4331577 3074900 2913590 2113502 2081057 2071646 2055390 2021369 3849397
Dry Mass 645874 608225 440578 377518 316705 306963 292048 287942 286759 284716 277392 439663
DDTE 33724 18375 15527 14378 12977 12728 12896 12852 12839 12817 12782 14881
TFU 3172 1447 1087 977 846 818 814 799 798 795 771 1006
Total Cost 36896 19822 16614 15355 13824 13546 13710 13651 13637 13613 13552 15887
CB LOV 0.8417 0.8418 0.8375 0.8365 0.8306 0.8307 0.8269 0.8202 0.8202 0.8202 0.7106 0.7301
CB LOC 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9997 0.9998
CB DDTE 33724 18375 15527 14378 12977 12728 12896 12852 12839 12817 12782 14881
CB TFU 3172 1447 1087 977 846 818 814 799 798 795 771 1006
Gross Mass 8536802 7929654 4905514 4226081 2985351 2827655 2072360 2040715 2031547 2015710 1981906 3781758
Dry Mass 313429 305302 210040 183066 151577 148321 156854 153951 153494 152704 146033 224547
DDTE 5211 2545 2346 2287 1982 1972 2183 2177 2175 2172 2170 2396
TFU 3076 1382 1030 924 800 772 753 749 748 745 721 944
Total Cost 8287 3927 3376 3211 2781 2744 2936 2926 2923 2917 2891 3341
CB LOV 0.7590 0.7591 0.7558 0.7549 0.7495 0.7496 0.7469 0.7470 0.7470 0.7470 0.6471 0.6653
CB LOC 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9997 0.9998
CB DDTE 5211 2545 2346 2287 1982 1972 2183 2177 2175 2172 2170 2396
CB TFU 3076 1382 1030 924 800 772 753 749 748 745 721 944
Gross Mass 192143 143614 112987 94419 79364 75952 81494 81117 80641 79818 79418 132051
Dry Mass 33524 24823 21813 17942 15141 13840 14679 14564 14369 14171 14127 25532
DDTE 73444 45964 39753 36820 31926 31406 30732 30667 30623 30550 30495 37759
TFU 8586 4002 3082 2774 2416 2337 2295 2273 2266 2258 2207 3046
Total Cost 82030 49966 42835 39594 34342 33743 33027 32940 32889 32807 32702 40806
CB LOV 0.5210 0.5196 0.5068 0.4979 0.4720 0.4687 0.4612 0.4575 0.4539 0.4484 0.3259 0.3572
CB LOC 0.8198 0.8177 0.8055 0.7950 0.7644 0.7589 0.7530 0.7530 0.7481 0.7412 0.7182 0.7438
CB DDTE 73444 45964 39753 36820 31926 31406 30732 30667 30623 30550 30495 37759
CB TFU 8586 4002 3082 2774 2416 2337 2295 2273 2266 2258 2207 3046
Average/Yr 237202 122455 98789 89956 78229 76203 74700 74225 74049 73811 72811 96392
OEC 1.4584 1.3877 1.3300 1.2971 1.2923 1.2885 1.2907 1.2933 1.2947 1.3009 1.3239 1.0000  
Figure 93: Simulation Outputs for Apollo EOR Architecture 
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Rel 90% Rel 80% Rel 70% Rel 50% Rel 30% Rel 20% Rel 15% Rel 10% Rel Cost DIR
Structure Al-Li Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
RCS Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic LOX/LH2 Hypergolic
Avionics Red 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ECLSS Red 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power Red 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parachute Red 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Propellant Type LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 Hypergolic
Engine Type Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Structure Type Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Engine Red 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power Red 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pressurant Mat Ti TI Ti Ti Ti Ti Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Ti
Ascent Fuel Type Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic
Descent Fuel Type Hypergolic LOX/LH2 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic
T/W LS 2.428571429 2 2 2.428571429 3 2.857142857 2.714285714 2 2 2 2.1
T/W LLO 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.85
Engine Red Ascent 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Engine Red Descent 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AR Ascent 107.1428571 117.8571429 128.5714286 150 96.42857143 85.71428571 128.5714286 150 96.42857143 107.1428571 75
AR Descent 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
Ascent Engine Cycle Type Expander Pressure Pressure Pressure Expander Pressure Pressure Pressure Pressure Pressure Pressure
Descent Engine Cycle Type Pressure Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Pressurant Mat Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Gr-Ep Ti
Structural Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Stage 1 Engine Type Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Gas Gen
Stage 1 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1
Stage 1 Structure Type Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Stage 2 Engine Type Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Gas Gen
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2
Stage 2 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Stage 3 Engine Type Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Gas Gen
Stage 3 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2
Stage 3 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Stage 1 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Stage 2 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Stage 3 Engine Out 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fuel Type Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2
Engine Red 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AR 75 139.2857143 128.5714286 150 150 150 150 139.2857143 139.2857143 139.2857143 75
Engine cycle Type Pressure Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander
Tank Material Al-Li Al-Li Ti Ti Ti Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Al
Pressurant Mat Ti Ti Ti Ti Ti Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Gr-Ep Ti
Structural Material Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
T/W 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.85
Gross Mass 8556 8556 7947 6661 6661 6661 6661 6661 6661 6621 6661
Dry Mass 7369 7369 6772 5709 5709 5709 5709 5709 5709 5703 5709
DDTE 10443 10443 9648 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6734 6738
TFU 305 305 280 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197
Total Cost 10748 10748 9928 6935 6935 6935 6935 6935 6935 6931 6935
CB LOV 0.9756 0.9756 0.9685 0.9311 0.9311 0.9311 0.9311 0.9311 0.9311 0.9045 0.9311
CB LOC 0.9778 0.9778 0.9728 0.9352 0.9352 0.9352 0.9352 0.9352 0.9352 0.9085 0.9352
CB DDTE 10443 10443 9648 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6738 6734 6738
CB TFU 305 305 280 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197
Gross Mass 34324 31593 17764 15721 15721 15721 15535 15535 15535 15471 35972
Dry Mass 6097 5162 3202 3041 3041 3041 2960 2960 2960 2955 5241
DDTE 6935 4980 4199 4140 4140 4140 4113 4113 4113 4111 4818
TFU 274 160 131 128 128 128 127 127 127 126 196
Total Cost 7209 5139 4331 4268 4268 4268 4240 4240 4240 4238 5013
CB LOV 0.9255 0.9229 0.9049 0.9049 0.9049 0.9049 0.8968 0.8968 0.8968 0.8968 0.9062
CB LOC 0.9261 0.9242 0.9063 0.9063 0.9063 0.9063 0.9001 0.9001 0.9001 0.9001 0.9106
CB DDTE 6935 4980 4199 4140 4140 4140 4113 4113 4113 4111 4818
CB TFU 274 160 131 128 128 128 127 127 127 126 196
Gross Mass 17240 13215 8925 7774 8157 8157 8110 8110 8110 8062 15278
Dry Mass 7128 6683 3496 3080 3013 3013 2998 2998 2998 2976 5728
DDTE 10623 4184 2736 2547 1885 1885 1880 1880 1880 1872 3720
TFU 1170 307 206 192 189 189 188 188 188 187 367
Total Cost 11793 4492 2942 2738 2073 2073 2068 2068 2068 2059 4087
CB LOV 0.9417 0.9414 0.9401 0.9401 0.9329 0.9329 0.9329 0.9329 0.9329 0.9300 0.9393
CB LOC 0.9429 0.9427 0.9413 0.9414 0.9342 0.9342 0.9342 0.9342 0.9342 0.9319 0.9405
CB DDTE 10623 4184 2736 2547 1885 1885 1880 1880 1880 1872 3720
CB TFU 1170 307 206 192 189 189 188 188 188 187 367
Gross Mass 14709218 10598487 5944936 5093617 5025403 4990127 4958677 4182452 4148985 4108484 7146468
Dry Mass 724982 553545 351301 306766 300879 299044 297409 256099 245371 241959 398597
DDTE 40146 19237 15962 14859 14806 14778 14753 14046 14034 13997 17627
TFU 4118 1539 1138 1050 1036 1033 1030 953 933 923 1335
Total Cost 44263 20775 17101 15909 15842 15811 15783 14999 14967 14920 18962
CB LOV 0.8408 0.8360 0.8301 0.8293 0.8240 0.8241 0.8241 0.8246 0.7674 0.7229 0.7228
CB LOC 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9997 0.9997
CB DDTE 40146 19237 15962 14859 14806 14778 14753 14046 14034 13997 17627
CB TFU 4118 1539 1138 1050 1036 1033 1030 953 933 923 1335
Gross Mass 141168 94852 61013 49949 50577 49890 49512 35446 35446 35272 74140
Dry Mass 15340 7227 4532 2772 2802 2521 2504 3643 3643 3628 8853
DDTE 8129 3766 3237 2867 2876 2834 2829 4145 4145 4139 5206
TFU 814 295 243 210 211 206 205 239 239 238 337
Total Cost 8943 4061 3479 3077 3087 3040 3034 4383 4383 4378 5543
CB LOV 0.9591 0.9569 0.9570 0.9501 0.9501 0.9395 0.9395 0.9178 0.9178 0.9178 0.9279
CB LOC 0.9604 0.9581 0.9583 0.9513 0.9513 0.9429 0.9429 0.9211 0.9211 0.9211 0.9291
CB DDTE 8129 3766 3237 2867 2876 2834 2829 4145 4145 4139 5206
CB TFU 814 295 243 210 211 206 205 239 239 238 337
Gross Mass 201,288 148,215 95,649 80,106 81,117 80,430 79,818 65,753 65,753 65,426 132,051
Dry Mass 35,933 26,441 18,001 14,602 14,564 14,283 14,171 15,310 15,310 15,262 25,532
DDTE 76,276 42,611 35,782 31,150 30,444 30,375 30,314 30,922 30,910 30,853 38,109
TFU 6,681 2,605 1,998 1,777 1,761 1,752 1,747 1,703 1,683 1,671 2,431
Total Cost 82,957 45,216 37,781 32,927 32,205 32,127 32,060 32,626 32,593 32,525 40,540
CB LOV 0.685723236 0.678090393 0.65450267 0.62409808 0.615382376 0.608539166 0.603097675 0.58955934 0.548621068 0.50043277 0.53151
CB LOC 0.819948047 0.816116467 0.795140729 0.758929184 0.753106689 0.746434517 0.741348882 0.724232428 0.724190765 0.701764489 0.743957
CB DDTE 76,276 42,611 35,782 31,150 30,444 30,375 30,314 30,922 30,910 30,853 38,109
CB TFU 6,681 2,605 1,998 1,777 1,761 1,752 1,747 1,703 1,683 1,671 2,431
Total LCC 213,334 96,055 76,781 67,605 66,567 66,323 66,150 65,864 65,438 65,143 87,975
























Rel 99% Rel 95% Rel 90% Rel 80% Rel 70% Rel 60% Rel 50% Rel 40% Rel 30% Rel 20% Rel 10% Rel Cost ESAS
Structure Ti Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
Avionics Red 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ECLSS Red 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power Red 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parachute Red 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Propellant Type LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/CH4
Engine Type Pressure Pump Pump Pump Pump Pump Pump Pump Pump Pump Pump Pump Pump Pressure
Structure Type Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al GrEp
Engine Red 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power Red 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pressurant Mat Ti Ti Ti GrEp MMC MMC MMC MMC MMC MMC MMC MMC MMC GrEp
Ascent Fuel Type LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 Hypergolic LOX/CH4 Hypergolic Hypergolic LOX/CH4
Descent Fuel Type LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 LOX/CH4 Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic Hypergolic LOX/CH4 Hypergolic LOX/CH4 Hypergolic LOX/LH2
T/W LS 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.1
T/W LLO 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4.5
Engine Red Ascent 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Engine Red Descent 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
AR Ascent 75 96.42857143 75 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 139.2857143 150
AR Descent 117.8571429 150 150 150 150 150 96.42857143 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Ascent Engine Cycle Type Pressure Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Descent Engine Cycle Type Pressure Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Expander Pressure
Tank Material Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al GrEp
Crew Compartment Mat Al Al-Li GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp
Pressurant Mat Ti Al Ti GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp GrEp
Structure Type Al-Li Al-Li Al-Li Al-Li Al-Li Al-Li Al-Li Al-Li Al-Li Al-Li Al-Li Al-Li Al-Li GrEp
Stage 2 Engine Type Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2
Stage 2 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al
EO 2nd Stage 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stage 1 Engine Type Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb
Stage 1 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2
Stage 1 Structure Type Ti Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al-Li
Stage 2 Engine Type Gas Gen Gas Gen Gas Gen Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Staged Comb Gas Gen
Stage 2 Propellant Type LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2 LOX/LH3 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/RP1 LOX/LH2
Stage 2 Structure Type Ti Al-Li Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al Al-Li
EO 1st Stage 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EO 2nd Stage 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gross Mass 11124 12176 9526 9526 9526 9526 9526 9526 9526 9526 9526 9526 9526 9526
Dry Mass 9409 10441 8085 8085 8085 8085 8085 8085 8085 8085 8085 8085 8085 8085
DDTE 10501 7278 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356
TFU 391 287 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191
Total Cost 10891 7565 5547 5547 5547 5547 5547 5547 5547 5547 5547 5547 5547 5547
CB LOV 0.9978 0.9978 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957
CB LOC 0.9978 0.9978 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957 0.9957
CB DDTE 10501 7278 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356
CB TFU 391 287 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191
Gross Mass 31202 19440 13197 9693 9216 9216 9216 9216 9216 9216 9216 9216 9216 13668
Dry Mass 14117 6672 4014 3302 2982 2982 2982 2982 2982 2982 2982 2982 2982 4295
DDTE 9954 4083 3336 2972 2914 2914 2914 2914 2914 2914 2914 2914 2914 5407
TFU 771 128 96 89 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 337
Total Cost 10724 4211 3432 3062 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 5744
CB LOV 0.9905 0.9901 0.9891 0.9857 0.9846 0.9846 0.9846 0.9846 0.9846 0.9846 0.9846 0.9846 0.9846 0.9884
CB LOC 0.9906 0.9901 0.9891 0.9858 0.9851 0.9851 0.9851 0.9851 0.9851 0.9851 0.9851 0.9851 0.9851 0.9888
CB DDTE 9954 4083 3336 2972 2914 2914 2914 2914 2914 2914 2914 2914 2914 5407
CB TFU 771 128 96 89 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 337
Gross Mass 130047 56006 50821 45841 45633 45786 46292 45786 45786 46073 44816 46073 46383 45180
Dry Mass 34716 11595 10875 9855 9842 9007 8982 9007 9007 9357 8613 9357 8570 11409
DDTE 9047 5595 5479 5019 5018 4848 4846 4848 4848 4463 4806 4463 4303 7014
TFU 1347 672 651 617 617 597 597 597 597 601 587 601 582 990
Total Cost 10394 6267 6130 5636 5635 5445 5444 5445 5445 5064 5393 5064 4885 8004
CB LOV 0.9876 0.9870 0.9869 0.9845 0.9845 0.9808 0.9808 0.9808 0.9808 0.9599 0.9526 0.9599 0.9383 0.9719
CB LOC 0.9876 0.9871 0.9870 0.9847 0.9847 0.9811 0.9811 0.9811 0.9811 0.9628 0.9608 0.9628 0.9464 0.9756
CB DDTE 9047 5595 5479 5019 5018 4848 4846 4848 4848 4463 4806 4463 4303 7014
CB TFU 1347 672 651 617 617 597 597 597 597 601 587 601 582 990
Gross Mass 1034432 939931 828642 890406 883289 788352 883289 883289 883289 883289 883289 883289 883289 803473
Dry Mass 114426 110918 101375 99675 99388 99057 99388 99388 99388 99388 99388 99388 99388 100502
DDTE 12336 6303 4502 3760 3727 4219 3727 3727 3727 3727 3727 3727 3727 4990
TFU 572 252 162 150 149 152 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 162
Total Cost 12907 6555 4664 3910 3876 4370 3876 3876 3876 3876 3876 3876 3876 5152
CB LOV 0.9986 0.9986 0.9978 0.9968 0.9968 0.9979 0.9968 0.9968 0.9968 0.9968 0.9968 0.9968 0.9968 0.9972
CB LOC 0.9998 0.9998 0.9997 0.9995 0.9995 0.9997 0.9995 0.9995 0.9995 0.9995 0.9995 0.9995 0.9995 0.9996
CB DDTE 12336 6303 4502 3760 3727 4219 3727 3727 3727 3727 3727 3727 3727 4990
CB TFU 572 252 162 150 149 152 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 162
Gross Mass 8124226 4938135 3727390 3699494 3683020 3655538 3595999 3579062 3579062 3588672 3546632 3588672 3599038 2861257
Dry Mass 241604 152899 112669 104662 103953 98047 93402 92731 92731 93111 91446 93111 93522 105209
DDTE 21011 8280 6836 6425 6408 6378 6307 6289 6289 6299 6255 6299 6310 9174
TFU 2221 725 583 557 555 545 528 527 527 528 523 528 529 719
Total Cost 23232 9004 7420 6982 6964 6924 6835 6816 6816 6827 6778 6827 6838 9893
CB LOV 0.9965 0.9963 0.9954 0.9952 0.9952 0.9924 0.9849 0.9849 0.9849 0.9849 0.9849 0.9849 0.9849 0.9883
CB LOC 0.9971 0.9970 0.9961 0.9959 0.9959 0.9940 0.9885 0.9885 0.9885 0.9885 0.9885 0.9885 0.9885 0.9912
CB DDTE 21011 8280 6836 6425 6408 6378 6307 6289 6289 6299 6255 6299 6310 9174
CB TFU 2221 725 583 557 555 545 528 527 527 528 523 528 529 719
Gross Mass 172,372 87,623 73,544 65,060 64,374 64,527 65,033 64,527 64,527 64,814 63,558 64,814 65,124 68,375
Dry Mass 58,242 28,708 22,975 21,242 20,910 20,075 20,050 20,075 20,075 20,425 19,681 20,425 19,638 23,790
DDTE 62,848 31,538 25,510 23,533 23,423 23,715 23,150 23,134 23,134 22,759 23,058 22,759 22,610 31,941
TFU 5,302 2,064 1,683 1,605 1,599 1,572 1,552 1,550 1,550 1,555 1,537 1,555 1,537 2,399
Total Cost 68,149 33,602 27,193 25,138 25,022 25,287 24,702 24,685 24,685 24,314 24,595 24,314 24,148 34,341
CB LOV 0.971281606 0.97012228 0.965293042 0.958569879 0.957497094 0.952267235 0.944000465 0.944014361 0.944014361 0.923893891 0.916934031 0.923893891 0.903139813 0.942682649
CB LOC 0.975945133 0.974933514 0.971690264 0.966046062 0.965389887 0.9620868 0.96192895 0.961932179 0.961932179 0.943983072 0.941956418 0.943983072 0.927850527 0.960178934
CB DDTE 62,848 31,538 25,510 23,533 23,423 23,715 23,150 23,134 23,134 22,759 23,058 22,759 22,610 31,941
CB TFU 5,302 2,064 1,683 1,605 1,599 1,572 1,552 1,550 1,550 1,555 1,537 1,555 1,537 2,399
Total LCC 179,014 76,760 62,392 58,691 58,451 58,164 57,151 57,104 57,104 56,835 56,727 56,835 56,296 84,514

























Assumed Subsystem Reliability Summary 
 
Table 64: Engine Subsystem Reliability 
Propellant Cycle Engine Reliability Source 
LOX/LH2 Pressure NA 0.95 NA 
LOX/LH2 Expander Rl-10 0.996 13 
LOX/LH2 Staged Comb SSME 0.9985 13 
LOX/LH2 Gas Gen J-2/RS-68 0.9987 13 
LOX/CH4 Pressure ESAS 0.965 13 
LOX/CH4 Expander Rl-10 Deriv 0.9974 13 
LOX/RP1 Staged Comb RD-180 0.998 NA 
LOX/RP1 Gas Gen F-1 0.999 69 
UDMH/N2O4 Pressure Apollo SPS 0.9969 69 
UDMH/N2O4 Expander NA 0.99 NA 
 
Table 65: Launch Vehicle Tank Subsystem Reliability 




Graphite Epoxy Overwrapped 0.99975 
MMC 0.999 
 
Table 66: Inspace Tank Subsystem Reliability 








Table 67: Inspace Structure Subsystem Reliability (SM & CM) 




Graphite Epoxy Overwrapped 0.99992 
MMC 0.9999 
 
Table 68: Inspace Structure Subsystem Reliability (LM) 




Graphite Epoxy Overwrapped 0.995 
MMC 0.99 
 
Table 69: RCS Subsystem Reliability 





Table 70: Command Module Other Subsystem Reliability Baseline [69]. 
Thermal Protection System 0.99996 
Primary Power 0.99954 
Electrical Conversion 0.99954 
Avionics 0.99954 
ECLSS 0.99825 
RCS Propulsion 0.99985 
Landing 0.99995 
 
Table 71: Service Module Other Subsystem Reliability Baseline [69]. 
Avionics 0.9969 
ECLSS 0.9983 
Primary Power Failure 0.9982 
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Table 72: Lunar Module Other Subsystem Reliability Baseline [69]. 
Landing Leg Failure 0.99999 
Avionics  0.98756 
Electrical Distribution 0.982 
ECLSS 0.9889 
Primary Power Failure 0.975 
Guidance and Navigation 0.9873 
 
 
Table 73: Saturn V Other Subsystem Reliability Baseline [69]. 
Avionics 0.968 
Electrical Power 0.9204 
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